Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties by Vázquez, Carlos Manuel
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2008 
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez 
Georgetown University Law Center, vazquez@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-076 
 
 




122 Harv. L. Rev. 599-695 (2008) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
  
599 
TREATIES AS LAW OF THE LAND: 
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TREATIES 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................601 
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUIVALENT TREATMENT .................................................611
A. The Supremacy Clause and the British Rule ................................................................613
B. The Purpose and Original Public Meaning of the Supremacy Clause.......................616
C. Early Judicial Construction ............................................................................................619
1. Ware v. Hylton on the Supremacy Clause’s Reversal of the British Rule ..........619
2. Foster and the Requirement of Equivalent Treatment..........................................621
D. The Contrary View............................................................................................................623
II. THE NON-SELF-EXECUTION EXCEPTION ...................................................................628
A. Four Versions of Non-Self-Execution.............................................................................629
B. Non-Self-Execution in Foster and Percheman .............................................................632
1. The Foster Conundrum..............................................................................................633
2. Intent of the U.S. Treatymakers? ..............................................................................638
3. Salvaging Foster ..........................................................................................................641
4. Percheman and the Presumption of Self-Execution ...............................................644
C. Understanding Medellín...................................................................................................646
1. The Effect of Non-Self-Execution ............................................................................648
2. The Cause of Non-Self-Execution ............................................................................651
(a) Presumption Against Self-Execution Rebuttable by  
Clear Statement that Treaty Has Domestic Legal Force .................................652
(b) Test Turning on Whether Treaty Requires Direct Judicial Enforcement ......654
(c) No Presumption .....................................................................................................656
(d) Default Rule of Self-Execution Rebuttable by Evidence of  
Intent To Require Implementing Legislation.....................................................657
(e) Test Turning on the Intent of U.S. Treatymakers .............................................658
(f) Medellín as a Nonjusticiability Case ..................................................................660
3. Interpreting Medellín..................................................................................................665
III. DECLARATIONS REGARDING SELF-EXECUTION AS MODERN-DAY 
PERCHEMAN OR MEDELLÍN STIPULATIONS .................................................................667
A. Declarations of Non-Self-Execution ..............................................................................672
1. The Case Against Validity .........................................................................................672
2. The Inadequacy of Existing Defenses ......................................................................675
3. Evaluating the Arguments Against Validity............................................................677
(a) Validity of Reservations of Non-Self-Execution................................................677
(b) Validity of Declarations of Non-Self-Execution ................................................681




TREATIES AS LAW OF THE LAND: 
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TREATIES 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez? 
Courts in recent years have perceived threshold obstacles to the enforcement of treaties 
deriving from their nature as contracts between nations that generally depend for their 
efficacy on the interest and honor of the parties, rather than on domestic adjudication.  
This approach to treaty enforcement is in tension with the Constitution’s declaration 
that treaties are part of the law of the land and its instruction to judges to give them 
effect.  The Founders understood that treaties depended on interest and honor on the 
international plane, but they made treaties enforceable in our courts anyway in order to 
avoid the international friction that could be expected to result from treaty violations 
and to capture the benefits of a reputation for treaty compliance.  The Supremacy Clause 
gives treaties a domestic judicial sanction that they would otherwise lack.  It makes 
treaties enforceable in the courts in the same circumstances as the other two categories 
of norms specified in the clause — federal statutes and the Constitution itself. 
The sole exception to this rule is for treaties that are non-self-executing in the sense 
contemplated by the Court in Foster v. Neilson.  The concept of a non-self-executing 
treaty fits uneasily with the Supremacy Clause, as reflected in the common but 
untenable view that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law.  According 
to Foster, a non-self-executing treaty is not enforceable in the courts because it is 
addressed to the political branches.  But determining which treaties are so addressed has 
been challenging.  Treaties generally leave the question of domestic implementation to 
the domestic laws of the states-parties, and our domestic law (the Supremacy Clause) 
directs judges to give them effect.  I argue that the Supremacy Clause establishes a 
default rule that treaties are directly enforceable in the courts like other laws, rebuttable 
only by a clear statement that the obligations imposed by the treaty are subject to 
legislative implementation. 
If the stipulation had to appear in the text of the treaty, the clear statement rule would 
present problems for U.S. treatymakers seeking to control the domestic consequences of 
multilateral treaties.  To address this problem, the treatymakers have developed a new 
form of clear statement, the “declaration” of non-self-execution.  However, scholars have 
questioned the compatibility of such declarations with the Supremacy Clause.  I 
conclude that the treatymakers have the power to limit the domestic effects of treaties 
through declarations of non-self-execution.  On the other hand, if the Constitution were 
understood to establish a default rule of non-self-execution, declarations of self-execution 
would stand on more tenuous ground.  Thus, a default rule of self-execution is not only 
more consistent with the constitutional text and structure and with Supreme Court 
precedent, it is also normatively attractive because it leaves the treatymakers with the 
power to control the domestic consequences of the treaties they conclude. 
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Rosenkranz, Mike Seidman, Yuval Shany, David Sloss, Peter Spiro, Paul Stephan, David Stewart, 
Ed Swaine, and Dan Tarullo, and for the excellent research assistance of Mark Herman. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Treaties are being invoked increasingly in the courts, both in cases 
connected to the “war on terror”1 and in cases that would not other-
wise be regarded as particularly international in nature.2  When con-
fronted with treaties, the courts often address as a threshold question 
whether a treaty is “judicially enforceable.”  Often, though not always, 
they will address this question in the context of deciding whether the 
treaty is “self-executing.”  The Supreme Court introduced this concept 
as the basis of an alternative holding in Foster v. Neilson3 in 1829, but, 
after disavowing its Foster holding four years later in United States v. 
Percheman,4 the Court all but abandoned the field for the next 174 
years.  In the meantime, the lower courts confessed to being con-
founded by the “self-execution” question.5  The Supreme Court reen-
tered the field last Term in Medellín v. Texas,6 its first case ever to 
deny relief solely7 on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-
self-executing.8  Although Medellín contains the Court’s first extended 
discussion of the self-execution doctrine since Percheman, the Court’s 
opinion raises more questions than it answers. 
This Article argues that our Constitution establishes a straightfor-
ward rule on this subject: the Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be 
the “supreme Law of the Land,” just as the Constitution and federal 
                                                                                                                           
 1 E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 
(2006); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al Odah v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2229 
(2008) (No. 06-1196), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/AOCert.pdf 
(presenting, inter alia, the question whether petitioners were entitled to the protection of the Ge-
neva Conventions). 
 2 E.g., Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 
(2006). 
 3 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829). 
 4 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833). 
 5 At least the more perspicacious of them.  See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 
(5th Cir. 1979) (declaring self-execution among the “most confounding” doctrines in treaty law). 
 6 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 7 As discussed infra pp. 647–48, there is some basis in the opinion for regarding the non-self-
execution rationale as an alternative basis for denying relief, as it was in Foster. 
 8 In his dissent in Medellín, Justice Breyer noted that Foster and Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. 
Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913), were the only cases in which the Supreme Court had denied relief 
on this ground.  Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 716 (1995) [here-
inafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines]).  The majority did not dispute the point.  See id. at 1366 n.12 
(majority opinion).  In the article cited by the dissent for this point, I noted that Cameron Septic 
Tank may have denied relief on non-self-execution grounds, but if so, it was ambiguous in doing 
so.  Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra, at 716 n.96.  I now regard Cameron Septic Tank as not hav-
ing based its holding on a conclusion that the treaty was non-self-executing.  The Court noted but 
did not endorse the apparent view of Congress that the relevant treaty was non-self-executing; it 
denied relief on the merits.  See Cameron Septic Tank, 227 U.S. at 50. 
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statutes are, and instructs judges to give them effect.9  By virtue of 
this clause, treaties are presumptively enforceable in court in the same 
circumstances as constitutional and statutory provisions of like con-
tent.  This requirement of equivalent treatment is subject to a single 
exception, namely, for treaties that are non-self-executing in the sense 
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson.  Foster illus-
trates only one of several ways in which a treaty might be non-self-
executing.  A treaty might be non-self-executing for constitutional rea-
sons, either because it purports to do what may only be done by stat-
ute, or because it imposes an obligation that requires the exercise of 
nonjudicial discretion.10  Foster-type non-self-execution is distinctive 
in that the need for legislative implementation derives from what the 
treaty itself has to say on the question.  I argue that the Supremacy 
Clause is best read to create a presumption that treaties are self-
executing in the Foster sense, a presumption that can be overcome 
only through a clear statement that the obligations in a particular 
treaty are subject to legislative implementation.11 
This Article’s twin claims — that the Constitution establishes a 
presumption that treaties are self-executing in the Foster sense and 
that a self-executing treaty is enforceable in the courts in the same cir-
cumstances as statutory or constitutional provisions of like content — 
are supported by the text of the Constitution and by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Percheman.  Medellín looks the other way, but is 
best understood to have found the treaty at issue non-self-executing 
because the treaty imposed an obligation that required the exercise of 
nonjudicial discretion.  So read, Medellín would be consistent with an 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause as creating a presumption that 
treaties are self-executing in the Foster sense. 
To say that treaties are to be treated by courts like statutory and 
constitutional provisions does not mean, of course, that treaty en-
forcement will always be simple.  Attempts to enforce the Constitution 
                                                                                                                           
 9 The Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 10 For further discussion of the different types of non-self-execution, see Vázquez, Four Doc-
trines, supra note 8; infra pp. 629–31. 
 11 For ease of exposition, I shall assume in this Article that a non-self-executing treaty is “ad-
dressed to” the lawmakers and that enactment of a statute is required to establish a judicially en-
forceable obligation.  I do not mean to deny, however, that a treaty may be “addressed to” the ex-
ecutive branch.  Such a treaty could be understood as a delegation of rule-making power to the 
executive.  For an argument that the treaty involved in Medellín should have been construed this 
way, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2008). 
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and federal statutes in court often generate impressive difficulties.  In 
any given case, it may be uncertain whether the person invoking the 
provision has standing to do so.  It may be uncertain whether the rem-
edy sought is appropriate.  There may be questions about whether the 
provision is sufficiently determinate to be amenable to judicial en-
forcement.12  Answering these questions in cases involving statutory or 
constitutional provisions is often difficult. 
But in cases involving treaties, the lower courts have concocted ad-
ditional obstacles to enforcement.  Consider the decision of the D.C. 
Circuit in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.13  Salim Hamdan, who had been des-
ignated for trial by military commission, argued that the procedures 
that the Secretary of Defense had established for such commissions did 
not conform to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which 
requires that any trials use procedures “recognized as indispensable” 
by civilized nations.14  Had this provision appeared in a statute, no 
court would have hesitated to enforce it.  There is little question that a 
person being subjected to particular procedures in a criminal trial has 
standing to assert a legal entitlement to better procedures.15  The court 
did not claim that the requirements of Common Article 3 were too 
vague for judicial enforcement.  To the extent that Hamdan needed a 
positive legal basis for the relief he sought (release through habeas 
corpus), the habeas statute provided such authorization, as the Court 
of Appeals correctly observed.16 
The court instead denied relief on the distinct ground — anterior to 
all of the above, and unknown in non-treaty cases — that the law 
Hamdan relied upon was not “judicially enforceable.”17  The court 
wrote: 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (consti-
tutional and statutory norms judicially enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “not ‘too vague and 
amorphous’” (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987))); Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (constitutional norms may not be judicially enforceable if there is 
a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards”). 
 13 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 14 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3 ¶ 1(d), Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
 15 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (noting that, when “the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the [government’s] action (or foregone action),” he ordinarily has 
standing to challenge it). 
 16 See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40 (“The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to 
rely on a private right of action . . . .”).  Thus, there was no need to find a private right of action 
in the treaty itself.  There would also be no need to find a private right of action in the treaty if a 
party were to invoke the treaty defensively.  For a discussion of whether the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 is constitutional insofar as it purports to preclude individuals from invoking the 
Geneva Conventions defensively in their trials before military commissions, see Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical 
Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73 (2007). 
 17 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40. 
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As a general matter, a “treaty is primarily a compact between independent 
nations,” and “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest 
and honor of the governments which are parties to it.”  If a treaty is vio-
lated, this “becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclama-
tion,” not the subject of a lawsuit.18 
Thus, without finding the treaty to be non-self-executing,19 the court 
found the treaty not to be judicially enforceable, even though a statute 
of like content clearly would have been.20  The Court of Appeals’s 
analysis closely tracked the government’s brief,21 which in turn was 
almost identical on this issue to the briefs the government has filed — 
and continues to file — in virtually every case involving treaties.22  
Numerous other lower courts confronted with treaty-based claims or 
defenses have adopted the same analysis,23 requiring a threshold show-
ing of “judicial enforceability”24 beyond what is required for statutory 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. at 38–39 (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)) (citation omitted). 
 19 The court did rely in part on dictum in a footnote of Johnson v. Eisentrager to the effect 
that “responsibility for observance and enforcement of [Geneva Convention] rights is upon politi-
cal and military authorities.”  339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950), quoted in Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39.  
Neither the Hamdan court nor the Eisentrager Court explicitly invoked the concept of non-self-
execution.  Some commentators have suggested, nevertheless, that either or both decisions were in 
reality applying the doctrine of non-self-execution.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Military 
Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 337–38 
(2007).  If so, then these cases illustrate the need for clarification of this doctrine.  The Court’s 
suggestion that the Geneva Conventions are not enforceable in domestic courts because the state 
parties to the Conventions contemplated resolving state-to-state disputes through diplomatic 
channels, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14, conflicts with the Supremacy Clause.  See infra Part 
I.  The Founders made treaties the “supreme Law of the Land” in order to avoid treaty violations 
by the United States that would trigger such state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms.  They 
were particularly concerned about triggering one such mechanism — war.  See infra p. 617. 
 20 See supra p. 603. 
 21 Compare Reply Brief for Appellants at 13, Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (No. 04-5393), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/REPLY-BRIEF.pdf (“While treaties are 
regarded as the law of the land, they ‘are not presumed to create rights that are privately enforce-
able.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th 
Cir. 1992)) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)), with Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38 (“‘Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.’  Even so, this country has traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that 
they do not create judicially enforceable individual rights.” (citation omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2)). 
 22 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 30–34, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 
05-184), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_184/briefs/Respondent 
%27s%20Brief.pdf; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellees at 5–7, Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-56202), 
2006 WL 3623163. 
 23 See, e.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 826–29 (11th Cir. 2008); Mora v. New York, 524 
F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 863; Cardenas v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 244, 253 (5th Cir. 
2005) (alternative holding); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jimenez-
Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195–98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60–62 (1st Cir. 2000); 
State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 274 (N.M. 2001); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 
575–76 (Or. 2005); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998). 
 24 The cases cited supra note 23 involved Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR), which provides that the states-parties shall notify certain persons of their right 
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and constitutional provisions and in addition to the requirement of 
“self-execution” that the Court recognized in Foster.25 
This Article argues that, when a treaty binds the United States to 
behave in a given way towards a particular individual, the treaty is 
“judicially enforceable” by the individual just as any statute or consti-
tutional provision would be, unless the treaty is non-self-executing in 
the Foster sense.  A treaty might be unenforceable in court because it 
is too vague, or otherwise calls for judgments of a political nature, or is 
unconstitutional, just as statutes and constitutional provisions might 
be.  But no additional threshold showing of the treaty’s “judicial en-
forceability” is required. 
It is true that treaties are contracts between nations.  It is also true 
that, as a matter of international law, the breach of a treaty by one 
party is generally a matter to be pursued by the other parties.  At the 
time of the Framing of the Constitution, the mechanisms for enforcing 
treaties were primarily diplomacy and, as a last resort, war.  Under 
traditional international law, individuals generally lacked standing to 
complain of a nation’s treaty violation or to seek any remedy on the 
international plane.  Moreover, treaties were not enforceable in domes-
tic courts solely by virtue of the treaty itself.  Under international law 
and under the domestic laws of the countries then in existence, judges 
could enforce treaties only if authorized to do so by domestic law.26 
The Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of these char-
acteristics of treaties, which had led to significant problems for the 
United States under the Articles of Confederation.27  In order to avoid 
the foreign relations difficulties that would result from treaty viola-
tions, and to capture the benefits of a reputation for treaty compliance, 
                                                                                                                           
to consult with their consuls if those persons are detained.  Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Article 36].  In these cases, 
the lower courts have framed the issue as whether Article 36 creates “judicially enforceable 
rights.”  See, e.g., Cardenas, 405 F.3d at 253.  Since Article 36 plainly gives detainees a right to be 
notified of their right to consult with their consuls, see Article 36 ¶ 1(b), the question whether it 
creates “judicially enforceable rights” reduces to the question whether the rights created by the 
provision are judicially enforceable. 
 25 In the VCCR cases, see supra note 23, the relevant treaty was conceded to be self-executing.  
See infra p. 623.  In Hamdan, the D.C. Circuit did not base its “judicial enforceability” holding on 
a claim that the Geneva Conventions were non-self-executing.  See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38–40.  
The lower courts are divided on whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing.  Compare 
United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 4 n.4 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007) (Geneva Conven-
tions “generally viewed as self-executing treaties”), and United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 
541, 553 n.20 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Geneva Conventions self-executing), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 
F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (Geneva Conventions non-self-executing), rev’d on other grounds, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004). 
 26 For elaboration of some of these features of traditional international law, see Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086–97 
(1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights]. 
 27 See infra pp. 616–18. 
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the Founders gave treaties the force of domestic law enforceable in 
domestic courts.  The Supremacy Clause thus supplements interna-
tional law mechanisms for enforcing treaties by adding domestic 
mechanisms.  It assimilates treaties to federal statutes and the Consti-
tution, thus obviating the differences in enforcement mechanisms that 
would otherwise exist between these forms of law.  Among other 
things, the Supremacy Clause makes treaties enforceable in court at 
the behest of individuals.28 
The one exception the Supreme Court has recognized to the rule of 
equivalent treatment comes from its holding in Foster v. Neilson that 
some treaties are non-self-executing because of what they have to say 
about the need for legislative implementation.29  The concept of a non-
self-executing treaty — a treaty that, while valid and in force, cannot 
be enforced in the courts until implemented by Congress — appears at 
first glance to be in significant tension with the Supremacy Clause, 
which declares “all” treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land” and 
instructs judges to give them effect.30  Indeed, non-self-executing trea-
ties are sometimes described as treaties that lack the force of domestic 
law.31  Of course, the plain text of the Supremacy Clause rules out the 
possibility that a treaty might be valid and in force yet lack the force 
of domestic law.32  Foster itself offers a basis for reconciling the con-
cept with the constitutional text: a non-self-executing treaty has the 
force of domestic law, but it is a law “addressed to” Congress.  Such a 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Because it refers to “Judges,” the clause clearly contemplates that courts will enforce trea-
ties, and, indeed, “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.”  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).  For elaboration on when treaties can be 
said to create rights for individuals, see Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26. 
 29 See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829). 
 30 See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. 760, 782–83 (1988) (arguing 
that the doctrine of non-self-execution should be rejected on this ground). 
 31 This idea has now arguably been endorsed by the Supreme Court.  See Medellín v. Texas, 
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 n.2 (2008).  For a pre-Medellín sampling of such statements, see Payne-
Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 155 (1972); J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON’S UNDERSTANDING 
THE CONSTITUTION 194–95 (14th ed. 1997); Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of 
Self-Executing Treaties, 45 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 66, 68 (1951).  Compare Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (concluding that because “the [War-
saw] Convention is a self-executing treaty,” “no domestic legislation is required to give [it] the 
force of law in the United States”), with United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 
(1992) (suggesting that a treaty’s self-executing character and its having “the force of law” are 
separate questions). 
 32 For a discussion of whether Medellín should be read to have endorsed this countertextual 
view, see infra pp. 648–50.  The assertion in the text assumes that a treaty that has been super-
seded by a conflicting statute is not “in force” as a matter of domestic law, even though it may 
well continue to bind the United States as a matter of international law.  See Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (articulating last-in-time rule). 
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treaty is not judicially enforceable because, in our constitutional sys-
tem, the courts lack power to order the legislature to legislate.33 
Chief Justice Marshall in Foster recognized that our Constitution, 
specifically the Supremacy Clause, establishes the general rule that 
treaties are enforceable in U.S. courts, just as the Constitution and 
federal statutes are.34  He recognized an exception where the treaty 
“addresses itself” to the political branches, and he looked to the lan-
guage of the treaty to answer this question.35  Following Foster, lower 
courts seeking to determine whether a treaty is or is not self-executing 
have searched for the intent of the parties about whether the treaty’s 
obligations are addressed to the legislative or judicial branch.  Unsur-
prisingly, the search has usually been fruitless.  Nations generally leave 
such questions to be governed by the domestic law of the parties.  
Domestic constitutional rules on treaty enforcement, in turn, differ 
widely among states.  Thus, except in the rarest of cases, courts search-
ing for a common intent of the parties regarding the need for imple-
menting legislation do so in vain.  A court that relies on the particular 
wording of a treaty provision as reflecting the parties’ intent to require 
legislative implementation is almost certainly attributing to the parties 
a nonexistent intent. 
Chief Justice Marshall appears to have learned this lesson quickly.  
Four years after introducing the concept of a non-self-executing treaty 
in Foster, the Court was confronted with the same provision of the 
same treaty in Percheman.36  The Chief Justice acknowledged in the 
later case that he had been too hasty in reading the text of the provi-
sion as contemplating legislative implementation.  He belatedly recog-
nized that the text of the provision was as consistent with self-
execution as with non-self-execution.37  Chief Justice Marshall also 
clarified in Percheman that a treaty is non-self-executing when it 
“stipulat[es] for some future legislative act.”38  Percheman is best read 
to recognize that the Supremacy Clause establishes a strong presump-
tion that treaties are enforceable in court in the same circumstances as 
provisions of statutes and the Constitution of like content, and that 
overcoming the presumption requires a clear statement — a stipula-
tion — that the obligations the treaty establishes are “addressed to” the 
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 33 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 975 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he essence of 
legislative power, within the limits of legislative jurisdiction, is a discretion not subject to com-
mand.”).  Justice Souter may have meant that the law itself cannot command a legislature to legis-
late.  If that were true, the very concept of a non-self-executing treaty would be problematic. 
 34 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
 35 Id. at 314–15. 
 36 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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political branches.  Of the available approaches to the issue, a pre-
sumption of self-execution accords best with the constitutional text and 
is most consistent with Percheman and with the Supreme Court’s later 
decisions. 
In Medellín, the Court closely followed the analysis in Foster, ap-
parently overlooking the lessons learned in Percheman.  Parts of the 
Court’s analysis in Medellín could be read to adopt a presumption that 
treaties are non-self-executing.  This reading, however, would conflict 
not only with constitutional text and prior precedent, but also with 
other portions of the Court’s analysis in Medellín.  If read to establish 
a presumption of non-self-execution, Medellín would be a radical hold-
ing indeed, requiring rejection of the holdings of many Supreme Court 
decisions.  Because the Court in Medellín disclaimed any intent to up-
set settled law, this reading should be rejected if another plausible 
reading is available.  Fortunately, the opinion supports an alternative 
reading, under which Medellín can be understood to have found the 
relevant treaty to be non-self-executing because the obligation it  
imposed required the exercise of nonjudicial discretion.  So read, 
Medellín is an example of an entirely distinct form of non-self-
execution, and is thus consistent with a reading of Percheman as hav-
ing established a presumption that treaties are self-executing in the 
Foster sense. 
Under a presumption of self-execution or non-self-execution, if U.S. 
treatymakers39 wish to control the domestic enforceability of a treaty, 
they need merely insist on the inclusion of a “stipulat[ion]” that its ob-
ligations are or are not subject to legislative implementation.  With re-
spect to bilateral treaties of the sort involved in Foster and Percheman, 
the burden should be manageable.  However, the inclusion of such a 
stipulation in multilateral treaties would be difficult, if not impossible.  
Multilateral treaties are typically negotiated at global conferences and 
framed in terms applicable generally to all nations that may ratify or 
accede to them.  Any suggestion that the treaties be framed so as to 
require or dispense with implementing legislation would disrupt possi-
bly delicate negotiations with discussion of an issue that is likely to be 
of no concern to most other states.  A rule requiring a clear statement 
of either self-execution or non-self-execution in the treaty would thus 
leave U.S. negotiators with little control over the domestic enforceabil-
ity of the multilateral treaties they conclude. 
Beginning in 1977, the U.S. treatymakers began attaching to cer-
tain multilateral treaties a “declaration” of non-self-execution, seem-
ingly to serve the same purpose as a Percheman “stipulat[ion] for some 
                                                                                                                           
 39 The treatymakers are the President and two-thirds of the Senators present.  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2. 
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future legislative act.”  Since their inception, however, such declara-
tions have been controversial.  Although the validity of these declara-
tions is a difficult question, I conclude that the treatymakers do have 
the power under our Constitution to render treaties non-self-executing 
by attaching declarations of non-self-execution.  The availability of 
this mechanism alleviates any concern that the Percheman clear state-
ment rule poses significant problems for U.S. treatymakers in today’s 
world of multilateral treaties. 
On the other hand, declarations of self-execution stand on more 
tenuous ground.  If the latter declarations are not valid, adoption of a 
presumption of non-self-execution would leave the U.S. treatymakers 
with far less control of the domestic enforceability of multilateral trea-
ties than they would have under a presumption of self-execution.  In-
deed, given the difficulty of including a clear statement of self-
execution in the text of a multilateral treaty, a default rule of non-self-
execution would effectively deny treatymakers the option of making 
self-executing multilateral treaties.  This denial would, in turn, render 
the treatymaking provision of Article II superfluous for multilateral 
treaties that contemplate domestic enforcement.  The likely invalidity 
of declarations of self-execution thus strengthens the normative and 
textual/structural case for a default rule of self-execution. 
Part I of this Article shows that the text of the Constitution, as 
properly interpreted by the Supreme Court, establishes a general rule 
that treaties are judicially enforceable to the same extent as provisions 
of the Constitution and federal statutes of like content.  Part II exam-
ines the single exception to this general rule — relating to treaties “ad-
dressed to” the political branches — and concludes that the Supremacy 
Clause, as properly construed in Percheman, establishes a presumption 
of self-execution that can be overridden only through a clear statement 
that the treaty is subject to legislative implementation.  This Part con-
siders six possible readings of the recent decision in Medellín and con-
cludes that the opinion is best read to have found the relevant treaty to 
be non-self-executing on justiciability grounds.  Part III considers 
whether the U.S. treatymakers may validly control the domestic en-
forceability of the treaties through declarations regarding self-
execution.  It concludes that declarations of non-self-execution are 
valid and effective if the default rule is one of self-execution, but dec-
larations of self-execution are unlikely to be regarded as binding if the 
default rule is non-self-execution. 
Before proceeding, a brief word on methodology is in order.  I be-
gin with a discussion of the constitutional text and how the Founders 
understood that text.  For some scholars, if original meaning is clear, 
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the analysis ends there.40  For others, the original meaning of the text 
is just one of several factors to be considered in interpreting the Con-
stitution41 — one that can be trumped by other factors, such as judi-
cial precedent.42  With respect to the requirement of equivalent treat-
ment, I need not join that debate.  As shown in Part I, the text, the 
original public meaning, and the Supreme Court’s construction of the 
Supremacy Clause all support that requirement.  The doctrine of non-
self-execution presents a more complex methodological question.  Fos-
ter-type non-self-execution is in tension with the constitutional text, 
and scholars have argued that the concept is in conflict with the Su-
premacy Clause’s original public meaning and should be rejected.43  I 
accept the existence of the concept because I am a faint-hearted 
originalist who accepts that original meaning can be trumped by en-
trenched precedent.44  One might argue that even a faint-hearted 
originalist should reject non-self-execution, as Foster remains the only 
case in which the Supreme Court has unambiguously denied relief on 
this ground, and its specific holding was subsequently overruled.  But, 
for reasons discussed in Part II, I conclude that it is too late to reject 
Foster-type non-self-execution entirely. 
In Part III, I consider whether a presumption in either direction 
would present practical problems for U.S. treatymakers today that 
they would not have faced at the time of the Founding.  If a presump-
tion would pose such problems, the question would arise whether 
original meaning may give way to practical considerations caused by 
changed circumstances.  Once again, the difficult methodological ques-
tion can be avoided, but this time only by confronting a difficult doc-
trinal question.  The difficult doctrinal question concerns the validity 
of an innovative form of Percheman stipulation — the declaration of 
non-self-execution (and its post-Medellín counterpart, the declaration 
of self-execution).  Depending on how one understands the term 
“treaty” in Article II, this new form of Percheman stipulation might it-
self violate the constitutional text and structure — specifically, the 
Constitution’s establishment of only three methods of enacting su-
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 40 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not 
As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMM. 257 (2005). 
 41 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1189 (1987). 
 42 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). 
 43 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 30; David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Consti-
tutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (2002); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in 
Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1469–70 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS 
OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)). 
 44 Cf. Scalia, supra note 42. 
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preme federal law.  On the other hand, as explained in Part III, refusal 
to recognize the validity of declarations of non-self-execution would 
produce an absurd doctrinal result.  I conclude that, as long as the 
declarations are deposited along with the United States’s instruments 
of ratification, they can plausibly be regarded for Article VI purposes 
as part of the treaties to which they relate.  Thus, the constitutional 
text can be given its intended effect without rejecting judicial prece-
dent, producing absurd results, or creating unanticipated practical 
problems for U.S. treatymakers.  On the other hand, declarations of 
self-execution would present more significant constitutional problems, 
and rejecting them would not produce doctrinal absurdity. 
I.  THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUIVALENT TREATMENT 
This Article maintains that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 
treaties are presumptively enforceable in court in the same circum-
stances as constitutional and statutory provisions of like content.  Ex-
plaining how the courts should resolve the many treaty enforceability 
issues that could arise in litigation would require (and largely dupli-
cate) treatises on issues such as standing and remedies.  This Part will 
instead seek to rebut a particular approach to treaty enforceability re-
flected in prominent lower court decisions and in executive branch 
briefs.  According to these decisions and briefs, treaties are very differ-
ent from the other forms of law mentioned in the Supremacy Clause.  
They are contracts between nations that generally depend on interest 
and honor, not litigation before domestic courts, for their enforcement.  
This Part explains that these characteristics of treaties do not affect 
their enforceability in the courts of this country. 
Although this Article does not discuss in detail all the legal implica-
tions of the requirement of equivalent treatment, it is useful at the out-
set to clarify some points of law and dispel potential misconceptions.  
First, I do not maintain that the content of a treaty is to be determined 
by recourse to the same rules that determine the content of constitu-
tional or statutory provisions.  The rules of treaty interpretation of 
course differ from the rules of statutory or constitutional interpreta-
tion.45  Second, I do not claim that the three forms of federal law listed 
in the Supremacy Clause are of equivalent stature.  The Constitution 
is, of course, superior to federal statutes and treaties.  Under current 
doctrine, treaties and federal statutes are regarded as having equiva-
lent stature, so that the last in time prevails in the event of a con-
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 45 For one thing, these rules are supplied by international law.  For a restatement, see Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
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flict.46  The last-in-time rule has been disputed by scholars, some of 
whom claim that treaties are superior to statutes47 and others the re-
verse.48  This Article takes no position on this question.49  The re-
quirement of equivalent treatment concerns the consequences for do-
mestic courts of treaties that are in force as a matter of domestic law.  
The last-in-time rule concerns whether a treaty is in force as a matter 
of domestic law. 
In general, the requirement of equivalent treatment takes the con-
tent of a treaty provision as given.  However, as to both the obligations 
and the rights and remedies conferred by a treaty, the treaty’s effect 
under domestic law differs subtly from its effect under international 
law.  As a matter of international law, treaties generally impose obliga-
tions on the United States as a corporate entity, not on any particular 
subnational units or officials.  However, international law also includes 
rules for attributing the acts of subnational units and officials (and 
even nationals in certain circumstances) to the nation.50  As I have ex-
plained elsewhere, the Supremacy Clause, by declaring treaties to be 
domestic law, transforms the obligations of the United States under a 
treaty into the obligations of all domestic law–applying officials whose 
conduct would be attributable to the United States under international 
law, unless a narrower category is specified.51 
The Supremacy Clause achieves a similar transformation with re-
spect to the correlative rights of individuals.  As a matter of interna-
tional law, treaties generally confer rights only on the states-parties in 
the sense that only states-parties have the power to set in motion the 
machinery of international law, such as it is, for responding to viola-
tions of international law.  Individuals do not generally have such a 
power, but they do have what might be called “primary rights” under 
treaties.  That is, treaties often obligate the states-parties to behave in 
particular ways towards individuals.  When treaties impose such obli-
gations, the individuals involved may be said to have a primary right 
to be treated in such ways, even though they lack secondary or reme-
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 46 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: 
A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005). 
 47 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 870–72 (1987); Jules Lobel, The Limits of 
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 
1071, 1096–1101 (1985) (offering evidence that the Framers held this view). 
 48 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 302–07 
(2005); Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479 (2006). 
 49 Cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2189 (1999) 
[hereinafter Vázquez, Laughing] (assuming validity of last-in-time rule because it is entrenched). 
 50 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf. 
 51 See Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26. 
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dial rights under international law.52  The Supremacy Clause annexes 
secondary rights under domestic law to the primary rights that U.S. 
treaties confer on individuals.53 
Recognizing this effect of the Supremacy Clause leaves open poten-
tially difficult questions about which individuals may seek enforce-
ment of which treaties when, and what remedies they may be 
awarded.  My claim here is that courts should address these questions 
by applying the rules they apply to decide these questions in statutory 
and constitutional cases.  As a rule of thumb, courts confronted with 
treaty-based claims should imagine that the content of the treaty pro-
vision being invoked appeared in a statute or in the Constitution.  
Constitutional provisions will usually provide the closest analogy.  
Like treaties, the Constitution generally applies to state action and of-
ten confers primary rights without specifying particular enforcement 
mechanisms.54  Some federal statutes fit this description as well. 
Determining the appropriate approach under the requirement of 
equivalent treatment will sometimes be difficult, and the requirement 
may not help much when the courts apply a different approach to the 
particular issue for the Constitution than for federal statutes.55  But 
recognizing the requirement of equivalent treatment will simplify the 
courts’ task significantly in many cases and avoid erroneous results.  
And, of course, accepting the requirement of equivalent treatment does 
not preclude arguing that the courts’ approach to the issue in the 
statutory or constitutional contexts is mistaken.  Sections A–C present 
the textual and historical case for the requirement of equivalent treat-
ment.  Section D discusses some lower court decisions taking a con-
trary approach, explains that they rest on a misreading of the Supreme 
Court decisions on which they purport to rely, and shows that 
Medellín is consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions in regarding 
non-self-execution as the sole exception to the requirement of equiva-
lent treatment. 
A.  The Supremacy Clause and the British Rule 
Article VI of the Constitution provides: 
  This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
                                                                                                                           
 52 On the distinction between primary and secondary rights, see id. at 1089–92. 
 53 See id. at 1087–97. 
 54 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 495 (5th ed. 2003). 
 55 For example, the Supreme Court appears to apply a more stringent approach to implying 
private rights of action under statutes than under the Constitution.  See Vázquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights, supra note 26, at 1155–56 (suggesting a third approach for treaties). 
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Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.56 
The bare text of this clause establishes that treaties are to be given ef-
fect by judges.  It strongly suggests that treaties are to be applied by 
judges in the same circumstances as federal statutes and (leaving aside 
the question of hierarchy) the Constitution.57  The clause’s reference to 
judges contradicts the claim that treaties, being contracts between in-
dependent nations, “depend[] for the enforcement of [their] provisions 
on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to 
[them]”58 rather than on lawsuits.  Although treaties may depend on 
“interest and honor” on the international plane, under the Constitution, 
the treaty obligations of the United States are also enforceable in court. 
To understand the effect of the clause’s text, it is useful to consider 
the status of treaties under the constitutional law of Great Britain, 
whose approach we would presumably have inherited had our Consti-
tution not adopted a different rule.  In Britain, treaties are made by 
the Crown.  Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, however, the “ab-
solute rule” has been that 
the assent of Parliament is needed for any exercise of the [royal] preroga-
tive which involves either a charge upon the people or an alteration in the 
law. 
  The fact that this absolute rule involved a limitation of the treaty-
making power of the Crown was recognized in the year after the [Glori-
ous] Revolution . . . [in a formal legal opinion of] the Chief Justices of the 
King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the Judge of the Court of Admiralty, 
the attorney and solicitor-general, and the advocate-general.59 
It was sometimes said that the Crown should not make a treaty that 
purported to alter domestic law without first obtaining Parliament’s 
assent.60  Thus, “[a]t the close of the American War of Independence it 
was necessary to give statutory powers to enable the Crown to make 
the treaties of Paris and Versailles, because the terms of the treaties in-
volved an alteration of the law affecting the American colonies.”61  But 
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 56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2. 
 57 See Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After Sanchez-Llamas, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 86 (2007); Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 577–78 
(2007). 
 58 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
 59 14 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (1964).  The opinion 
provided, inter alia, that “if any ship or goods be taken by a foreign privateer and be brought into 
any port of this kingdome, and such ship or goods shall be here claimed by your Majesty’s sub-
jects as belonging to them, they have a right by law to have a warrant out of your Majesty’s court 
of Admiralty to arrest the same, in order to try their claimes; and no article in any treaty can ex-
clude them from such their right, or disable your Majesty’s court to proceed therein.”  Id. at 67–68 
(quoting 2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 125–26 (R.G. Mars-
den ed., Lawbook Exch. 1999) (1916)). 
 60 Id. at 69 (discussing Lord Loughborough and others who took this view). 
 61 Id. at 68 (citing 22 Geo. 3, c. 46, § 2 (1782)). 
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it was also understood that, if a treaty were made that did purport to 
alter domestic law, the treaty would not have the effect of altering such 
law.  The law in force, entitled to enforcement in the courts, would 
remain as before until Parliament passed a statute implementing the 
treaty.62 
In short, from the time of the Glorious Revolution, treaties in Great 
Britain were not regarded as having the force of domestic law and 
were not enforceable in the courts unless implemented by Parliament.  
Instead, treaties imposed obligations on the nation as a matter of in-
ternational law, enforceable at the state-to-state level through diplo-
matic means or military force.  As Professor Frederick Maitland ex-
plained in his lectures on British constitutional history, “a treaty made 
by the king has in general no legal effect whatever. . . . Suppose that 
under [an extradition] treaty a person was arrested and brought before 
one of the courts by habeas corpus; the treaty would have been treated 
as waste-paper.”63  And, in a phrase that has been recently seized upon 
by writers in the field, Maitland observed, “until a statute has been 
passed [implementing a treaty,] one may . . . laugh at the treaty.”64 
Reading the constitutional text against this background yields some 
straightforward conclusions.  Article II gives the treatymaking power 
to the President and one house of the legislature, a supermajority of 
which must approve any treaty.65  Article VI then declares that trea-
ties, once made, have the force of supreme federal law and instructs 
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 62 Thus, a 1728 legal opinion by the attorney general and solicitor general “clearly lays down 
the rule that the Crown, by an exercise of its treaty making power, cannot affect the legal rights of 
its subjects, because the law cannot be changed by the prerogative.”  11 SIR WILLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 253 (1938) (citing 2 OPINIONS OF EMINENT 
LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 339–42 (George Chalmers ed., 
1858)).  And “in 1764 the law officers and the advocate-general advised that the Crown could not 
legally enter into, or enforce the regulations of a projected treaty between England and 
France . . . because they were contrary to a statute of William III’s reign.”  14 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 59, at 68 (citing 2 OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF 
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 343–44). 
 63 F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 424–25 (1909). 
 64 Id. (quoted in John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural De-
fense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2227 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and 
Public Lawmaking]).  Professor Yoo goes on to argue, implausibly, that the Framers attempted to 
“continue the British system.”  Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra, at 2230; see also John 
C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Under-
standing, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2087–91 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and the Constitu-
tion].  It is difficult to understand how a system in which courts and citizens may laugh at treaties 
may be said to be a system in which treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land.”  See generally 
Vázquez, Laughing, supra note 49 (responding to Yoo).  Scholars who agree about little else have 
uniformly rejected Yoo’s claim that the Constitution makes all or most treaties non-self-executing.  
See Martin J. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Trea-
ties As “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2099 n.19, 2151 (1999); Kesavan, 
supra note 48, at 1488–89; Ramsey, supra note 43, at 1469–73; Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal 
Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 907–17 (2004). 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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judges to give them effect notwithstanding inconsistent state law.  The 
clause thus represented a clear break from the British approach.  It es-
tablished new and different rules as a matter of U.S. constitutional law 
with respect to both the making and the enforcement of treaties.  By 
requiring the consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, the Foun-
ders gave a role to a part of the legislature in the making of treaties.  
By declaring them to be the law of the land once made, they dispensed 
with the need for an additional act of the legislature.  Because this new 
rule had no analogue in British practice, British practice could furnish 
no guidance to U.S. courts in determining when and how to apply 
treaties.  The constitutional text was the only guide available on that 
question — and it simply instructed judges to apply treaties as law, 
just as they apply federal statutes and the Constitution itself.66 
B.  The Purpose and Original Public Meaning 
of the Supremacy Clause 
The history of the Supremacy Clause’s adoption, and the Supreme 
Court’s early decisions construing it,67 confirm that the clause makes 
treaties judicially enforceable even though they are contracts between 
nations that, on the international plane, depend on interest and honor 
for their efficacy.  The Founders understood that these were character-
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 66 Professor Martin Flaherty has noted that some Founders during the ratification debates de-
fended the Supremacy Clause by maintaining that treaties were directly enforceable in England, 
relying on Blackstone’s statement that “[i]t is also the king’s prerogative to make treaties, leagues, 
and alliances with foreign states and princes . . . [which are] binding upon the whole commu-
nity . . . .  Whatever contracts . . . he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, 
resist, or annul.”  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 249 (Univ. of Chi. Press, photo. 
reprint 1979) (1st ed. 1765), noted in Flaherty, supra note 64, at 2136, 2145.  These Founders 
probably misunderstood Blackstone, who elsewhere wrote: 
[T]he consent of all three [of the component parts of Parliament (the King, the House of 
Lords and the House of Commons)] is required to make any new law that shall bind the 
subject.  Whatever is enacted for law by one, or by two only, of the three is no statute; 
and to it no regard is due, unless in matters relating to their own privileges. 
1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at 155.  If Blackstone did mean that treaties in England were directly 
applicable as law, he “was not quite accurate . . . [;] when he wrote, English constitutional law 
had imposed some limitations” on the royal prerogative, including the principle that a treaty could 
not itself effect a charge on the people or an alteration of the law.  10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 374 (1938) (citing 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 
253, 268).  In any event, that some Founders may have believed that treaties in Britain were di-
rectly enforceable is perfectly consistent with my claim that the Supremacy Clause made treaties 
(or confirmed that treaties were) directly applicable by courts.  See Vázquez, Laughing, supra note 
49, at 2158 n.14.  Although these Founders’ statements do present a challenge to the “clear break” 
thesis, they do not furnish an alternative basis for doctrine concerning the circumstances in which 
treaties are or are not directly enforceable in court.  Neither Blackstone nor the Founders who 
relied on him or otherwise claimed that the British rule was self-execution went beyond making 
general statements on that question.  The only detailed analyses of the effect of treaties as domes-
tic law in Britain came from those who noted, correctly, that treaties categorically lacked such 
effect.  See, for instance, Justice Iredell’s analysis in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), 
discussed infra pp. 619–21. 
 67 See infra notes 85–104 and accompanying text. 
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istics of all treaties, yet they declared treaties to be the law of the land 
in order to “show the world that we make the faith of treaties a consti-
tutional part of the character of the United States; that we secure 
[their] performance no longer nominally, for the judges of the United 
States will be enabled to carry [them] into effect.”68 
The Supremacy Clause was the Founders’ solution to one of the 
principal “vices” or “evils” of the Articles of Confederation.69  The Ar-
ticles gave Congress the power to conclude treaties, but they did not 
establish a mechanism for their enforcement.70  (This was part of a 
broader problem with the Articles — their failure to provide for the 
enforcement of any of the acts of the federal government.)  Congress 
had concluded a number of treaties, most importantly the Treaty of 
Peace with Great Britain,71 but the states violated them, causing sig-
nificant problems for the fledgling nation.72  Most importantly, the 
Treaty of Peace gave British creditors specific rights against their 
American debtors, but the states had passed laws making it difficult or 
impossible for the British to recover in court.73  The Continental Con-
gress, in its waning days, passed a resolution urging the states to repeal 
these laws,74 but a majority of states failed to do so.75 
There was general agreement at the Constitutional Convention that 
the new Constitution had to empower the federal government to en-
force treaties.  The Founders were anxious to avoid treaty violations 
because such violations threatened to provoke wars and otherwise 
complicate relations with more powerful nations.76  The Founders also 
wanted to establish a reputation for treaty compliance to induce other 
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 68 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 490 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1888) (state-
ment of James Wilson). 
 69 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recording James Madison’s speech listing “violations of the law of nations & of 
Treaties” as an “evil” against which the Articles of Confederation did not provide); James Madi-
son, Vices of the Political System of the United States (April 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 345, 349 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975) (listing “[v]iolations of 
the law of nations and of treaties” as a “vice” of the Articles of Confederation). 
 70 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI; Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 
26, at 1101–02. 
 71 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
 72 See 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 781–874 (1934) (re-
printing the extensive report by Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Adams on the British to the 
Continental Congress, reporting on, and discussing the merits of, British complaints about state 
violations of the Treaty of Peace). 
 73 See the discussion of the Virginia statute at issue in Ware v. Hylton, infra pp. 619–21. 
 74 See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 124–25, 177–84 
(1934). 
 75 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
1411 n.11 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). 
 76 See sources cited in Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26, at 1102–03. 
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nations to conclude beneficial treaties with the new nation.77  They 
considered several options.  For example, the Virginia Plan would have 
empowered Congress to “negative” state laws that contravened federal 
treaties78 — an approach that would have been consistent with the 
British approach because, presumably, judges and citizens could have 
continued to laugh at treaties until “negatived” by Congress.  In the 
end, the Founders adopted the Supremacy Clause.  The mechanism 
they adopted thus relied on a judicial negative rather than a legislative 
one.79  By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, treaties became enforceable 
in court without the need for prior legislative implementation or incor-
poration into domestic law. 
The Founders were aware that treaties were contracts between na-
tions that, as a matter of international law, operated only on nations 
and depended for their efficacy on either military force or the good 
faith of the parties (“interest” and “honor”).  Their recognition of these 
characteristics of treaties comes through most clearly in their discus-
sions of the Articles of Confederation, which they regarded as defec-
tive precisely for these reasons.  They described the Articles as a “mere 
treaty” because they operated on the thirteen states as political bodies 
and were “dependent on the good faith of the parties”80 or on the 
“force of arms.”81  Madison, for example, described the Articles as “in 
fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of alliance, 
between independent and sovereign States.”82  The Framers opted for 
a judicial sanction to give efficacy to the new Constitution, as well as 
federal statutes and treaties.  They manifested this intent in the Su-
premacy Clause’s declaration that all three would be “the supreme 
Law of the Land.”  They understood that “law,” in contrast to treaties, 
was operative on individuals, compulsory, and enforceable at the be-
hest of individuals through “the mild and equal energy of the magis-
tracy.”83  By declaring treaties to be “law,” and instructing judges to 
give them effect, the Founders made them operative as a matter of 
domestic law on the individuals protected by them, and enforceable by 
such individuals in the courts.  In this way, they made irrelevant for 
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 77 See sources cited in id. at 1103 n.81. 
 78 See id. at 1104. 
 79 See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 48–49 
(1904). 
 80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 79–80. 
 81 William Samuel Johnson, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 
15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 248–49 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984). 
 82 James Madison, Observations (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361, 
363 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
 83 Johnson, supra note 81, at 249. 
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domestic purposes the characteristics of treaties that, in the Founders’ 
view, distinguished them from laws.84 
In short, the Founders recognized the limited effect, and limited ef-
ficacy, of treaties under international law.  To achieve certain purposes 
they regarded as important to the nation, they gave the treaties con-
cluded by the nation additional force as a matter of domestic constitu-
tional law. 
C.  Early Judicial Construction85 
1.  Ware v. Hylton on the Supremacy Clause’s Reversal of the Brit-
ish Rule. — The effect of the Supremacy Clause with respect to trea-
ties received extensive consideration in an important early case, Ware 
v. Hylton.86  The case involved an article of the Treaty of Peace with 
Great Britain providing that “[i]t is agreed that creditors on either side, 
shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value 
in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”87  The 
plaintiffs were British creditors; the defendants were debtors from Vir-
ginia.  The defendants had paid the debt into the Virginia treasury, 
which, according to a Virginia wartime statute, constituted a bar to 
any further proceedings to collect the debt.88 
Justice Iredell, on circuit, considered first whether a treaty provi-
sion of this nature would have been enforceable in the British courts 
without prior legislative implementation, and he concluded that it 
would not be: 
[I]t is an invariable practice in that country, when the King makes any 
stipulation of a legislative nature, that it is carried into effect by an act  
of Parliament.  The Parliament is considered as bound, upon a principle  
of moral obligation, to preserve the public faith, pledged by the treaty,  
by passing such laws as its obligation requires; but until such laws are 
passed, the system of law, entitled to actual obedience, remains de facto, as  
before.89 
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 84 The points made in this paragraph are developed at greater length, with additional cita-
tions, in Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26, at 1097–1110. 
 85 The early judicial construction of the Supremacy Clause’s effect is relevant not just qua Su-
preme Court doctrine, but also as evidence of the original public meaning of the clause.  Justice 
Iredell and Chief Justice Marshall were themselves Framers.  Later cases are of course less proba-
tive of original meaning.  Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810 (2008) (post-
Civil War discussions of Second Amendment “do not provide as much insight into its original 
meaning as earlier sources”). 
 86 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).  
 87 Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, at art. IV. 
 88 Ware, 3 U.S. at 200–01. 
 89 Id. at 274 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
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This was so regardless of how the treaty provision was phrased.  Thus, 
even if a treaty itself purported to set a tariff at a given level, an act of 
Parliament would be necessary to set the tariff at that level.90 
Justice Iredell then considered whether any different result would 
have obtained in the United States before the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, and he concluded that the rule would have been the same as in 
Great Britain, “the very country from which we derive the rudiments 
of our legal ideas.”91  During this period, he reasoned: 
[N]o suit was ever maintained in any court in the United States, merely on 
the footing of the treaty when an act of the l[e]gi[sl]ature stood in the way.  
It was to remove the obstacle arising from [the British rule], that Congress 
recommended the repeal of all acts inconsistent with the due execution of 
the treaty.  And I must with due submission say, that in my opinion with-
out such a repeal, no British creditor could have maintained a suit in vir-
tue of the treaty, where any legislative impediment existed, until the pre-
sent constitution of the United States was formed.92 
According to Justice Iredell, the Founders adopted the Supremacy 
Clause to address the “embarrassments” that resulted from the state 
courts’ adherence to the British rule and the state legislatures’ failure 
to implement the treaty.93  Under the Articles, treaties were 
binding in moral obligation, but could not be constitutionally carried into 
effect (at least in the opinion of many,) so far as acts of legislation then in 
being constituted an impediment, but by a repeal.  The extreme inconven-
iences felt from such a system dictated the remedy which the constitution 
has now provided, “that all treaties made or which shall be made under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; 
and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the 
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”  Under 
this Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, 
upon principles of moral obligation, it is also by the vigour of its own au-
thority to be executed in fact.  It would not otherwise be the supreme law 
in the new sense provided for, and it was so before in a moral sense. 
  . . . [W]hen this constitution was ratified, the case as to the treaty in 
question stood upon the same footing, as if every act constituting an im-
pediment to a creditor’s recovery had been expressly repealed, and any 
further act passed, which the public obligation had before required, if a 
repeal alone would not have been sufficient.94 
Justice Iredell’s opinion confirms that the purpose and effect of the 
Supremacy Clause was to reverse the British rule, which we would 
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 90 Id. at 275. 
 91 Id. at 276. 
 92 Id.  Justice Iredell was referring to an act of the Continental Congress expressing concern 
about state violations of the Treaty of Peace and urging state legislatures to enact laws requiring 
compliance.  See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 176–84; see 
also supra p. 617. 
 93 Ware, 3 U.S. at 277 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 94 Id. 
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otherwise have inherited.  Under the British rule, all treaty provisions, 
no matter how phrased, required implementation by Parliament.  Be-
fore the adoption of the Constitution, the same rule prevailed in the 
United States, causing major embarrassments.  The Supremacy Clause 
was adopted to solve this problem.  It did so by dispensing with the 
need for implementing legislation.  The Supremacy Clause serves to 
“execute” treaties in advance.95 
Justice Iredell went on to hold that the treaty did not revive debts 
that had been discharged under state law before the treaty entered into 
force.96  The Supreme Court reversed Justice Iredell on this point.97  
The other Justices believed that Justice Iredell had interpreted the 
treaty too narrowly.  No Justice expressed a narrower view regarding 
the effect of treaties under the Constitution. 
Justice Story’s analysis of the Supremacy Clause’s effect with re-
spect to treaties in his Commentaries on the Constitution was to simi-
lar effect.  In the United States, he stressed, treaties are not just com-
pacts between nations.  They are also laws to be enforced by courts: 
It is . . . indispensable, that [treaties] should have the obligation and force 
of a law, that they may be executed by the judicial power, and be obeyed 
like other laws. . . . The difference between considering them as laws, and 
considering them as executory, or executed contracts, is exceedingly impor-
tant in the actual administration of public justice.  If they are supreme 
laws, courts of justice will enforce them directly in all cases, to which they 
can be judicially applied . . . .  If they are deemed but solemn compacts, 
promissory in their nature and obligation, courts of justice may be embar-
rassed in enforcing them, and may be compelled to leave the redress to be 
administered through other departments of the government.98 
Like Justice Iredell, Justice Story understood that, by virtue of the Su-
premacy Clause, treaties were not just “solemn compacts” among in-
dependent nations.  They also had the force of domestic law and were 
accordingly enforceable in courts like the other forms of supreme fed-
eral law. 
2.  Foster and the Requirement of Equivalent Treatment. — Foster 
v. Neilson99 is usually cited for the proposition that treaties sometimes 
do require implementation by Congress before they may be enforced in 
the courts.  Exactly which treaties the Foster Court had in mind will 
be considered in Part II.  But Foster also provides further support for 
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 95 Although Justice Iredell was writing about a treaty that pre-dated the Constitution, his 
opinion offers no basis for thinking that the Supremacy Clause would operate any differently for 
treaties concluded after the Constitution’s adoption. 
 96 Ware, 3 U.S. at 279–80 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 97 See id. at 245 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 285 (opinion of the Court). 
 98 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
640–41 (photo. reprint 2001) (3d ed. 1858). 
 99 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
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the idea that a treaty’s domestic enforceability is not affected by the 
fact that it is a compact among nations that, under international law, 
depends for its efficacy on the good faith of the parties or military 
force.  As Justice Iredell did in Ware, Chief Justice Marshall began his 
analysis of this issue by describing the effect of treaties on the interna-
tional plane and in countries that did not have a Supremacy Clause: 
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative 
act.  It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, 
especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into  
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the  
instrument.100 
Lower courts and commentators have relied on this language in argu-
ing that treaties are not generally enforceable in domestic courts.101  In 
doing so, they have overlooked the significance of the sentences that 
immediately follow: 
In the United States a different principle is established: Our constitution 
declares a treaty to be the law of the land.  It is, consequently, to be re-
garded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, when-
ever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.102 
The Court thus made it clear that the “principle” established for the 
United States by the Supremacy Clause is “different” from the “gen-
eral[]” rule under international law and in nations that do not have a 
Supremacy Clause.  For the latter, a treaty is merely a “contract be-
tween two nations” that “in its nature” does not “of itself” effect “the 
object to be accomplished.”  For the United States a treaty is also the 
“law of the land.”  Thus, according to Chief Justice Marshall, self-
executing treaties are “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent 
to an act of the legislature.”103  As Chief Justice Marshall put it more 
than a quarter century earlier, even though a treaty is a “contract be-
tween nations,” “where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such af-
fects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds 
those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of 
congress.”104 
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 100 Id. at 314. 
 101 E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); 
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 64, at 2087–91. 
 102 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
 103 Id.  The statement can be found in numerous other Supreme Court decisions as well.  See, 
e.g., Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 
221 (1902); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195 
(1901); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons 
of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 416 
(1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 747 (1838). 
 104 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 (1801). 
  
2008] TREATIES AS LAW OF THE LAND 623 
D.  The Contrary View 
Despite its pedigree, the requirement of equivalent treatment has 
largely been overlooked by the lower courts.  The problem is well illus-
trated by decisions of the state and lower federal courts involving the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations105 (VCCR).106  Because the 
executive branch had told the Senate that the VCCR was self-
executing,107 no one seriously claimed in any of these cases that the 
VCCR was non-self-executing.108  It was also undisputed that the 
VCCR obligated state and local officials to notify the individuals in-
volved that they had a right to consult with their consuls, and that of-
ficials had violated this obligation.  In some of these cases, the indi-
viduals involved had been convicted and argued that the state’s 
violation of the VCCR entitled them to relief from their convictions or 
sentences if they could show that the state’s violation prejudiced 
them.109  In other cases, the individuals involved sought relief at trial, 
such as the exclusion of evidence.110 
In response, the states argued, inter alia, that the provision of the 
VCCR entitling individuals to such notice was not enforceable in do-
mestic courts at the behest of such individuals.111  If the right to re-
ceive such notice had had its source in the Constitution or a federal 
statute, the intended recipient of such notice would clearly have had 
standing to invoke the right in court, and judicial enforceability would 
not otherwise have been an issue.  (Whether the law authorized any 
particular remedy would be a separate question, and the courts in 
these cases correctly considered it separately.)  Yet many of the state 
and federal courts faced with this issue concluded that the treaty pro-
vision was not judicially enforceable, accepting the argument of the 
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 105 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 106 See cases cited supra note 23. 
 107 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 91–9 app. at 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal 
Adviser for Administration). 
 108 See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 686 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is, as the United States recognizes, a self-
executing treaty.”).  Medellín v. Texas specifically reserved this question.  128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 
(2008). 
 109 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2676–77 (2006) (describing argument 
of petitioner Bustillo); Villagomez v. Sternes, 88 F. App’x 100 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 110 See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 574 (Or. 2005), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). 
 111 See Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), available 
at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/TexasrespondentsbriefMedellin2007.PDF; Brief for 
Respondent State of Oregon at 10–12, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (No. 04-10566), available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_10566/briefs/Brief%20for%20Oregon.pdf; 
Respondent’s Brief at 25, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (No. 04-5928), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5928/briefs/Respondent%27s%20brief.pdf. 
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states and the federal executive branch112 that treaties are contracts 
between nations generally enforceable only through international di-
plomacy or other state-to-state mechanisms.113  As we have seen, this 
is generally true of treaties as a matter of international law and of un-
implemented treaties in nations that follow the British rule.  In the 
United States, however, it is true of unimplemented treaties only if 
they are non-self-executing. 
When the issue reached the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon,114 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion left the question of 
judicial enforceability open.  A majority ruled against Sanchez-Llamas 
on the ground that the remedy he was seeking — exclusion of evidence 
— was not authorized by the treaty.115  (The four Justices who reached 
the issue concluded that the relevant provision of the VCCR was judi-
cially enforceable.116)  Before becoming Chief Justice, however, then-
Judge Roberts had joined the majority of the court of appeals in  
Hamdan, which found the Geneva Conventions not to be judicially  
enforceable.  In doing so, the court accepted the Bush Administra- 
tion’s reading of several Supreme Court decisions as establishing that  
treaties are “compact[s] between . . . nations” that “depend for [their]  
enforcement . . . [on] interest and honor” rather than on judicial  
proceedings.117 
These decisions, however, support the opposite conclusion.  The 
court of appeals’s misreading of Foster has already been noted.118  The 
other standard citation for the Administration’s now-standard argu-
ment that treaties are not generally judicially enforceable is this state-
ment from the Head Money Cases:119 
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.  It depends 
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the 
governments which are parties to it.  If these fail, its infraction becomes 
the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the in-
jured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by 
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 112 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27–29, Medellín 
v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/ 
medellincertstagemrd2.pdf; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 7, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (No. 04-10566), 2006 WL 271823; Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18–19, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (No. 
04-5928), [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief in Medellin v. Dretke], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
osg/briefs/2004/3mer/1ami/2004-5928.mer.ami.pdf. 
 113 See cases cited supra note 23. 
 114 126 S. Ct. 2669. 
 115 Id. at 2681–82.  In a companion case, the majority held that petitioner Bustillo had forfeited 
his rights under the VCCR by failing to raise the issue at his trial.  Id. at 2682–87. 
 116 See id. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2690–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 117 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting The Head Money Cases, 
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118 See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
 119 112 U.S. 580. 
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actual war.  It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing 
to do and can give no redress.120 
Rather than suggesting that treaties are not generally judicially en-
forceable, the Court was here discussing whether the courts could 
grant relief on the basis of a treaty in the face of subsequent legislation 
requiring a different result.  The Court applied the last-in-time rule, 
under which treaties and federal statutes are deemed to have equiva-
lent status, and hence the last in time prevails in the event of a con-
flict.121  In the quoted passage, the Court merely noted that, in the face 
of congressional action in breach of a treaty, the sole remedy for the 
breach lies in “international negotiations and reclamation.”122  That 
conclusion is unexceptional in light of the understanding that such 
congressional action negates the domestic force of the treaty. 
That the Head Money Cases are fully consistent with the proposi-
tion that self-executing treaties are to be enforced by the courts just 
like legislative acts is made clear in other portions of the opinion.  
Immediately following the passage quoted above, the Court wrote: 
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon 
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial lim-
its of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which 
are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the 
country. . . . The Constitution of the United States places such provisions 
as these in the same category as other laws of Congress by its declaration 
that “this Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all 
treaties made or which shall be made under authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land.”  A treaty, then, is a law of the land 
as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which 
the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.  And when 
such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court 
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would 
to a statute.123 
That the court of appeals in Hamdan misconstrued the Head 
Money Cases is made clear by the Supreme Court’s own decision two 
years later in United States v. Rauscher.124  There, the Court ex-
plained that the “interest and honor” passage from the Head Money 
Cases addressed the “difference between the judicial powers of the 
courts of Great Britain and of this country in regard to treaties.”125  
The language from the Head Money Cases addressed “the effect of a 
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 120 Id. at 598. 
 121 See id. at 599. 
 122 Id. at 598. 
 123 Id. at 598–99. 
 124 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
 125 Id. at 417–18.  As discussed above, treaties in Great Britain are not regarded as the law of 
the land and are never applied by courts in the absence of implementing legislation. 
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treaty as a part of the law of the land, as distinguished from its aspect 
as a mere contract between independent nations.”126  The Court 
stressed in Rauscher that because the Constitution declares treaties to 
be the supreme law of the land, “the courts are bound to take judicial 
notice of [them,] and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the 
rights of persons growing out of [them].”127  Thus, far from contradict-
ing anything in Ware or Foster, the Head Money Cases reaffirm that 
treaties in the United States are not just contracts between independ-
ent nations to be enforced only through international diplomacy and 
other state-to-state mechanisms.  They are also the supreme law of the 
land, and thus they are generally to be applied by the courts as “rule[s] 
of decision for the case[s] before [them]”128 just like statutes and consti-
tutional provisions of like content. 
Medellín confirms the irrelevance for self-executing treaties of the 
fact that treaties are contracts between nations that, as a matter of in-
ternational law, depend for their enforcement on “interest” and 
“honor.”  Although the opinion begins inauspiciously in this regard by 
quoting the “interest and honor” language from the Head Money 
Cases,129 its later analysis makes clear that these characteristics of trea-
ties are relevant only to non-self-executing treaties.  Specifically, in 
concluding that the treaty relied upon by Medellín was non-self-
executing, the Court cited the fact that it “reads like ‘a compact be-
tween independent nations’ that ‘depends for the enforcement of its 
provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are 
parties to it.’”130  If a treaty is non-self-executing, it is, indeed, not ju-
dicially enforceable and thus does depend on “interest” and “honor” for 
its efficacy.  By understanding Head Money–like language as signify-
ing non-self-execution, Medellín confirms that the idea that treaties are 
contracts between nations depending on interest and honor for their 
efficacy has no relevance to treaties that are self-executing.131 
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 126 Id. at 418. 
 127 Id. at 419. 
 128 Id. at 599. 
 129 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008).  The Court also cited Hamilton’s distinction 
between a “law” and a “mere treaty” without noting that Hamilton was referring to the effect of 
treaties in the absence of a constitutional provision declaring them to be “law.”  Id.; see supra 
p. 618. 
 130 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358–59 (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)). 
 131 In a footnote, the Court cited a number of lower court cases that “have presumed that trea-
ties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary” 
even if self-executing.  Id. at 1357 n.3.  The Court did not say that it was endorsing the proposi-
tion that it was attributing to these cases.  If it did mean to endorse it, the endorsement would be 
dictum and (if broadly understood) would be erroneous for the reasons set forth in this Part.  In 
each of these cases, the court relied on the “interest and honor” language from the Head Money 
Cases, which the Court now regards (correctly) as relevant only to non-self-executing treaties.  In 
any event, the Court’s description of some of United States v. Li was inaccurate, see Li, 206 F.3d 
56, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc) (recognizing that “nontextual sources” can be consulted if “the 
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As noted, the requirement that self-executing treaties be treated by 
courts as equivalent to federal statutory and constitutional provisions 
does not mean that treaty enforcement will be simple.  It leaves us 
with all of the sometimes very difficult questions that arise when fed-
eral statutes and the Constitution are invoked by individuals in our 
courts.  The rule of equivalent treatment tells us that it is these, and 
only these, questions that courts should be asking when they are con-
fronted with a self-executing treaty.  If a treaty requires the states-
parties to treat particular individuals in particular ways, the courts 
should not decline to enforce the obligation on the ground that the 
treaty is a contract between states, was intended to confer rights only 
on states, or sets forth an international enforcement mechanism.132  I 
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treaties’ terms are ambiguous”), and the relevant discussion in United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 
F.3d 377, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2001), was dictum.  The other cases cited are reconcilable with the re-
quirement of equivalent treatment because they involved the implication of a private right of ac-
tion or of an exclusionary remedy or the waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.  See 
United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (exclusion of evidence); Goldstar 
(Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (sovereign immunity); Canadian 
Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (sovereign immunity); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (private right of ac-
tion).  These are all issues for which the courts apply a similar presumption in the statutory con-
text.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (applying a similar presumption for 
implied rights of action under statutes); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (noting that 
the Court finds waiver of state sovereign immunity “only where stated ‘by the most express lan-
guage or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other 
reasonable construction’” (alteration in original) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 
U.S. 151, 171 (1909))); St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218 (1961) (avoiding “a 
construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence unless the statute, strictly con-
strued, requires such a result”).  The presumption referred to in Medellín’s footnote dictum should 
not be understood to extend beyond these contexts. 
  The Court’s citation of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law in the same foot-
note (also in dicta) for a “background presumption” that even self-executing treaties “generally do 
not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts,” should also 
be approached with caution.  See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]).  First, the Restatement comment does 
not refer to a presumption of any sort, but instead makes a factual statement about the proportion 
of treaties that create private rights or rights of action.  (The term “background presumption” 
comes from the Medellín majority.)  Second, while it is true that treaties as international instru-
ments do not generally confer rights on private parties enforceable in domestic courts, see supra p. 
605, this is not relevant to their enforceability in our courts.  As we have seen, the Supremacy 
Clause generally makes treaties enforceable in our courts in the same circumstances as statutory 
and constitutional provisions of like content. 
 132 This last point is one that the lower courts in VCCR cases have gotten right.  None of these 
courts suggested that the VCCR was unenforceable in U.S. courts because the VCCR establishes 
an international judicial mechanism for settling disputes among states-parties.  But cf. Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) (suggesting that the rights afforded by the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions are not enforceable in domestic courts because the parties “obvious[ly]” contemplated 
an enforcement regime based on state intervention).  The existence of an international enforce-
ment mechanism does not suggest the unavailability of domestic enforcement.  The Founders au-
thorized our courts to enforce treaties in order to avoid violations by the United States that might 
trigger international enforcement mechanisms, such as war.  See supra pp. 617–18. 
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leave a more detailed exploration of the requirement of equivalent 
treatment for another day. 
II.  THE NON-SELF-EXECUTION EXCEPTION 
The significance of the requirement of equivalent treatment de-
pends on the scope of its sole exception, that for “non-self-executing” 
treaties.  The Court introduced the concept in Foster as a subsidiary 
alternative basis for denying relief, and, as noted, it suggested that 
only self-executing treaties were to be regarded in the courts as equiva-
lent to acts of the legislature.  What exactly makes a treaty non-self-
executing has long been a matter of great uncertainty.  The Court 
overruled Foster in United States v. Percheman, which found the same 
treaty provision to be self-executing.  After Foster, the Court never 
again, until very recently, denied relief on this basis.  In the meantime, 
the lower courts seeking to apply the doctrine had candidly pro-
nounced themselves confounded by it.133 
The Court’s recent decision in Medellín v. Texas is its first to deny 
relief on non-self-execution grounds since Foster, and the first ever to 
do so solely on this basis.  The majority seemed unburdened by uncer-
tainty about the self-execution doctrine.  Unfortunately, the Court’s 
opinion does little to clarify the doctrine for the rest of us. 
This Part seeks to make sense of the non-self-execution exception in 
light of the text and original public meaning of the Supremacy Clause 
and the Court’s precedents.  It argues that the term “non-self-
executing” has been used to describe treaties that are not enforceable 
in the courts without prior legislative implementation for a variety of 
distinct reasons.  Three of these reasons are consistent with the re-
quirement of equivalent treatment.  Only the fourth category of non-
self-execution, the one introduced in the Foster decision, can be said to 
reflect a doctrine unique to treaties and an exception to the require-
ment of equivalent treatment.  This category of the doctrine, however, 
is problematic at its core because it appears to be based on a mistake 
about the nature of treaties under international law.  Percheman re-
fined the Foster doctrine in a way that significantly alleviated the 
problem.  Medellín can be read in a way that would resurrect — and, 
indeed, aggravate — the original problem, but it is also amenable to a 
reading that would avoid the problem entirely. 
Section A summarizes the four distinct categories of non-self-
executing treaties.  The first three consist of treaties that are not judi-
cially enforceable for reasons that apply equally to constitutional and 
statutory provisions.  Only the fourth — which consists of treaties that 
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 133 See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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require prior implementation because of what the treaty itself has to 
say about the need for legislative implementation — is unique to trea-
ties.  Section B examines in greater depth the conundrum posed by this 
fourth version of non-self-execution and discusses Percheman’s solu-
tion to the problem.  The problem stems from the fact that treaties will 
virtually never have anything relevant to say about whether judicial 
enforcement must be preceded by legislative implementation.  To look 
for an answer to that question in the treaty is to engage in a snark 
hunt, as the dissenting Justices in Medellín correctly noted.134  I argue 
that Percheman alleviated this problem by establishing that a treaty is 
self-executing in the Foster sense unless it “stipulat[es] for some future 
legislative act.”135  Section C considers several possible readings of the 
Court’s recent decision in Medellín, explains the problems that would 
be posed if Medellín were read as an example of Foster-type non-self-
execution, and argues that the opinion is best read as an example of 
the nonjusticiability version of the doctrine.  So read, the decision is 
consistent with the requirement of equivalent treatment and with the 
proposed reading of Percheman. 
A.  Four Versions of Non-Self-Execution136 
Although non-self-execution has rarely been the basis of a Supreme 
Court decision, the concept has been the subject of numerous lower 
court decisions and a great deal of scholarly commentary.  These 
sources, and Supreme Court dicta,137 show that the term has been used 
to describe at least four distinct types of reasons why treaties might 
not be judicially enforceable without prior legislative implementation, 
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause’s instruction to judges to give 
them effect.  The first three sets of reasons apply equally to constitu-
tional and statutory provisions and thus do not represent an exception 
to the requirement of equivalent treatment. 
First, the term “non-self-executing” is often used to describe trea-
ties that do not create a private right of action.138  If a litigant seeks 
damages for an alleged treaty violation and the treaty does not create a 
right to damages, the courts will sometimes say that the treaty is non-
self-executing.  Of course, the fact that a treaty does not create a pri-
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 134 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING 
OF THE SNARK: AN AGONY IN EIGHT FITS (1876). 
 135 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
 136 For a more detailed examination of the four types of non-self-execution, see Vázquez, Four 
Doctrines, supra note 8. 
 137 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734–35 (2004); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 
428–29 n.22 (1984); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); United States v. Ferreira, 54 
U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46 (1851). 
 138 Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719–22. 
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vate right of action for damages does not mean that the treaty is judi-
cially unenforceable.  Other forms of relief may be available, and even 
damages may be available if another law authorizes them.  Addition-
ally, the treaty may be enforceable defensively; a defendant need not 
establish a private right of action, as he is not seeking to maintain an 
action.  To be sure, a treaty will not entitle a litigant to a particular 
remedy if it does not authorize the remedy, either expressly or by im-
plication,139 and no other law authorizes it.  But, in this respect, trea-
ties are no different from the other two forms of federal law, which 
sometimes do not give rise to particular remedies or rights of action. 
In contrast to the first category, the second and third categories of 
non-self-execution result in the treaty being completely unenforceable 
in court in the absence of implementing legislation.  But, here too, the 
reasons the treaty is not directly enforceable in court correspond to 
reasons for which constitutional and statutory provisions may similarly 
be unenforceable.  Both flow from the Constitution’s allocation of 
powers among the branches of the federal government. 
The second category of non-self-executing treaties consists of trea-
ties that purport to accomplish something for which the Constitution 
requires a statute.140  For example, although the Constitution does not 
say so expressly, the courts have concluded that only a statute may 
criminalize conduct.141  As a result, a treaty purporting to criminalize 
conduct would not be effective in criminalizing the conduct.  Congress 
would have to implement the treaty before anyone could be criminally 
prosecuted.  Such a treaty may be described as “non-self-executing,” 
but it is non-self-executing by virtue of the Constitution’s allocation of 
powers between the treatymakers and the lawmakers.  Another exam-
ple is the appropriation of money.142  Treaties purporting to criminalize 
conduct or appropriate money are unconstitutional and hence invalid 
because they purport to accomplish what only a statute may do.143  
Because such treaties are invalid, they lack the force of domestic law, 
just as an unconstitutional statute does. 
The third category of non-self-execution is also based on the Con-
stitution, but this one reflects a constitutional disability of courts.  This 
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 139 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680 (2006) (“[W]here a treaty does not provide 
a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on 
the States through lawmaking of their own.”). 
 140 I call this the constitutionality doctrine.  See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 
8, at 718–19. 
 141 See, e.g., Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980); The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 
838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, 
§ 111 cmt. i. 
 142 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 111 cmt. i.  But see Paust, 
supra note 30, at 775, 778, 780–781. 
 143 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 111 cmt. i. 
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category consists of treaties that impose obligations that are nonjusti-
ciable because they call for judgments of a nonjudicial nature.144  Ex-
amples include treaties that call on parties to “use their best efforts” to 
accomplish certain ends.145  Determining what is the “best” the nation 
can do under the circumstances requires the balancing of numerous 
conflicting goals the nation may have, or of various conflicting de-
mands on its resources.  These are of course judgments for the political 
branches, not the courts.  A treaty might also raise nonjusticiable ques-
tions if it is “too vague for judicial enforcement.”146  To the extent of 
the ambiguity, the treaty implicitly leaves the states-parties with dis-
cretion about how to comply.  Determining how to exercise that discre-
tion is a decision for the political branches.  Treaties that are not en-
forceable in court for these reasons are no different from constitutional 
and statutory provisions that are regarded as nonjusticiable for similar 
reasons.  For example, the Court’s canonical decision on nonjusticia-
bility lists among the reasons supporting the nonjusticiability of a dis-
pute “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”147  Vague 
treaties fall in the first category; “best efforts” treaties in the second. 
Like the previous two versions of the doctrine, the Foster version 
of non-self-execution results in a treaty being entirely unenforceable 
without prior legislative implementation, but it differs from them in 
that the need for implementing legislation has its source in the treaty 
itself.  In applying the first two versions, judges must interpret the 
treaty to determine the nature of the obligation, but the need for im-
plementation comes from the Constitution.  Legislative implementa-
tion is needed either because the treaty requires something that cannot 
be accomplished by treaty or because the treaty imposes an obligation 
that requires judgments that, in our constitutional system, are not for 
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 144 See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 710–18. 
 145 For instance, article 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, provides that “[t]he Contracting States shall as far as possible 
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees” and that “[t]hey shall make every effort 
to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of 
such proceedings.”  The Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), described this arti-
cle as “precatory and not self-executing.”  Id. at 429 n.22.  Another example would be a treaty that 
stipulates that the parties shall respond to a particular problem in one of two specified ways.  
Even if one of the two options, or both, would involve the courts, the treaty is “addressed to” the 
political branches because only they can make the initial choice between the two options.  (I am 
grateful to Judge John Rogers of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for this example.) 
 146 People of Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); see also Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (treaty 
phrased in “broad generalities”); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (treaty 
did not provide “specific standards”); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 
1992) (“language . . . of a broad and general nature”). 
 147 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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the courts to make.  In applying the Foster category, on the other 
hand, judges look to the treaty to see what it says about the need for-
legislative implementation.148  Of the four versions of non-self-execu-
tion, only the Foster category is unique to treaties.149 
B.  Non-Self-Execution in Foster and Percheman 
Foster was a dispute concerning ownership of a tract of land in 
what is now eastern Louisiana.  Plaintiffs Foster and Elam sued Neil-
son in ejectment.150  They claimed title through an 1804 Spanish grant, 
relying on article 8 of an 1819 treaty between Spain and the United 
States, which provided that certain Spanish grants “shall be ratified 
and confirmed” by the United States.151  A majority of the Court con-
cluded that the 1804 grant to Foster’s predecessor was not covered by 
article 8 because the land in question had been ceded by Spain to 
France in 1800 and by France to the United States in 1803.152  The 
Court could have stopped there, but Chief Justice Marshall proceeded 
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 148 Even with respect to Foster-type non-self-execution, the need for legislation comes in part 
from the Constitution.  This is so at least in a negative sense.  The Supremacy Clause might have 
been read to establish a rule of self-execution inalterable by treaty language, just as the British 
rule of non-self-execution is inalterable by treaty language.  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra 
note 8, at 702–03.  Indeed, Justice Iredell appears to have read the Supremacy Clause that way.  
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 277 (1796) (noting that, because of the Supremacy 
Clause, treaties are to be enforced as if “any . . . act [had been] passed” that would have been nec-
essary to make the treaty enforceable under the British rule).  Instead, the Court held in Foster 
that a treaty might require legislation because of what it has to say on that question.  Still, under 
the interpretation of Foster proposed in section II.B.3, it is the Constitution that precludes direct 
judicial enforcement, not the treaty.  The difference between Foster-type non-self-execution and 
the previous two types is that, for Foster-type non-self-execution, the constitutional need for legis-
lative implementation is triggered by treaty language relating to the need for implementing legis-
lation, whereas, with respect to the constitutionality and nonjusticiability categories of non-self-
execution, the need for legislation comes from the Constitution’s allocation of powers among the 
three branches of the federal government and is not tied to treaty language relating to the need for 
legislative implementation. 
 149 Some have argued that a treaty that is non-self-executing in the Foster sense is no different 
from a statute that delegates rulemaking power to the executive branch.  See, e.g., United Shoe 
Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir. 1907).  There is much to the 
analogy, see Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26, at 1125–29, but there are also impor-
tant differences.  Most importantly, statutes delegating rulemaking power to agencies are enforce-
able in court in certain circumstances, see id. at 1153, whereas treaties that are “addressed to the 
legislature” are not.  In any event, the analogy supports a default rule of self-execution.  After all, 
statutes are not thought to delegate rulemaking power to an agency unless they are written that 
way.  See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (requir-
ing a “clear mandate in the Act” before concluding that Congress intended to delegate lawmaking 
authority); United Shoe Mach., 155 F. at 845. 
 150 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 299 (1829). 
 151 Id. at 310 (quoting Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of 
America and His Catholic Majesty (Adams-Onís Treaty), U.S.-Spain, art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 
252 [hereinafter Adams-Onís Treaty]). 
 152 See id. at 301, 310. 
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to offer an alternative holding, one that apparently had not been pro-
posed by Neilson or briefed by either party.153  He concluded that arti-
cle 8 did not itself ratify and confirm the Spanish grants.  Rather, arti-
cle 8 was “addresse[d] . . . to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment.”154  Consequently, “the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court.”155 
The Court’s analysis leaves no doubt that it regarded the distinc-
tion between a self-executing and a non-self-executing treaty as turn-
ing on the language of the treaty.  It framed the question before it by 
asking, “Do [the] words [of the treaty] act directly on the grants, so as 
to give validity to those not otherwise valid; or do they pledge the faith 
of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm 
them?”156  The Court indicated that the treaty would have been self-
executing had it provided that the grants “shall be valid” or that the 
grants were “hereby confirmed.”157  “Had such been its language, it 
would have acted directly on the subject, and would have repealed 
those acts of congress which were repugnant to it . . . .”158  But the ac-
tual language of article 8 — “shall be ratified and confirmed” — con-
templated, in the Court’s view, an act of ratification or confirmation.  
Such an act, the Court concluded, had to come from Congress. 
1.  The Foster Conundrum. —  The Court’s distinction has proved 
difficult to apply, and the reason is not difficult to discern.  As a rule, 
nations negotiating treaties do not concern themselves with details of 
domestic implementation.  Specifically, they do not concern themselves 
with whether enforcement by domestic officials (including judges) 
must be preceded by legislative implementation.  As we have seen, the 
nations of the world have very different constitutional rules on this 
question.  Since the Glorious Revolution, the rule in Great Britain has 
been that treaties always require legislative implementation before 
they may be applied by the courts.159  According to Justice Iredell, the 
British rule was the prevailing one among nations at the time the 
Framers self-consciously adopted a different one for the United 
States.160  Today, many nations of the Commonwealth retain this con-
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 153 See id. at 256–99 (reporting the arguments of the parties). 
 154 Id. at 314. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 314–15. 
 159 See supra p. 614–15. 
 160 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796) (Iredell, J.) (“The present Constitution of 
the United States, affords the first instance of any government . . . saying [that] treaties should be 
the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
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stitutional rule.161  As recognized in both Ware and Foster, the United 
States would have inherited this rule if the Constitution had not estab-
lished a different one.  Our different rule generally dispenses with the 
need for legislative implementation, but, as we have seen, the Consti-
tution still requires implementation of certain types of treaty obliga-
tions.162  Other nations have rules requiring implementation for certain 
types of treaties but not others. 
Because of the diversity of constitutional rules on the subject 
among the nations of the world, general international law does not ad-
dress the particular types of domestic officials — legislative, executive, 
or judicial — who will be responsible for achieving compliance with 
international obligations.  It leaves this issue to the domestic law of 
each nation.163  This is what is meant by the notion that international 
law is generally concerned with ends and not means.164 
General international law can be modified by treaty.  It is thus con-
ceivable that nations will agree by treaty that particular types of do-
mestic officials shall be obligated to perform particular acts or have 
particular responsibilities.  Today, international agreements increas-
ingly assign particular responsibilities to particular types of officials, 
such as judges or executive officials.165  But this was rarely the case at 
the time of the Constitution’s adoption.  Even today, treaties will 
rarely address the specific issue that concerns us here, that is, whether 
the involvement of judicial or executive officials must be preceded by 
legislative action.  As we have seen, for some countries legislative im-
plementation will always be required, and for others it will be required 
for some types of obligations but not others, regardless of what the 
treaty provides.  If a multilateral treaty did mandate domestic en-
forcement without prior legislative implementation, many nations of 
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 161 See, e.g., N.J. Botha, South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 590–92 
(Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005) (noting that, in South Africa, the British rule applies to all 
treaties that are “not technical, administrative or executive”); Maurice Copithorne, Canada, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, at 100–01; see also infra p. 679. 
 162 These include treaty provisions that require criminalization of conduct or appropriation of 
money and vague or precatory provisions.  See supra pp. 630–31. 
 163 See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 82–83 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur 
Watts eds., Longman 9th ed. 1992) (1905); Stephan, supra note 57, at 81. 
 164 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
241 (1983); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classifica-
tion of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 371 (1999). 
 165 See, e.g., Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, arts. 17.2, 17.4–17.5, Apr. 12, 2006,  
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_ 
upload_file73_9496.pdf (specifically requiring enactment of legislation); Case Concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) (holding that the VCCR re-
quires a hearing in court rather than in a discretionary proceeding such as a clemency proceed-
ing); see also infra notes 323, 324 (discussing article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]). 
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the world would be precluded from acceding, and other nations would 
be able to comply with respect to some types of provisions but not  
others. 
The particular approach to resolving this question endorsed by the 
Court in Foster — close scrutiny of the treaty text — is particularly 
likely to lead judges astray.  Because nations negotiating treaties rarely, 
if ever, select the wording of a treaty with the question of legislative 
implementation in mind, judges who draw conclusions about this 
question from treaty text are very likely attributing to the words a 
meaning that was not intended by the parties.  Indeed, to the extent 
the parties had this issue in mind when they selected the treaty lan-
guage, they are likely to have chosen language compatible with either 
direct or indirect enforcement.166  Thus, either the language will have 
been chosen for entirely unrelated reasons or it will likely be ambigu-
ous on the point. 
Consider the treaty language that, in the view of the Foster Court, 
unambiguously signified self-execution and non-self-execution.  The 
Court said that a treaty providing that the grants were “hereby” con-
firmed would be self-executing, whereas a treaty providing that the 
parties shall “pass acts” ratifying the grants would be non-self-
executing.  The question was whether the actual phrasing — “shall 
ratify” — resembled one or the other more closely. 
But even a treaty provision phrased as a “hereby” obligation would 
not necessarily require direct, as opposed to indirect, enforcement.   
The treaty provision involved in Ware comes as close as one can imag-
ine to being a “hereby” obligation;167 yet it is clear that this provision 
did not require direct enforcement of this obligation.  The provision 
imposed the same obligation on both parties, yet, in Great Britain, the 
provision would not have been enforceable in the courts without im-
plementing legislation.  Indeed, at the time the treaty was concluded, 
the United States followed the British rule as well.  Thus, the provi-
sion could not have been intended to be directly enforceable in the 
courts of either party.  That the treaty, as framed, purported to “act[] 
directly on the subject”168 did not mean that the treaty required direct, 
as opposed to indirect, judicial enforcement.  Yet the Court in Ware 
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 166 I use the term “direct enforcement” to mean enforcement by domestic officials without im-
plementing legislation, and “indirect enforcement” to mean enforcement by domestic officials only 
after legislative implementation. 
 167 It provided that “[i]t is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful im-
pediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts, heretofore con-
tracted.”  Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, at art. 4. 
 168 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
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found it to be directly enforceable in our courts by virtue of the Su-
premacy Clause.169 
Nor does a treaty framed as an obligation to “pass acts” accom-
plishing certain ends necessarily require indirect, as opposed to direct, 
enforcement.  Assume that a country had a constitutional rule under 
which all treaties, no matter how framed, were directly enforceable 
without implementing legislation.  It is inconceivable that such a coun-
try would be found to be violating a “pass acts” provision if its officials 
gave effect to the underlying obligation in the absence of implementing 
legislation.170  It is true that such a provision explicitly permits indirect 
enforcement, but, as we saw, even a “hereby” treaty implicitly permits 
indirect enforcement. 
In short, virtually all treaties, no matter how phrased, permit but 
do not require either direct or indirect judicial enforcement.171  Ware 
establishes that a treaty is not non-self-executing just because it per-
mits indirect enforcement.  Thus, if Foster-type non-self-execution 
turns on the content of the treaty with respect to the need for legisla-
tion, it must turn on whether it requires or forbids direct enforcement.  
Yet virtually no treaty will do either.  Thus, almost all treaties will 
have no relevant content on the question.172  As the dissenters in 
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 169 For the same reason, Ware establishes that there is no requirement of mutuality of obliga-
tion with respect to Foster-type self-execution.  Contra David H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity 
for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2006) (arguing that mutuality of obliga-
tion should be relevant in determining whether a treaty is self-executing).  A treaty can be self-
executing for the United States even if it is not self-executing for other states-parties. 
 170 It is possible that a “pass acts” treaty might require legislation to supplement direct en-
forcement, on the theory that legislation would make the treaty even more effective or compliance 
even more likely.  This appears to have been the case with respect to the U.S.-Peru Trade Promo-
tion Agreement, supra note 165.  The requirement of legislation appears to have been inserted at 
the behest of the United States to strengthen, rather than to attenuate, the efficacy of Peru’s 
commitment.  H.R. REP. NO. 110-421, at 1–2 (2007) (“[T]he Peru FTA has become the first U.S. 
free trade agreement to include, in its core text, fully-enforceable commitments by the Parties to 
adopt, maintain, and enforce basic international labor standards, as stated in the 1988 ILO Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. . . . These changes make the Peru FTA the 
strongest free trade agreement ever to be considered by the Committee with regard to basic inter-
nationally recognized labor standards.”); cf. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ art. 55 (pro-
viding that treaties are part of national law).  But, if legislation were required as a supplement to 
direct enforcement, direct enforcement would not violate the treaty. 
 171 As discussed in Part III, there is nothing in international law that would prevent states from 
concluding a treaty requiring direct or indirect judicial enforcement.  My point is that, because of 
the diversity of constitutional rules on the subject, it would be impracticable for states to do so 
and, in any event, as a factual matter, it is rarely done. 
 172 I use the formulation “no relevant content” to avoid the suggestion that the parties’ failure 
to negotiate over direct versus indirect enforcement or to address the issue expressly in the treaty 
itself means that there is a gap in the treaty to be filled in through interpretation (for example, by 
asking how the parties might have resolved the issue had they thought about it).  Treaties do have 
content on the question: Except in the exceedingly rare circumstances in which they provide oth-
erwise, treaties permit either direct or indirect enforcement, and require neither.  This content is 
not relevant to the self-execution question under Foster because, as we have seen, treaties that 
permit indirect enforcement are not for that reason non-self-executing. 
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Medellín correctly noted, to seek an answer to that question in the 
treaty is to “hunt[] [for] the snark.”173 
If Foster-type non-self-execution turns on the content of the treaty 
on the question of direct versus indirect enforcement, it is crucial to 
specify a default rule.  Because treaties almost never have any relevant 
content on that question, the answer to the self-execution question will 
almost always be the one specified by the default rule.  If the default 
rule were that treaties are non-self-executing unless they require direct 
judicial enforcement, then almost no treaties would be self-executing.  
This result would be in significant tension with the constitutional text, 
which clearly contemplates that judges will generally apply treaties.  
(When a treaty is non-self-executing, judges apply the implementing 
statute, not the treaty itself.)174  Moreover, that result is inconsistent 
with the many cases, stretching back to Ware, in which the Court has 
applied unimplemented treaties even though the United Kingdom and 
other nations following the British rule have been parties.175  As we 
have seen, such treaties cannot be read to require direct judicial en-
forcement, as nations following the British rule do not allow such en-
forcement, and no one has ever claimed that they have been in viola-
tion for this reason.  It is also inconsistent with the many, many cases 
in which the Supreme Court has directly applied treaties over  
the years, only one of which involved a treaty that required direct  
enforcement.176 
If the default rule were that treaties are self-executing in the Foster 
sense unless they prohibit direct judicial enforcement, then few, if any, 
treaties would be non-self-executing in this sense.  This would not con-
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 173 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1381 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 174 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 111 cmt. h.  If the Su-
premacy Clause had contemplated that judges would apply treaties only if implemented by stat-
utes, treaties could have been omitted from that clause.  See Vázquez, Laughing, supra note 49, at 
2170–71. 
 175 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2694 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t is common ground that the [Vienna Convention on Consular Relations] is ‘self-
execut[ing].’”); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 686 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is, as the United States recognizes, a self-
executing treaty.”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699–700 (1988) 
(the Hague Service Convention is self-executing); Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987) (the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters is self-executing); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin 
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (the Warsaw Convention “is a self-executing treaty”); see also 
Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 166 (1995) 
(“In the United States, CISG is a self-executing treaty with the preemptive force of federal law.  
Unless otherwise agreed, CISG applies to ‘contracts for sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in different States . . . when the States are Contracting States.’” (quoting 
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 1(a), Apr. 11, 1980, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3) (alteration in original)). 
 176 See infra note 249. 
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flict with the constitutional text or with Supreme Court case law (with 
the possible exception of Medellín, to be discussed below).  But it 
would conflict with the understanding, based on Foster, that there ex-
ists a category of treaty that is non-self-executing because of what it 
has to say about the need for legislative implementation.  This under-
standing has been relied upon by the U.S. treatymakers in negotiating 
treaties over the years, and has become the foundation of their recent 
practice of addressing the self-executing nature of treaties through 
“declarations” regarding self-execution (a development addressed in 
Part III).  Thus, it may be too late in the day to adopt a presumption 
that would eliminate the Foster category of non-self-executing treaties. 
In short, because virtually all treaties permit but do not require or 
prohibit direct or indirect judicial enforcement, the issue cannot turn 
on the content of the treaty on this question.  If the Foster version of 
non-self-execution is to be retained as a distinct category, the distinc-
tion will have to turn on some other feature of the treaty’s language. 
2.  Intent of the U.S. Treatymakers? — Recognizing that treaties 
rarely have any relevant content on the question of direct versus indi-
rect judicial enforcement, some commentators have argued that the is-
sue turns on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers (the President and 
Senate) rather than that of the parties.177  Some of these commentators 
rely on a comment to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law, which reasons as follows: 
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States 
to decide how it will carry out its international obligations.  Accordingly, 
the intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to 
be self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by 
legislation or appropriate executive or administrative action.  If the inter-
national agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and the inten-
tion of the United States is unclear, account must be taken of any state-
ment by the President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it  
to the Senate for consent or to the Congress as a whole for approval, and  
of any expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing with the  
agreement.178 
However, if we assume that the treaties in question have no relevant 
content on the question of direct versus indirect enforcement, as these 
commentators (correctly) do,179 then the constitutional basis for con-
sulting statements made by the President or the Senate on the question 
during the negotiation or ratification process is unclear, to say the 
least. 
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 177 E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 540 (2008). 
 178 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 111 cmt. h. 
 179 See Bradley, supra note 177, at 544–45 (“there is almost never . . . a collective intent” of 
treaty parties regarding self-execution). 
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In interpreting statutes, courts often consult statements made dur-
ing the legislative process (although some members of the Medellín 
majority have strenuously objected to the practice).180  But, when they 
do so, it is to illuminate the meaning of the statute — that is, to deter-
mine the content of the statute on the particular question before 
them.181  Courts might similarly consult statements made by the Presi-
dent or the Senate during the negotiation or ratification process to in-
terpret ambiguous treaty provisions.  Such statements might even be 
relevant in answering some versions of the self-execution question.  
They might help illuminate whether the treaty requires the criminali-
zation of conduct or the appropriation of money, or imposes a firm or 
a discretionary obligation.182  But where it is clear that the treaty has 
no relevant content on the issue, as it will be for Foster-type non-self-
execution in all but rare circumstances, the basis for consulting the 
statements of the President and Senate disappears. 
To regard the views of the President and Senate on this question as 
binding, or even relevant, would be to recognize a form of federal law-
making not specified in the Constitution.  The Constitution sets forth 
three methods of making federal law: amendment of the Constitution 
pursuant to Article V, making of statutes pursuant to Article I, and 
making of treaties pursuant to Article II.183  Statements of the Presi-
dent and Senate regarding the direct judicial enforceability of treaties 
are obviously neither constitutional amendments nor statutes.  Nor are 
they treaties.  Treaties require not just the approval of the President 
and Senate, but the agreement of another nation.  A treaty, in fact, 
consists of the mutual agreements reached by two (or more) nations.184  
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 180 See, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 999 (2008) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part).  
 181 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008) (“‘Legislative history,’ 
of course, refers to the pre-enactment statements of those who drafted or voted for a law; it is con-
sidered persuasive by some, not because they reflect the general understanding of the disputed 
terms, but because the legislators who heard or read those statements presumably voted with that 
understanding.”). 
 182 I conclude below that this last question is the one decided by the Court in Medellín.  If so, 
then its reliance on statements by the President and Senate was proper.  See infra pp. 662–63. 
 183 On the exclusivity of these methods of making federal law, see Bradford R. Clark, Separa-
tion of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1331–32 (2001).  But cf. Car-
los Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1601, 1635–37 (2008) (arguing that fidelity to the original design may require a departure 
from the exclusivity of these three forms of lawmaking to compensate for other departures that 
may have come to be accepted). 
 184 See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 374 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“The question before us in a treaty case is what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than 
what a single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them, thought it agreed to.  And to 
answer that question accurately, it can reasonably be said, whatever extratextual materials are 
consulted must be materials that reflect the mutual agreement (for example, the negotiating his-
tory) rather than a unilateral understanding.”) (citing New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 
1, 23 (1898)). 
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But, as we have seen, the treaty itself will almost never have any rele-
vant content on the question of direct enforceability.  Therefore, the 
statements of the President and Senate on the question cannot be re-
garded as part of the treaty or relevant to its interpretation.  They 
merely reflect the President and Senate’s preferences on a question 
that the treaty itself does not address. 
The Restatement’s rationale for consulting such statements is sin-
gularly unpersuasive.  It is true that “it is ordinarily for the United 
States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations.”  
But this tells us nothing about how the decision of the United States 
on this question is to be made.  Justice Iredell appeared to believe that 
the Founders made the decision for all treaties when they adopted the 
Supremacy Clause.185  The Court in Foster recognized an exception for 
some treaties, but the Court’s analysis makes clear that the exception 
turns on the text of the treaty, which reflects the intent of the parties, 
not just of the United States.  The answer to the question of whether 
the preferences of the President and Senate are binding, or relevant, 
where the treaty has no relevant content on the question, is not in the 
least suggested by the fact that the decision is to be made by the 
United States.  The “United States” similarly makes statutes, yet it is 
clear that it must follow the procedure set forth in Article I to do so. 
Defenders of the “intent of the treatymakers” view also claim sup-
port in the treatymakers’ practice of attaching declarations of non-self-
execution to some treaties.186  These declarations are statements depos-
ited along with the United States’s instruments of ratification “declar-
ing” the relevant treaties to be non-self-executing.187  If in fact the trea-
ties involved had no relevant content on the question, then these 
declarations would appear to be nothing more than the statements of 
the President and Senate on the issue.  Thus, scholars have argued 
that, if these declarations are valid, then so too are similar statements 
made by the President and Senate during the ratification process but 
not formally communicated to the other parties along with the United 
States’ instruments of ratification.188 
This is the strongest argument for the “intent of the treatymakers” 
view.  Some scholars would respond by denying that declarations of 
non-self-execution are valid.189  As will be discussed in Part III, I re-
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 185 See supra pp. 620–21. 
 186 See Bradley, supra note 177, at 545. 
 187 See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 131 & n.13 (1999) 
(noting that declarations of non-self-execution were deposited with the instruments of ratification 
for the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention). 
 188 See Bradley, supra note 177, at 544–45. 
 189 See infra section III.A.1. 
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gard the declarations as valid, although I think the issue is closer than 
most defenders of these declarations appear to believe.  Nevertheless, 
as discussed in section III.A, there are powerful coherence-based rea-
sons for upholding such declarations and, at least when they are for-
mally communicated to the other parties along with the instruments of 
ratification, they may plausibly be regarded as parts of the treaties to 
which they are attached.  Less formal statements made by members of 
the executive branch or the Senate regarding a matter not addressed in 
the treaty, on the other hand, cannot plausibly be regarded as parts of 
the treaties to which they relate.  They are naked acts of lawmaking 
by officials to whom the Constitution does not give lawmaking 
power.190 
3.  Salvaging Foster. — Foster-type non-self-execution could be 
salvaged in a manner tolerably consistent with the constitutional text if 
the Supremacy Clause were interpreted to require implementing legis-
lation for certain treaty provisions framed as obligations to “pass acts” 
accomplishing certain ends, even if such provisions do not forbid di-
rect judicial enforcement.  If that were our constitutional rule, then 
our rule would not turn on the content of the treaty with respect to the 
need for legislative implementation.  It would instead be a domestic-
law requirement of implementing legislation triggered by language  
in the treaty conveying that indirect enforcement was affirmatively  
contemplated, even if the treaty did not go so far as to forbid direct  
enforcement. 
The Court in Foster plainly contemplated that a treaty provision 
would require implementing legislation if framed as a commitment to 
“pass acts” accomplishing certain ends, but not if its words “act di-
rectly” upon the subject.191  The Court did not offer a rationale for re-
quiring legislation in the first case but not the second, even though, as 
we have seen, both provisions permit but do not require indirect judi-
cial enforcement as a matter of international law.192  There are, never-
theless, differences between the obligations imposed by the two types 
of provisions that might justify a domestic-law rule requiring imple-
menting legislation for one but not the other. 
A treaty providing that the grants are “hereby” confirmed would be 
violated if a judge failed to recognize a grant as valid the moment the 
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 190 To be sure, this lawmaking is of a negative character; it limits the effect the treaty would 
otherwise have under the Supremacy Clause.  For this reason, I conclude below that accepting a 
power in the treatymakers, acting jointly through a declaration of non-self-execution, is less prob-
lematic than accepting a declaration of self-execution (if our default rule were non-self-execution).  
But it is still lawmaking and thus problematic unless it takes the form of a statute or treaty. 
 191 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).  
 192 The Court may have been under the misconception that it was merely giving effect to the 
international-law content of the provision regarding the need for legislation. 
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treaty entered into force.  A provision stating that the parties shall 
“pass acts” confirming the grants implicitly gives states-parties a rea-
sonable time to enact the contemplated legislation.193  A requirement 
of implementing legislation might be justified in the second case on the 
theory that it is for the political branches to determine what a reason-
able time for enactment of implementing legislation is.  If this were the 
sole rationale for requiring implementing legislation for “pass acts” 
treaties, however, the Foster category of non-self-execution could be 
subsumed within the “justiciability” category.194 
But this rationale would not explain the need for implementing leg-
islation if the treaty required the states-parties to “pass acts” by a 
specified date.  In such a case, there would be no doubt about the time 
by which law-applying officials would be required to recognize the 
grants as valid.  Yet, although there are no other Supreme Court cases 
on point, such a treaty would appear to be among those that Foster 
regarded as non-self-executing.  If so, then the inability of the courts to 
enforce such a treaty after the specified date would have to be justified 
on other grounds. 
The justification should take account of the reasons the Founders 
decided to alter the British rule and to establish as the American rule 
that treaties generally do not require implementing legislation.  As we 
saw, the Founders’ decision to give treaties the force of domestic law 
was their response to the problem of treaty violations by the States 
during the period of the Articles of Confederation.195  They authorized 
the courts to enforce treaties without awaiting legislative implementa-
tion in order to avoid the international friction that they expected 
would result from treaty violations attributable to the United States.  
Non-self-executing treaties would be problematic from this perspective 
because the courts’ power to enforce them would depend on subse-
quent action by the House, which was not involved in the treatymak-
ing process.  The danger would exist that treaty violations would occur 
and be unremediable by the courts between the time the treaty was 
made and the time it was implemented. 
Given this purpose of the Supremacy Clause, one might justify a 
requirement of implementing legislation for treaties affirmatively stat-
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 193 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 111 cmt. h (“If an in-
ternational agreement or one of its provisions is non-self-executing, the United States is under an 
international obligation to adjust its laws and institutions as may be necessary to give effect to the 
agreement.  The United States would have a reasonable time to do so before it could be deemed in 
default.”). 
 194 Constitutional norms have been held to be nonjusticiable for similar reasons.  Cf. Coleman 
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452–54 (1939) (explaining that in order to be valid, amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution must be ratified by states within a reasonable time of their submission to states 
by Congress, but holding that the question of what is a reasonable time is a political question). 
 195 See supra section I.B. 
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ing that the obligations were subject to implementing legislation be-
cause such language signals to the other parties that compliance will 
depend on action by a legislative body.  The actions of a legislative 
body cannot generally be taken for granted.  The presence of this lan-
guage might be expected to reduce the international friction that could 
result from a violation by preparing states-parties for the increased 
likelihood that the treaty would be violated.  To be sure, a state-
party’s failure to enact the legislation does not excuse non-
compliance,196 but it might have been thought that the violation of an 
obligation addressed to the legislature would be likely to give rise to 
less friction than the violation of a provision purporting to “act upon 
the subject.” 
But Foster is reconcilable with the constitutional text only if ac-
companied by a strong presumption of self-execution, one that can be 
overridden only through a clear statement that the obligations imposed 
by the treaty are subject to legislative implementation.  The Suprem-
acy Clause declares “all” treaties to be the law of the land and instructs 
judges to give them effect.  The clause’s text can accommodate an ex-
ception for treaties “addressed” solely to the legislature, but, as we 
have seen, most treaties are addressed to no domestic officials in par-
ticular.  The parties generally leave such matters to domestic law, and 
our domestic law is the Supremacy Clause, which instructs judges to 
give effect to treaties.  At a minimum, it should take a clear statement 
to countermand that instruction.  Moreover, if the purpose of the Su-
premacy Clause, with respect to treaties, was to reduce international 
friction resulting from treaty violations, then a clear statement of the 
need for legislation would appear to be required to overcome the de-
fault rule established by that clause.  In the absence of such language, 
the Supremacy Clause would actually exacerbate the problem by pro-
ducing an expectation in our treaty partners that treaties would be en-
forced in our courts without implementing legislation.  Even language 
affirmatively calling for legislation would be insufficient.  The parties 
may have called for legislation as a supplement to direct judicial en-
forcement — that is, in order to strengthen rather than attenuate the 
obligation.197  If the need for legislation were justified by the belief 
that the legislature’s violation of an obligation to pass legislation 
would produce less international friction than the violation of a provi-
sion that purports to “act upon the subject,” then a provision that re-
quires legislation as a supplement to direct enforcement or to 
strengthen rather than attenuate the obligation would not qualify. 
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 196 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
 197 For an example, see supra note 170. 
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In short, to overcome the default rule established by the Supremacy 
Clause, what is needed is a clear statement that the treaty is subject to 
legislative implementation.  Ware establishes that a treaty provision 
that implicitly permits indirect judicial enforcement is not enough.  If 
implicit permission of indirect enforcement is not enough, it follows 
that language expressly contemplating indirect enforcement as the sole 
or at least the principal method of enforcement is needed.198 
4.  Percheman and the Presumption of Self-Execution. — Chief 
Justice Marshall learned quickly.  In Percheman, having received 
briefing on the issue, the Court ruled that Article 8 of the Adams-Onís 
Treaty was indeed self-executing.  The Court justified its about-face on 
this issue in part by relying on the Spanish text of the treaty, which 
was brought to its attention by Percheman’s counsel.199  This text left 
no doubt that Article 8 was intended to act upon the grants.200  But 
the Court also recognized that it had been too casual in Foster in con-
cluding that the treaty was “addresse[d] . . . to” the legislature.  The 
English words did “not necessarily” contemplate implementing legisla-
tion.201  “They may import that [the grants] ‘shall be ratified and con-
firmed’ by force of the instrument itself.”202  Because the words were 
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 198 A clear example would be a provision to the effect that “[t]his agreement requires implemen-
tation by legislation in each country,” Agreement Relating to the Establishment of the Roosevelt 
Campobello International Park, U.S.-Can., art. 12, Jan. 22, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1504.  On the other 
hand, a treaty that requires parties to enact “the necessary legislation” would not suffice; such a 
provision does not tell us whether legislation is “necessary” to implement any particular obliga-
tion.  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 709 (discussing problems with lower court 
decisions relying on provisions of this nature to find treaties non-self-executing).  Also insufficient 
would be provisions to the effect that the parties “may give effect to this convention either by giv-
ing it the force of law or by including in their national legislation in a form appropriate to that 
legislation, the rules adopted under this convention,” International Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Protocol of Signature, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 
155.  Such a provision merely restates the choice the parties would have if there were no provision 
specifically addressing the question of legislative implementation. 
 199 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833).  The Court had pointed to the 
discrepancy between the Spanish and English texts on this issue the year before in United States 
v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 741–42 (1832), but found it unnecessary to reverse Foster on 
this point, finding Foster distinguishable.  Id. at 742–43. 
 200 As quoted by the Court in Percheman in English translation, the Spanish text provided that 
the grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of them, to the same 
extent.”  Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88 (internal quotation mark omitted).  The original Span-
ish is even clearer: 
Todas las concesiones de terrenos hechas por [Su Majestad Católica] ó por sus legitimas 
autoridades antes del 24 de Enero, de 1818, en los expresados territorios que [Su 
Majestad] cede á los Estados Unidos, quedarán ratificadas y reconocidas á las personas 
que esten en posesion de ellas, del mismo modo que lo serian si [Su Majestad] hubiese 
continuado en el dominio de estos territorios. 
Adams-Onís Treaty, supra note 151 (emphasis added), quoted in Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. 
Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STORIES 151, 169 n.84 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007). 
 201 Percheman, 32 U.S. at 89.  
 202 Id. 
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amenable to that construction, “that construction which estab-
lishes . . . conformity [with the Spanish text] ought to prevail.”203 
The Court did not expressly recognize that most treaties will be 
equally ambiguous on the matter, but it did frame the self-execution 
question in a way that suggests a tightening of the test for finding a 
treaty to be non-self-executing.  It described a self-executing treaty as 
one that accomplishes the desired end “by force of the instrument it-
self,” and a non-self-executing treaty as one that “stipulat[es] for some 
future legislative act.”204  To similar effect, the Court also framed the 
question as whether the United States had “insist[ed] on the interposi-
tion of government”205 to accomplish the treaty’s end.  To “stipulate” is 
to specify or to state clearly or expressly.206  Similarly, to “insist” is to 
“make a demand with persistent urgency.”207  If a non-self-executing 
treaty is one that stipulates and insists that its obligations are subject 
to implementing legislation, then a clear statement to that effect would 
appear to be required.  Thus, these formulations, considered alongside 
the Court’s implicit recognition that greater caution was required in 
distinguishing self-executing from non-self-executing treaties, support a 
reading of Percheman as adopting a presumption of self-execution. 
If the presumption were rebuttable only by a clear statement that 
the treaty requires indirect judicial enforcement, then few if any trea-
ties would meet the test.  If the Foster category is to be retained as a 
distinct version of non-self-execution, then the presumption must be 
understood to be rebuttable by language indicating that the parties 
contemplated that the obligation imposed by the treaty would be ac-
complished through intervening acts of legislation, even if they would 
not object to direct judicial enforcement.208  In the Court’s words, 
what is needed is a “stipulati[on]” that the treaty’s goals will be ac-
complished through “future legislative act[s].”209 
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 203 Id. at 88. 
 204 Id. at 89. 
 205 Id. at 88. 
 206 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1704 
(4th ed. 2000) (“To specify or arrange in an agreement: stipulate a date of payment and a price.”); 
THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1907 (2d ed. 1991) (“Of one of the parties to 
an agreement, or a person making an offer: to require or insist upon (something) as an essential 
condition.”); 2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2245 (1981) (“to make an express demand for some term in an 
agreement”); cf. JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 10 (Edward Copeland ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2006) (1811) (“He did not stipulate for any particular sum, my dear Fanny; he 
only requested me, in general terms, to assist them . . . .”). 
 207 THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 856 (2d ed. 1991). 
 208 See supra note 198. 
 209 Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89. 
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C.  Understanding Medellín 
In its recent decision in Medellín, the Court appears to have lost 
sight of the lesson learned by the Marshall Court in Percheman.  In its 
first decision ever to deny relief solely on non-self-execution grounds, 
the Court hewed closely to the analysis in Foster, characterizing 
Percheman (not altogether accurately) as having overruled Foster “on 
other grounds.”210  If understood as an application of the Foster ver-
sion of non-self-execution, Medellín reflects many of the same prob-
lems as Foster, and then some.  Fortunately, an alternative reading is 
available that avoids those problems: the Court may be understood to 
have held the relevant treaty to be non-self-executing in the nonjusti-
ciability sense. 
This section first considers several possible interpretations of 
Medellín if the case were understood as having applied the Foster ver-
sion of the non-self-execution doctrine.  Although each interpretation 
finds support in some aspects of the Court’s analysis, they all face in-
surmountable conflicts with the constitutional text and past Supreme 
Court decisions that Medellín either did not purport to reject or explic-
itly endorsed.  The section then advances an alternative interpretation 
of Medellín as an example of the nonjusticiability version of non-self-
execution, a reading that reconciles the opinion with the requirement 
of equivalent treatment and avoids the many problems inherent in a 
reading of Medellín as an example of Foster-type non-self-execution. 
Medellín was the latest of the VCCR cases to reach the Supreme 
Court.  Unlike Mr. Sanchez-Llamas and his predecessors, however, Mr. 
Medellín did not base his claim directly on Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention.211  Instead, he relied on Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, 
pursuant to which the United States “under[took] to comply” with 
judgments of the ICJ in cases to which it was a party.  In Case Con-
cerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),212 a case 
brought by Mexico against the United States on behalf of Medellín 
and 51 other Mexican nationals on death row, the ICJ ruled that Arti-
cle 36 entitled Medellín to a hearing before a judicial tribunal to de-
termine whether the violation of his right to consular notification had 
prejudiced him in his trial or sentencing.213  Medellín argued that be-
cause Article 94 was the supreme law of the land, state courts were ob-
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 210 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). 
 211 Sanchez-Llamas would have doomed any such claim as it held that rights under Article 36 
were subject to state-law procedural default rules, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 
2687 (2006), and Medellín had defaulted in state court. 
 212 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 213 Id. at 60. 
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ligated to comply with the ICJ judgment and provide him with the 
requisite hearing. 
The majority in Medellín stated that “the Avena deci-
sion . . . constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the 
United States.”214  Nevertheless, it held that state courts are not re-
quired to provide the hearing contemplated by Avena because Article 
94 is not self-executing.215 
The opinion is not a model of clarity.  Some of the reasons the 
Court gave for finding Article 94 not to be self-executing seem to have 
little to do with any version of the self-execution question.  For exam-
ple, the Court relied on Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, which pro-
vides that a judgment of the ICJ “has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case.”216  Noting that the 
parties to the ICJ judgment were Mexico and the United States, the 
Court concluded that the Avena judgment was not binding as between 
the United States and Medellín.217  The Court here appears to have 
been saying that Medellín lacked standing to enforce the Avena judg-
ment, a rationale for denying relief distinct from non-self-execution.  
Presumably, the Court would not have denied relief on this basis if the 
suit had been brought by Mexico instead.  Medellín is thus arguably, 
like Foster, a case in which non-self-execution was an alternative 
ground for denying relief.  Unlike in Foster, however, in Medellín non-
self-execution was the Court’s principal basis for denying relief.  In 
fact, the Court in Medellín appeared to believe that Mr. Medellín’s 
lack of standing had a bearing on self-execution, though the connec-
tion between the two concepts is not evident. 
With respect to the self-execution question, the opinion left numer-
ous ambiguities, both as to what caused Article 94 to be non-self-
executing and what effect this would have on its status.  Although my 
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 214 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356. 
 215 The opinion seems to equate the non-self-executing character of Article 94 with the non-self-
executing character of ICJ decisions.  But the two need not be coextensive.  A treaty might in the-
ory be non-self-executing while requiring that all ICJ decisions be automatically enforced in do-
mestic courts.  In such an event, Congress would have to enact a statute requiring courts to en-
force ICJ judgments, but the statute would have to make ICJ judgments enforceable without the 
need for legislative implementation of each decision.  Cf. infra note 259 (discussing British com-
pliance with the obligation to “give effect” to the EEC Treaty).  On the other hand, Article 94 it-
self could be self-executing in the sense that it operates directly as law (as I argue all treaties do in 
the United States by virtue of the Supremacy Clause), while ICJ judgments are not self-executing 
because Article 94 does not require that all such judgments be enforced.  The latter is what I shall 
conclude the Court actually held in Medellín.  See infra section 2.f.  However, because the Court 
wrote as if it were determining the self-executing nature of Article 94, I will first consider the 
plausibility of various tests that might be derived from Medellín for determining whether treaties 
are self-executing. 
 216 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Statute of the International Court 
of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179). 
 217 Id. at 1361. 
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principal focus is the cause of non-self-execution, I will first consider 
what the Court had to say about the effect of non-self-execution.  Since 
Foster-type non-self-execution turns on what the treaty itself has to say 
on the self-execution question, its cause follows from what the treaty 
has to say about its effect. 
1.  The Effect of Non-Self-Execution. — The Court in Medellín 
noted that “the label ‘self-executing’ has on occasion been used to con-
vey different meanings,” but it made clear that “[w]hat we mean by 
‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as fed-
eral law upon ratification.”218  “Conversely, a ‘non-self-executing’ 
treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal 
law.”219  This and many similar statements in the opinion suggest that 
the majority understood that the effect of a determination that a treaty 
is non-self-executing is that the obligations imposed by the treaty as a 
matter of international law lack the force of domestic law.220  If so, the 
Court was endorsing a view that had been repeated by many lower 
courts and commentators221 but had never before been endorsed by the 
Court itself.  It is a claim that has not received the scrutiny deserved 
by a statement so directly at odds with the constitutional text. 
The Supremacy Clause declares that “all” treaties are the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”222  This provision thus takes the international obli-
gations imposed on the United States by its treaties and gives them the 
force of domestic law.  Exceptions can legitimately be interpolated for 
treaties that are invalid or have been superseded by subsequent stat-
utes.  For example, a treaty that purports to accomplish what is be-
yond the treaty power lacks the force of domestic law because, to that 
extent, it is invalid.  Similarly, though a treaty superseded by a statute 
continues to bind the United States internationally, it is considered re-
pealed as a matter of domestic law.  There is no basis, however, for 
denying the force of domestic law to a treaty that imposes an obliga-
tion on the United States that is not beyond the treaty power or oth-
erwise invalid and has not been superseded by a statute. 
The Medellín majority did not attempt to square the view that 
non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law with the text 
of the Supremacy Clause.  As support for this characterization, it 
merely cited Foster’s statement that, if a treaty is self-executing, it 
must be regarded in the courts as the equivalent of an act of the legis-
lature.223  But Foster never said that non-self-executing treaties lack 
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 218 Id. at 1356 n.2. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See infra note 239. 
 221 See sources cited supra note 31. 
 222 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
 223 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).  
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the force of domestic law.  Rather, it characterized such treaties as laws 
“addresse[d] to” the political branches rather than the courts.224  When 
a treaty is addressed to the legislature, as the Court concluded in Fos-
ter, then it is clearly not the equivalent of an act of the legislature, as 
legislatures do not typically pass laws obligating themselves to pass 
specified other laws in the future.  Moreover, such a treaty is not to be 
“regarded in [the] courts” at all,225 because courts in our constitutional 
system lack the power to require the legislature to legislate.  Such a 
treaty is thus not judicially enforceable because of the particular na-
ture of the obligation it imposes, not because it lacks the force of do-
mestic law. 
To be sure, a treaty addressed to the legislature lacks virtually all of 
the attributes that we usually associate with a “law.”  For example, it is 
not enforceable in courts, and can be violated by the norm-subject 
with impunity.  I share the majority’s skepticism about the legal status 
of such a norm.  But the difficulty of understanding how a non-self-
executing treaty can be said to be a “law” in any recognizable sense 
should have led the Court to question the concept of non-self-
execution, not to ignore the constitutional text.  Non-self-execution, af-
ter all, originated as an alternative holding in a subsequently overruled 
decision and was never again the clear basis for denial of relief by the 
Supreme Court.  The Medellín majority instead appeared to treat Fos-
ter’s alternative holding as sacrosanct and barely took notice of the 
constitutional text. 
Notwithstanding the suggestions throughout the opinion that non-
self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law, Medellín is sus-
ceptible to a narrower interpretation.  At several points, the Court said 
that non-self-executing treaties were not “enforceable” domestic law.226  
Only this narrower understanding of Medellín avoids a direct conflict 
with the constitutional text.227  For this reason, even the Solicitor Gen-
eral of Texas, who argued the case on behalf of the State, disavows the 
broader interpretation.228 
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 224 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356, 1359, 1361, 1365. 
 227 See Bradley, supra note 177, at 541 (“The narrower interpretation of the decision, that non-
self-executing treaties are simply not judicially enforceable, appears to be preferable because it is 
easier to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides 
that ‘all’ treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the 
land.”); cf. Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manu-
script at 13, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (discussing problem with no-domestic-
force view and noting the majority’s “confusion about what self-execution means”). 
 228 Medellin v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution, Federalist Society Online Debate Series, Mar. 28, 
2008 (remarks of Ted Cruz), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp (“I agree that 
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Indeed, the Medellín majority itself implicitly recognized that Arti-
cle 94 of the U.N. Charter had some effect as domestic law.  In decid-
ing that the President lacked the power to order the state of Texas to 
comply with the ICJ’s judgment in Avena, the majority applied Justice 
Jackson’s familiar tripartite test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.229  The majority concluded that the President’s power was at 
its lowest ebb because he was acting in the face of a non-self-executing 
treaty, which, in its view, reflected a decision by the treatymakers that 
enforcement of the treaty would require an act of legislation.230  Thus, 
as applied by the majority, Article 94 had the domestic legal effect of 
reducing the President’s power to act unilaterally.  In this part of its 
opinion, the majority seems to reach the same conclusion regarding 
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter that the Court in Foster reached with 
respect to Article 8 of the Adams-Onís Treaty: in both cases, the treaty 
had domestic legal force but was “addressed to” the legislature and 
hence required legislative implementation before it could be enforced 
in the courts.  As discussed above, this understanding reconciles Fos-
ter-type non-self-execution (albeit uneasily) with the constitutional 
text.231 
One scholar who has embraced a narrow interpretation of Medellín 
on this point has suggested that the Court should be understood to 
have held that a non-self-executing treaty is not judicially enforceable 
domestic law.232  This gets it almost right.  If non-self-executing trea-
ties are “laws” addressed to the political branches, then they are not 
judicially enforceable.  But a more precise definition is required.  Some 
treaties are not judicially enforceable because the obligation they im-
pose is not one for the courts at all.  But there was little doubt in ei-
ther Foster or Medellín that compliance with the relevant obligations 
would require the involvement of courts at some point.  The question 
was whether judicial enforcement had to be preceded by action from 
the political branches.  In the words of Medellín, a self-executing
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treaties stand on the same footing as ‘laws.’  But Congress passes all the time ‘laws’ that are not 
enforceable in court . . . .”). 
 229 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368. 
 230 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368–71. 
 231 Whether the Court was correct to conclude that the treaty was indeed addressed to the leg-
islature is, of course, a separate question.  Cf. supra note 11 (suggesting that some non-self-
executing treaties might be addressed to the executive branch). 
 232 Bradley, supra note 177, at 548. 
  
2008] TREATIES AS LAW OF THE LAND 651 
treaty is one that is “immediate[ly]”233 or “direct[ly]”234 or “auto-
matic[ally]”235 enforceable in the courts.  When we say that a treaty is 
non-self-executing in the Foster sense, therefore, what we mean is that 
such a treaty is enforceable in the courts only indirectly — that is, 
pursuant to implementing legislation or other appropriate action by 
the political branches.  The treaty is the supreme law of the land, but 
it is “addressed to” the political branches rather than the courts.236 
2.  The Cause of Non-Self-Execution. — This leaves the question of 
determining what makes a treaty non-self-executing.  As discussed 
above, a treaty might be addressed to the political branches by virtue 
of the Constitution.  That is the case when a treaty purports to accom-
plish what is beyond the treatymaking power or imposes an obligation 
that requires the exercise of nonjudicial discretion.  The distinctive 
feature of Foster-type non-self-execution is that the need for legislative 
implementation results from what the treaty itself has to say on the 
subject. 
It is clear that the Medellín majority regarded the question before 
it as one of treaty interpretation.237  This was the reason it focused on 
the text of the treaty, and chided the dissent for failing to do so.238  But 
Medellín does not specify what judges are supposed to look for in the 
text or the clarity with which they should expect to find it.  This sec-
tion considers several alternative tests that find support in Medellín, if 
the decision is read as an example of Foster-type non-self-execution.  
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 233 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358 (Article 94 “is not ‘an acknowledgement that an ICJ decision 
will have immediate legal effect in the courts of U.N. Members . . . .’” (quoting U.S. Amicus Brief 
in Medellin v. Dretke, supra note 112, at 34)); id. (Article 94 does not “indicate that the Senate 
that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in do-
mestic courts.”). 
 234 Id. at 1361 (“The pertinent international agreements . . . do not provide for implementation 
of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts . . . .”); id. at 1362 (referring to 
the dissent’s “novel approach to deciding which . . . treaties give rise to directly enforceable fed-
eral law”). 
 235 Id. at 1359 (“The remainder of Article 94 confirms that the U.N. Charter does not contem-
plate the automatic enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts.”); id. at 1360 (“If ICJ judg-
ments were . . . regarded as automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately 
and directly binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.”); id. (refer-
ring to Medellín’s view that ICJ decisions are “automatically enforceable as domestic law”); id. 
(“[T]he ICJ decision in Avena does not automatically constitute federal law judicially enforceable 
in United States courts.”). 
 236 Professor Bradley’s formulation is also too narrow in focusing solely on enforceability in 
courts.  A treaty that is addressed to the legislature lacks other characteristics of federal laws as 
well; for example, it does not preempt conflicting state laws.  Thus, it is more accurate to say that 
such treaties are not enforceable by any domestic law-applying officials until implemented by 
lawmaking officials.  But cf. supra note 11 (noting that a treaty might be non-self-executing be-
cause addressed to the executive branch). 
 237 See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (noting “our obligation to interpret treaty provisions to de-
termine whether they are self-executing”). 
 238 See id. 
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Each test is consistent with some aspects of the majority’s analysis but 
inconsistent with other aspects. 
(a)  Presumption Against Self-Execution Rebuttable by Clear State-
ment that Treaty Has Domestic Legal Force. — Consistent with the 
passages indicating that the majority understood non-self-executing 
treaties to lack the force of domestic law, the Medellín opinion at times 
seems to focus on what the treaty had to say about its own status as 
domestic law.  These portions of the opinion suggest that the majority 
was looking for clear evidence that the parties to the treaty affirma-
tively intended it to have the force of domestic law.  For example, the 
Court states that a treaty would be non-self-executing if it were “rati-
fied without provisions clearly according it domestic effect.”239  One 
possible reading of Medellín’s holding, then, is that a treaty is non-self-
executing unless its text clearly specifies that it has the force of domes-
tic law.240 
This reading is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, it is 
based on the notion that a non-self-executing treaty lacks the force of 
domestic law, which, as we saw earlier, is inconsistent with the consti-
tutional text.  Some scholarly defenders of this reading of Medellín 
have argued that the Supremacy Clause can be read to give domestic 
legal force only to treaties that purport to have domestic legal force.241  
But that is not how the clause reads.  The Supremacy Clause does not 
limit its operation to treaties that state that their obligations shall have 
such force.242 
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 239 Id. at 1369; see also id. at 1356 (“In sum, while treaties ‘may comprise international com-
mitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes 
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on these terms.’” 
(ellipsis in original) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(en banc))); id. at 1364 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions 
indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”); id. at 
1366 (“Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination 
by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic 
effect.”). 
 240 See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that Medellín “adopt[ed] a 
clear-statement rule for determining when treaties are self-executing”). 
 241 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution, Federalist Society Online Debate Series, 
Mar. 28, 2008 (remarks of Nick Rosenkranz), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp. 
 242 An interesting question would be raised by a treaty that expressly provided that it did not 
have the force of domestic law.  Cf. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 12 (1990) (stating that declara-
tion of non-self-execution attached to Torture Convention “clarif[ies] that the provisions of the 
Convention [will] not of themselves become effective as domestic law”).  I am not aware of any 
treaty containing such language in its body or even in an attached declaration.  If it existed, its 
validity would be “controversial.”  See Bradley, supra note 177, at 550.  If valid, I suppose we 
would say that the treaty has domestic legal force to the extent of establishing that it lacks domes-
tic legal force.  In any event, recognizing that a treaty lacks domestic legal force if it so states is a 
far cry from saying that treaties lack such force even if they do not so state.  The latter cannot be 
reconciled with the constitutional text. 
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Moreover, a rule under which treaties are non-self-executing unless 
they clearly state that they have the force of domestic law would be in-
consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior cases stretching back to 
Ware v. Hylton and including some cases that the Medellín Court en-
dorsed.  The treaty involved in Ware did not include language specify-
ing that the obligations it imposed would have the force of domestic 
law.  Indeed, as we saw, when the treaty was concluded, it could not 
have had the force of domestic law in either Great Britain or the 
United States.243  Yet the treaty was found to have the force of domes-
tic law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.  The requirement of a clear 
statement of domestic force would also conflict with the many cases in 
which the Court has found multilateral treaties to be self-executing 
even though the United Kingdom and other nations following the Brit-
ish rule were parties.244  These treaties did not specify that they would 
have the force of domestic law in the various states-parties; in fact, 
they could not have had such force in many of the states-parties be-
cause of their constitutional rules. 
Nor was there such language in the treaties involved in Sumitomo 
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,245 Kolovrat v. Oregon,246 or Clark v. 
Allen247 — decisions that the Medellín majority explicitly endorsed.248  
Indeed, such language was absent from all but one of the treaties in-
volved in the innumerable other cases in which the Supreme Court has 
expressly or implicitly found treaties to be self-executing.249  Reading 
Medellín to adopt a test under which only one treaty that the Supreme 
Court has ever considered would be self-executing would thus require 
rejection of the holdings of many, many cases.  But the Court did not 
purport to be reversing a single self-execution decision, much less radi-
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 243 See supra pp. 619–20. 
 244 See cases cited supra note 175. 
 245 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 246 366 U.S. 187 (1961). 
 247 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 248 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1365–66 (2008). 
 249 See, for example, the cases cited in Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 716 nn.96, 99.  
The one exception is the treaty found to be self-executing in Bacardi Corp. of America v. Dome-
nech, 311 U.S. 150, 159 (1940), which provides in Article 35: 
The provisions of this Convention shall have the force of law in those States in which in-
ternational treaties possess that character, as soon as they are ratified by their constitu-
tional organs.  The Contracting States in which the fulfillment of international agree-
ments is dependent upon the enactment of appropriate laws, on accepting in principle 
this Convention, agree to request of their legislative bodies the enactment of the neces-
sary legislation in the shortest possible period of time and in accordance with their con-
stitutional provisions. 
Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and Other American Republics 
for the Protection of Trade-Marks art. 35, Feb. 20, 1929, 124 L.N.T.S. 357 [hereinafter Inter-
American Trademark Convention].  This is a truly odd provision in a number of respects.  See 
infra p. 667 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining agreement on such a provision). 
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cally changing course.250  Such a reading also conflicts with the 
Court’s statement that “some international agreements are self-
executing and others are not.”251  There appears to be only one U.S. 
treaty in force that would meet this test.252  Medellín accordingly can-
not be read to adopt a presumption of non-self-execution rebuttable by 
a clear statement that the treaty was intended to have the force of do-
mestic law. 
(b)  Test Turning on Whether Treaty Requires Direct Judicial En-
forcement. — Portions of the majority opinion suggest that the Court 
was asking whether the treaty required direct judicial enforcement and 
suggest that the Court believed that, if the treaty permitted indirect 
judicial enforcement, it was non-self-executing and hence not enforce-
able in the courts without prior implementation.  Thus, it stated that 
Article 94 was non-self-executing because it “do[es] not provide for im-
plementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic 
courts,”253 and it suggested that “direct enforcement in domestic 
courts”254 was a “particular remedy”255 that must be provided for in 
the treaty itself and may not be imposed on the states through judicial 
lawmaking.256 
If that had been the question, the Court’s opinion could have been 
much briefer.  Consistent with the view that international law is gen-
erally concerned with ends and not means, there is little doubt that the 
parties to the U.N. Charter did not intend to require direct judicial en-
forcement of ICJ judgments.  They would certainly have been satisfied 
with indirect judicial enforcement, which would have been the only 
constitutional option for the United States with respect to ICJ judg-
ments requiring the criminalization of conduct or the appropriation  
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 250 That the majority did not intend such a drastic change in the law is confirmed by its subse-
quent decision denying Medellín a stay of execution in part on the ground that he had had four 
years in which to obtain the necessary legislation.  In denying the stay, the majority wrote that 
“Congress has not progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since the ICJ 
ruling,” Medellín v. Texas, 77 U.S.L.W. 3073, 3073 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (per curiam), implicitly re-
jecting Justice Breyer’s argument in dissent that “until this Court’s decision in Medellin a few 
months ago, a member of Congress might reasonably have believed there was no need for legisla-
tion because the relevant treaty provisions were self-executing,” id. at 3074 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
The Court thus denied that it was changing the rules. 
 251 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 252 I refer to the Inter-American Trademark Convention, supra note 249. 
 253 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1361; see also id. at 1358 (expressing agreement with the executive 
branch’s argument that Article 94 “is not ‘an acknowledgement that an ICJ decision will have 
immediate legal effect in the courts of U.N. members’” (quoting U.S. Amicus Brief in Medellin v. 
Dretke, supra note 112, at 34)); id. (Article 94 non-self-executing because it does not “indicate that 
the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal ef-
fect in domestic courts”). 
 254 Id. at 1361. 
 255 Id. at 1361 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680 (2006)). 
 256 Id. 
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of money, and would likely be the only option for other nations in  
other circumstances.  Neither Medellín nor any amicus supporting him  
argued that Article 94 required direct judicial enforcement of ICJ  
judgments.257 
But that was not the question before the Court.  The Court’s very 
first important treaty decision, Ware v. Hylton, established that the 
Supremacy Clause could make a treaty judicially enforceable even 
though the treaty did not require direct judicial enforcement.258  As al-
ready discussed, virtually all treaties permit indirect judicial enforce-
ment.  If only treaties requiring direct judicial enforcement were self-
executing, then virtually no treaties would be self-executing.259  This 
understanding of the self-execution test is thus untenable for the same 
reason as the previous one: it would conflict with the text of the Su-
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 257 Medellín argued that Article 94 imposed an obligation to comply with ICJ judgments and 
that the Supremacy Clause made that obligation enforceable in the courts.  Brief for Petitioner at 
23–26, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3–8, Medellín, 128 S. 
Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984). 
 258 See supra p. 635.  The treaty could not have required direct judicial enforcement, since both 
parties followed the British rule at the time it was concluded. 
 259 Again, the Inter-American Trademark Convention, supra note 249, appears to be the only 
existing U.S. treaty that would satisfy this test, and only if “force of law” were understood to en-
tail judicial enforcement.  Although some treaties specifically require enforcement in courts, see, 
e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
6 I.L.M. 368, they do not for that reason require direct judicial enforcement.  See infra note 357.  
Nations following the British rule would comply with such treaties by passing legislation author-
izing their courts to enforce them. 
  The same is true of the treaty obligation cited by Justice Stevens as an example of a self-
executing obligation: annex VI, article 39 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which the United 
States has signed but not yet ratified.  See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, annex VI, art. 39, opened 
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397).  This article provides that “decisions of the [Sea-
bed Disputes] Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same 
manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the en-
forcement is sought.”  It does not provide, however, that states must give direct effect to this 
treaty obligation.  Nations following the British rule would comply by passing statutes requiring 
their courts to enforce the decisions of this tribunal “in the same manner as judgments or orders of 
[their] highest court[s].” 
  Finally, the same appears to be the case for the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (EEC Treaty), another treaty to which the United 
States is not a party.  The European Court of Justice held in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. 
Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, 13, that some articles of this treaty “produc[e] di-
rect effects and creat[e] individual rights which national courts must protect” even in the absence 
of national legislation on the subject.  The United Kingdom subsequently enacted a statute in-
structing its courts to enforce the provisions of the EEC Treaty that “in accordance with the 
Treat[y] are without further enactment to be given legal effect.”  European Communities Act, 
1972, c. 68, § 2(1) (Eng.).  That the United Kingdom is complying with its obligation to give “di-
rect effect” to certain provisions of the EEC Treaty through the operation of a statute directing its 
courts to enforce those provisions indicates that the treaty does not actually require direct, as op-
posed to indirect, enforcement. 
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premacy Clause, the Supreme Court’s prior cases, and Medellín’s own 
statement that “some international agreements are self-executing.”260 
(c)  No Presumption. — That the Court did not adopt a presump-
tion against self-execution is suggested by the fact that it was not con-
tent to rely on the absence of language in the treaty about domestic le-
gal effect or direct judicial enforceability.  Instead, it relied on 
language in the treaty — “undertakes to comply” — that the Court 
understood to reflect a need for future action,261 as well as the en-
forcement provisions of Article 94(2)262 and the practice of other states-
parties.263  Reliance on these sources seems inconsistent with a pre-
sumption against self-execution.264 
Portions of the Medellín opinion suggest that the majority decided 
the issue based on its general impression that the parties contemplated 
legislative implementation.  For example, the Court justified its con-
clusion by noting that Article 94 “read[] like” a non-self-executing pro-
vision.265  This impressionistic approach is reminiscent of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s gut reading of the phrase “shall ratify and confirm” — 
which, indeed, the majority used as a model in this regard.266  But 
Chief Justice Marshall soon learned the dangers of this approach.267  
Even the ablest of U.S. judges are often unfamiliar with international 
law terminology and usage.  The likelihood that judges will be misled 
is particularly acute with respect to the self-execution question be-
cause, as explained, the language of the treaty will almost always be 
(purposely) ambiguous on the point.  Thus, if we ask courts to decide 
the issue based on the impression the language leaves them with, the 
results will be highly unpredictable. 
Relatedly, the impressionistic approach gives tremendous power to 
courts to determine which treaties shall be enforced and which shall 
not.  This broad discretion is well illustrated by the fact that Article 
94’s “undertakes to comply” formulation “read” to the majority like a 
non-self-executing provision, while a treaty using virtually identical 
words was held by the Court in Comegys v. Vasse268 to be self-
executing.  In response to the Medellín dissent’s reliance on Comegys, 
the Court could say only that it involved a different treaty.269  That 
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 260 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 261 Id. at 1358–59. 
 262 Id. at 1359–60. 
 263 Id. at 1363. 
 264 See Bradley, supra note 177, at 546 (“It would be over-reading the decision, however, to con-
clude that it supports a presumption against self-execution.”). 
 265 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See supra pp. 644–45. 
 268 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828). 
 269 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1364–65. 
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the majority itself would regard such broad and unguided judicial dis-
cretion as a major problem is shown by its blistering criticism, pre-
cisely on this ground, of the approach favored by the dissent.270 
As explained in section B, because treaties will almost never have 
any relevant content on the issue, it is essential to articulate a default 
rule on the question of Foster-type non-self-execution.  Because the 
language of the treaty is very likely to be ambiguous, the default rule 
has to be one that is rebuttable only by a clear statement.  With re-
spect to a question as to which the treaty has no relevant content, a 
“no-presumption” approach is untenable.  It would license ad hoc deci-
sionmaking untethered to any actual intent of the parties and produce 
arbitrary results. 
(d)  Default Rule of Self-Execution Rebuttable by Evidence of In-
tent To Require Implementing Legislation. — Though the Medellín 
opinion’s tone and much of its analysis point the other way, one part of 
its analysis supports a reading of the opinion as embracing a default 
rule of self-execution rebuttable by evidence of an intent to require 
implementing legislation.  After finding Article 94 to be non-self-
executing, the Court considered whether the state courts were required 
to comply with the Avena judgment by virtue of the President’s 
memorandum instructing them to comply.271  In applying Justice Jack-
son’s Youngstown analysis,272 the Court concluded that the President’s 
action fell into the third category because Article 94 was a non-self-
executing treaty, and “[a] non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one 
that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have domestic 
effect of its own force.”273  Therefore, the Court held, as a non-self-
executing treaty, Article 94 prohibited the President from unilaterally 
enforcing its provisions. 
The Court’s analysis here suggests that, for a treaty to be regarded 
as non-self-executing, there must be affirmative evidence of an “under-
standing that [the treaty was] not to have domestic effect of its own 
force.”  If we understand the Court to have meant “not directly en-
forceable” as opposed to “no[] . . . domestic effect,” consistent with our 
analysis above,274 then the Court’s reasoning here suggests that a 
treaty is to be regarded as non-self-executing only if there is affirma-
tive evidence of an understanding that it was not intended to be di-
rectly enforceable.  If the treaty were silent on the issue, it would be 
self-executing. 
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 270 See id. at 1362–63. 
 271 Id. at 1367–72. 
 272 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,  
concurring). 
 273 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369. 
 274 See supra section II.C.1. 
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Under the opposite default rule, the Court’s Youngstown analysis 
would make no sense.  If silence about the need for legislation ren-
dered a treaty non-self-executing, then a finding of non-self-execution 
would place the President’s action in the middle Youngstown cate-
gory.275  An alternative understanding of Medellín’s Youngstown ana-
lysis would be that the Court believed that silence in a treaty was in-
dicative of an intent to require implementing legislation because the 
Court believed there was a background presumption of non-self-
execution.  The problem with this interpretation is that the Court had 
never before articulated a background presumption of non-self-
execution.  Indeed, even after the Medellín decision, it is far from clear 
that there is a presumption against self-execution.  Even commentators 
who would welcome such a presumption stop short of claiming that 
the Court adopted one.276  It is thus difficult to attribute to the treaty-
makers an affirmative intent to require implementing legislation based 
on their silence on the issue. 
If the court were understood to have adopted a default rule of non-
self-execution, rebuttable only by treaty language specifying that the 
treaty has direct effect, the Court’s Youngstown analysis would lead to 
the absurd conclusion that the President has less power to require the 
states to comply with ICJ judgments if there is a treaty imposing a 
firm obligation to comply with such judgments but saying nothing 
about its direct effect, than if there had been no treaty imposing an ob-
ligation to comply.  This absurd conclusion can be avoided only by 
understanding the Court to have adopted a default rule of self-
execution rebuttable by affirmative evidence that the treaty contem-
plates implementing legislation.277 
(e)  Test Turning on the Intent of U.S. Treatymakers. — Recogniz-
ing the significant problems with any test that turns on the intent of 
the parties on the question of direct judicial enforceability, some com-
mentators have read Medellín to endorse the Restatement approach, 
under which the intent of the U.S. treatymakers is determinative.278  
They point to the numerous references in the opinion to what the Sen-
ate must have intended.279  Despite these references, however, the ma-
jority opinion cannot be read to have embraced the Restatement ap-
proach.  In each case but one, the majority referred to the intent of the 
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 275 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“congressional inertia, indiffer-
ence, or quiescence” can put a President’s action in the middle category). 
 276 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 177, at 546. 
 277 For elaboration of this point, see Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, supra note 11, at 569–70. 
 278 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 177, at 544. 
 279 Id. 
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Senate as reflected in the terms of the treaty.280  The one time it did 
not link the Senate’s presumed intent exclusively to the terms of the 
treaty, it referred to the treaty’s “text, background, negotiating and 
drafting history, or practice among signatory nations.”281  Importantly, 
each of these sources reflects the intent of the parties, not the unilateral 
views of the U.S. treatymakers. 
The majority did at one point rely on executive branch statements 
reflecting its belief that Article 94 was the exclusive enforcement 
mechanism for addressing violations of Article 94(1).282  This reliance 
was consistent with the majority’s belief that the issue before it was 
one of treaty interpretation.283  Executive branch statements might be 
relevant to treaty interpretation as evidence of the intent of one of  
the parties.  But, where it is conceded that the treaty has no relevant  
content on an issue, the court’s role is not one of treaty interpret- 
ation.  The majority’s analysis does not suggest that it would have re- 
garded it as appropriate to consult executive branch statements in such  
circumstances. 
Indeed, the majority’s opinion suggests strongly that it would not 
regard executive branch or Senate statements on such matters as bind-
ing, or even relevant, if the content of the treaty were clear.  Echoing 
Chadha,284 as well as scholars who have argued forcefully that the 
three forms of federal lawmaking set forth in the Constitution are ex-
clusive,285 the majority stressed that “[o]ur Framers established a care-
ful set of procedures that must be followed before federal law can be 
created under the Constitution.”286  These are, of course, the proce-
dures for making the three forms of federal law listed in the Suprem-
acy Clause.  As we have seen, statements by the President or Senate on 
matters not addressed by a treaty do not qualify as any of those 
three.287 
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 280 See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1364 (2008) (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-
executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the 
agreement to have domestic effect.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1366 (“Our cases simply require 
courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated 
it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.” (emphasis added)). 
 281 Id. at 1367. 
 282 Id. at 1359. 
 283 See id. at 1362. 
 284 INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 285 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Separation of Powers As a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1331–37 (2001). 
 286 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1362. 
 287 It is true that the majority gave a functionalist defense of its formalist insistence on these 
procedures.  It stressed that each of these procedures “requires joint action by the Executive and 
Legislative Branches,” id. at 1369, which protects the populace against a dangerous accumulation 
of power in any one branch.  This rationale for insisting on adherence to the constitutionally 
stipulated procedures for making federal law would not appear to call into question the relevance 
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Treatymaking requires the agreement not just of the President and 
Senate, but also of another nation.  The requirement of another nation 
is far from trivial.  The President and Senate were given the power to 
assume certain obligations as leverage to extract from other countries 
promises that would benefit the nation.  Treaties consist of these mu-
tual rights and obligations.  These are what the Supremacy Clause de-
clares to be the “supreme Law of the Land.”  As we have seen, virtu-
ally all treaties have no relevant content on the question of direct 
versus indirect judicial enforceability.  That leaves the Supremacy 
Clause’s instruction to the courts to give effect to treaties as the rele-
vant law on the question, subject to constitutional limitations such as 
those limiting what may be accomplished by treaty or what may be 
enforced by courts.  The disembodied “intent” of the President and 
Senate has no claim to legal status or even relevance. 
(f)  Medellín as a Nonjusticiability Case. — All but one of the 
foregoing readings of Medellín as involving Foster-type non-self-
execution are plagued with constitutional problems.  (The one that is 
not — interpretation d — is in tension with the other portions of the 
opinion discussed above.)  An alternative interpretation avoids these 
problems.  On this alternative reading, the Court found ICJ judgments 
not to be directly enforceable in U.S. courts because Article 94 left the 
parties to the Charter (or at least the United States) with some discre-
tion not to comply.  So understood, Medellín is not an example of Fos-
ter-type non-self-execution at all, but instead an example of non-self-
execution as nonjusticiability.  Such a shift in reading is not necessarily 
a radical one, for the two types of non-self-execution are closely re-
lated, and, indeed, on one view, Foster itself can be understood as a 
nonjusticiability holding.288 
As discussed in section II.A, the nonjusticiability category includes 
treaties that are not enforceable in the courts because the obligations 
they impose call for the exercise of discretion that is clearly for the po-
litical branches and not the courts.  Such treaties are not judicially en-
forceable without prior legislative implementation for the same reason 
that similarly structured constitutional and statutory provisions would 
not be: they require “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
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of statements reflecting the joint or common views of the President and Senate concerning direct 
judicial enforceability.  But the majority focused on this particular purpose of the Constitution’s 
lawmaking procedures because it was addressing the validity of an action that it viewed as having 
been taken by the President alone: the “Memorandum” requiring the states to comply with the 
Avena judgment.  The majority’s analysis does not suggest that other requirements for supreme 
federal lawmaking do not also have an important function, or that the Court would excuse com-
pliance with such procedures if the purpose of the requirement would not be advanced in a par-
ticular case. 
 288 See supra p. 642. 
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for nonjudicial discretion.”289  This category of non-self-execution is 
thus consistent with, rather than an exception to, the requirement of 
equivalent treatment. 
One kind of treaty that is nonjusticiable for this reason is one that 
requires the parties to “use their best efforts” to accomplish certain 
goals.  Such provisions are nonjusticiable because the determination of 
what is the “best” the nation can do under the circumstances involves 
a policy determination clearly for nonjudicial discretion.  Compliance 
may require a balancing of competing demands on the nation’s re-
sources, or even a balancing of the goals reflected in the treaty with 
other goals the nation may have. 
The Medellín opinion indicates that the Court concluded that ICJ 
judgments are not directly enforceable in the courts because Article 94, 
in effect, obligates the United States to do its best to comply with ICJ 
judgments.  Most significantly in this respect, the Court gave as its 
very first reason for finding Article 94 to be non-self-executing that Ar-
ticle 94 “does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ com-
ply.”290  This initial focus suggests that the Court read Article 94 to 
leave the parties with discretion not to comply.  This reading is further 
supported by the Court’s interpretation of Article 94(2),291 in conjunc-
tion with the fact that the United States retained a veto in the Security 
Council, as establishing that the United States had retained “the option 
of noncompliance.”292 
This reading of the opinion also helps make sense of the Court’s 
otherwise mystifying reliance on Article 94’s use of the term “under-
takes to comply.”  In international law usage, an “undertaking” is well 
recognized to be a hard, immediate obligation.293  That Article 94 uses 
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 289 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 290 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 291 Id. at 1359 (interpreting it as “provid[ing] the sole remedy for noncompliance: referral to the 
United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state”). 
 292 See id. at 1360.  Alternatively, the Court may have meant that the veto shows that the 
United States had retained the practical, but not the legal, “option of noncompliance,” and that 
this practical option would be lost if ICJ judgments were directly applicable in the courts.  The 
interpretation offered in the text is the more charitable one, however, as the alternative reading 
overlooks the fact that the United States in any event retained the practical option of not comply-
ing with ICJ decisions by passing a later in time statute prohibiting compliance.  To be sure, if 
ICJ decisions were directly enforceable, the burden would be on those opposing compliance to 
procure the necessary legislation, but the veto tells us nothing about whether that burden was 
meant to lie with the proponents or opponents of compliance. 
 293 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 231 (Feb. 26, 2007) (“The ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘undertake’ is to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a 
pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation.  It is a word regularly used in treaties setting 
out the obligations of the Contracting Parties . . . .  It is not merely hortatory or purposive.  The 
undertaking is unqualified . . . .”); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, 
§ 301 reporters’ note 2 (citing as “[a]n example of a nonbinding agreement” an instrument that 
“avoids words of legal undertaking”). 
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the term in this sense is confirmed by the Spanish version of this Arti-
cle, which uses in place of this term a phrase that translates most 
closely as “agrees to comply.”294  To the majority, the term suggested 
that future acts were contemplated.  Of course, compliance with an 
ICJ judgment will necessarily require action subsequent to the ICJ’s 
decision (unless the judgment is purely prohibitory, in which case 
compliance would require future inaction).  But it is not obvious why 
any contemplated future action would have to come from the legisla-
ture rather than the courts (that is, through future judicial rulings en-
forcing the ICJ judgments). 
The key to this puzzle appears to lie in the fact that, in colloquial 
English usage, the term “undertakes” has acquired a secondary mean-
ing denoting a “soft” obligation, a meaning along the lines of the verbs 
to “attempt”295 or to “endeavor” or to “give it a shot.”296  If the Court 
understood the term “undertakes” to mean “endeavor” or “try,” then it 
read Article 94 to leave the United States with the discretion not to 
comply or, in its own words, with “the option of noncompliance.”297 
To be sure, this reading of Medellín is in tension with the Court’s 
recognition elsewhere in the opinion that “the Avena deci-
sion . . . constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the 
United States.”298  If the Court meant here that Article 94 imposed a 
firm obligation to comply with ICJ judgments, the Article would do 
more than just require the parties to do their best to comply.  On the 
other hand, if the provision did impose a firm obligation to comply, 
then it would have effectively provided that the parties “shall” or 
“must” comply.  The Court’s reliance on the provision’s failure to em-
ploy the terms “shall” or “must” therefore must reflect the Court’s view 
that the provision does not really impose a firm obligation to comply.  
Since the Court said merely that Avena was “an international law  
obligation” without specifying the nature of the obligation, it may  
have meant that the United States had an obligation to endeavor to  
comply.299 
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 294 See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the Spanish phrase, “com-
promete a cumplir”). 
 295 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1365 (11th ed. 2003) (listing “at-
tempt” among meanings of “undertake”). 
 296 See ROGET’S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 311 (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., 6th ed. 2001) 
(listing “endeavor” and “take a shot at” as synonyms of “undertake”). 
 297 Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 298 Id. at 1356.  The nonjusticiability reading also fits uneasily with the Court’s Youngstown 
analysis, but, as noted, that portion of the opinion makes sense only if the Court were understood 
to have adopted a default rule of self-execution, an interpretation that is also consistent with 
Percheman. 
 299 Alternatively, the Court might have believed that Article 94 imposed only a “moral” obliga-
tion to comply.  See id. at 1359–60 (quoting A Resolution Proposing Acceptance of Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice: Hearings on S. Res. 196 Before the Subcomm. of the 
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If the Court held that Article 94 contemplated implementing legis-
lation because it imposed an obligation to try to comply with ICJ 
judgments, then Medellín is an example of the nonjusticiability cate-
gory of non-self-execution.  To the extent Foster reflects a type of non-
self-execution distinct from the nonjusticiability category, the Foster 
type consists of treaties that are non-self-executing because of what the 
treaty itself has to say about the need for legislative implementation.  
Foster calls for judges to consult the words of the treaty for what they 
say about that precise issue.  In contrast, with respect to treaties that 
are non-self-executing because nonjusticiable, the treaty text is con-
sulted to determine the nature of the obligation it purports to impose 
— for example, in Medellín, whether the treaty imposed a firm obliga-
tion to comply or only an obligation to try to comply.  The need for 
legislation, however, comes from domestic constitutional principles, 
specifically principles about the sorts of decisions that are appropriate 
for judicial as opposed to legislative or executive officials.300  Although 
it is likely that other nations will reach similar conclusions about the 
sorts of domestic officials that will be responsible for achieving com-
pliance with particular kinds of obligations, it is important to note that 
the treaty itself does not designate the responsible categories of offi-
cials.  Consistent with the general principle that international law is 
concerned with ends and not means, the treaty itself will generally be 
indifferent on this point.  The need for implementing legislation comes 
from general domestic-law principles of justiciability, not the treaty  
itself.301 
If the Court did conclude that Article 94(1) only obligated the par-
ties to try their best to comply with ICJ judgments, its interpretation 
was almost certainly wrong.  The problems with the “soft” interpreta-
tion of “undertake” have already been noted.  Interpreting Article 94(2) 
in conjunction with the veto in the Security Council as producing that 
                                                                                                                           
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 142 (1946) (statement of Charles Fahy, State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser) (“[W]hile parties that accept ICJ jurisdiction have ‘a moral obligation’ to 
comply with ICJ decisions, Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of enforcement.”)). 
 300 Thus, if the Court was asking whether Article 94 imposed a firm or discretionary obligation 
to comply with ICJ judgments, the practice of other states-parties regarding the direct judicial 
enforceability of ICJ judgments would be suggestive of the answer, though no more than this.  Cf. 
Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1363 (discussing the practice of other states-parties on direct judicial en-
forcement of ICJ judgments).  On the other hand, if the Court was applying the Foster category of 
non-self-execution, the practice of other states-parties would not have been relevant.  See supra 
note 169 (mutuality of obligation not a requirement of Foster-type self-execution). 
 301 The nonjusticiability reading thus helps make sense of the Court’s belief that the issue be-
fore it was one of treaty interpretation.  Whether the obligation to comply with ICJ judgments 
was firm or discretionary is an issue of treaty interpretation.  On the other hand, as we have seen, 
treaties generally have no relevant content on the question of direct versus indirect enforcement, 
so there will be no occasion to interpret the treaty on that point.  The need for legislation will 
generally be determined by the default rule. 
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result only for the five veto-holding nations is also problematic.  Arti-
cle 94(2) creates an international mechanism for giving efficacy to ICJ 
judgments; the practical relevance of the veto is that it renders these 
measures ineffective in enforcing compliance on the part of the five 
veto-holding nations.  Most treaties, however, do not even create inter-
national enforcement mechanisms.  If the veto signifies non-self-
execution because it makes the enforcement mechanism provided for 
in the treaty ineffective, then a fortiori treaties that lack an interna-
tional enforcement mechanism would be non-self-executing.  Yet this 
has never been the rule.  As discussed in Part I, the Founders were 
aware of the deficiencies in the international mechanisms for enforcing 
treaties, but they recognized the importance of treaty compliance for 
the nation and, to promote such compliance, they supplemented the 
international mechanisms with a domestic one.  The point of declaring 
treaties to be the supreme law of the land and thus enforceable in 
courts was to avert or remedy violations of treaties by the United 
States before they triggered international enforcement mechanisms 
against the United States.302 
If Medellín were to become a model for determining when a treaty 
imposes a firm obligation or a discretionary one, the result would be 
troubling.  But the decision cannot be read to hold that the use of the 
word “undertakes” always makes a provision discretionary, as the ma-
jority recognized that treaties using that formulation are sometimes 
self-executing.303  The precedential value of Medellín on this point is 
also diminished by the Court’s reliance on other factors, such as the 
veto power.  The precedential value of Medellín’s reliance on the veto 
is, in turn, diminished by its reliance on the text of Article 94 and 
other factors.  In short, the Court’s reliance on multiple arguments 
significantly reduces the precedential value of any one of them.  Thus, 
if Medellín were understood to have found Article 94 to impose an ob-
ligation to use our best efforts to comply, its erroneous interpretation of 
the treaty should not have significant implications for other treaties. 
In any event, of all the possible readings of Medellín (save the one 
consistent with Percheman), this interpretation is the soundest from 
the perspective of constitutional interpretation.  The problems with 
this holding would be confined to its interpretation of Article 94 as es-
sentially precatory.  If that interpretation of the treaty were assumed to 
be correct, then the (constitutional) conclusion that action from the po-
litical branches was required was sound.  On the other hand, if the 
Court were understood to have found Article 94 to be non-self-
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 302 See supra p. 617; supra note 19; see also Flaherty, supra note 64, at 2147; Vázquez, Treaty-
Based Rights, supra note 26, at 1102–03. 
 303 See supra p. 656 (discussing majority’s treatment of Comegys). 
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executing because of what it said, or did not say, about the treaty’s 
domestic legal force or its direct judicial enforceability, the decision 
would present the very significant problems discussed above. 
3.  Interpreting Medellín. — If Medellín had been written by Jus-
tices who believed in a Living Constitution, one might reasonably have 
concluded that they had revised our constitutional regime for treaty 
enforcement in the belief that an approach devised for a weak, fledg-
ling nation was not suitable for a hyperpower.  It is true that the 
Founders’ decision to give treaties the force of domestic law was influ-
enced by their fear of the international repercussions of treaty viola-
tions, which was a much greater concern for them then than it is for us 
now.  The nation then was comparatively weak; it would certainly not 
have commanded anything resembling a veto on the world stage.  A 
constitution written for a hyperpower might well make very different 
arrangements for both treatymaking and treaty enforcement. 
But the Court did not purport to be asking what the best constitu-
tional arrangement would be for us now.  Had that been the question, 
the Court would have given at least passing consideration to the con-
sequences of its holding for existing and future treaties.  Part III con-
siders the impact of a default rule of self-execution or non-self-
execution for U.S. treatymakers seeking to control the domestic conse-
quences of treaties they negotiate in the future.  If only rebuttable by a 
clear statement in the treaty itself, both default rules would pose diffi-
culties for U.S. treatymakers negotiating multilateral treaties, although 
the problems would be far more significant if the default rule were 
non-self-execution.  As explained in Part III, for multilateral treaties, 
adoption of a default rule of non-self-execution would be tantamount 
to adoption of the British rule.  That it would resurrect, for an impor-
tant class of treaties, the approach that the Founders specifically re-
jected is an additional reason for rejecting such an interpretation of 
Medellín. 
Still, the nation would adjust over time even to a default rule of 
non-self-execution.  After all, the British have lived with the British 
rule for many years.  We would no doubt adapt to this rule by follow-
ing the British practice of not ratifying treaties until the implementing 
legislation were in place.304  Interpreting Medellín to have adopted a 
presumption of non-self-execution would be most problematic with re-
spect to the thousands of past treaties (both bilateral and multilateral) 
concluded on the opposite assumption.  If the new presumption were 
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 304 This has been our practice with respect to treaties that require implementing legislation.  
See Memorandum from Congressional Research Service to Senate Majority Leader George 
Mitchell (July 8, 1991), in 137 CONG. REC. 21,169, 21,170 (1991) (“The practice of conditioning 
Senate advice and consent so as to prohibit deposit of the instrument of ratification until imple-
menting legislation is adopted is a fairly common one.”). 
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applied retroactively, then multilateral treaties assumed by the treaty-
makers to be self-executing would now require legislative implementa-
tion.  Because of the passage of time, the legislative majorities that 
made possible the making of the treaty originally would likely be diffi-
cult to mobilize to achieve the enactment of implementing legislation 
now. 
In any event, the question for a constitutional interpreter is not 
which rule makes the most practical sense today (a concern relevant 
largely only in choosing between otherwise equally valid interpreta-
tions), but rather which rule coheres best with the existing constitu-
tional material, including the Constitution’s text, its structure, and ac-
cumulated doctrine.  The Justices in the majority no doubt believe that 
the question of policy is for members of a constitutional convention, 
not for courts.305  In Medellín, they purported to be interpreting the 
Constitution we have, not the one we should have,306 and so the opin-
ion should be read in that light.  Because they purported to be apply-
ing settled law, the opinion should not be read in a way that would 
upend the law on the subject. 
For the reasons discussed above, a default rule of self-execution, 
rebuttable by a clear statement that the obligation is subject to legisla-
tive implementation, coheres best with the text, history, and pre-
Medellín Supreme Court doctrine.  If Medellín were read as an appli-
cation of the nonjusticiability category of non-self-execution, it would 
be consistent with an interpretation of Percheman as adopting a pre-
sumption of self-execution for treaties potentially falling into the Fos-
ter category of non-self-execution.  On the other hand, if read to adopt 
a default rule of non-self-execution, rebuttable only by a clear state-
ment of domestic effect or direct enforceability, Medellín will have 
transformed the Constitution from one that “show[s] the world that we 
make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the 
United States”307 into one that tells other nations that they must close 
every imaginable loophole if they expect the United States to comply 
with its treaties.  For the reasons discussed in this Part, Percheman is 
best read to have adopted a presumption that treaties are self-
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 305 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (“Undoubtedly some think 
that the Second Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our 
Nation, where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a 
serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the role of 
this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”). 
 306 See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1362 (2008). 
 307 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 490 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1888) (state-
ment of James Wilson). 
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executing in the Foster sense, and Medellín is best read as an example 
of an entirely distinct type of non-self-execution.308 
III.  DECLARATIONS REGARDING SELF-EXECUTION 
AS MODERN-DAY PERCHEMAN OR MEDELLÍN STIPULATIONS309 
For the reasons discussed in Parts I and II, Foster and Percheman 
together are best read to hold that, because of the Supremacy Clause, a 
treaty is judicially enforceable in the same circumstances as constitu-
tional or statutory provisions of like content, unless the treaty contains 
a clear statement that the obligations it imposes are subject to legisla-
tive implementation.  Medellín is best read to leave the Percheman 
clear statement rule in place, but portions of the opinion could be read 
to adopt the opposite presumption.  With respect to bilateral treaties of 
the sort involved in Foster and Percheman — the sort of treaty that 
has predominated for much of our history — either presumption 
would leave matters largely within the control of U.S. negotiators.  If 
they wish to control the domestic consequences of such treaties, they 
need merely propose the inclusion of the language necessary to do so.  
Because states negotiating treaties generally do not concern themselves 
with questions of domestic enforcement, the other party should have 
no objection to such a provision.310 
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 308 Some scholars who believe that Medellín does not adopt a presumption of non-self-
execution also argue that Medellín cannot fairly be read to adopt a presumption of self-execution.  
See Bradley, supra note 177, at 540.  I agree that Medellín does not adopt a presumption that 
treaties are self-executing in the nonjusticiability sense.  Indeed, this form of non-self-execution 
does not lend itself to a presumption either way, as the question turns on an interpretation of the 
treaty on an issue the treaty does address — in the Medellín case, whether the treaty imposes a 
firm obligation to comply or an obligation to try to comply.  That is a question to be answered by 
interpreting the treaty using the recognized international law rules of treaty interpretation, see 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, not pursuant to any domestic law pre-
sumption.  Foster-type non-self-execution, on the other hand, does lend itself to a presumption 
because the question is whether particular language in a treaty triggers a domestic law need for 
implementing legislation.  I do not argue that Medellín recognizes a presumption that treaties are 
self-executing in the Foster sense.  But cf. supra pp. 657–58 (arguing that one aspect of Medellín’s 
analysis supports a default rule of self-execution).  Rather, I argue that Medellín is best read as a 
nonjusticiability case having nothing to say about Foster-type non-self-execution. 
 309 Although Part II concluded that Medellín is best read not to adopt a presumption against 
self-execution, section III.B considers the validity of declarations of self-execution to overcome a 
presumption against self-execution.  I call these “Medellín stipulations” because the Senate has 
proposed them in response to the Medellín decision, albeit without endorsing an interpretation of 
that decision as adopting a presumption of self-execution.  See infra note 317.  The analysis in 
section III.B provides additional reasons to reject a reading of Medellín as adopting a default rule 
of non-self-execution. 
 310 For example, two treaties currently awaiting the Senate’s consent provide in their preambles 
that “the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the United States.”  Treaty Concerning De-
fense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-Austl., Sept. 5, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-10 (2007); Treaty 
Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., June 21 & 26, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
110-7 (2007). 
  
668 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 599
Today, however, many of the most important treaties are multilat-
eral.  They are negotiated at global conferences in which most of the 
world’s countries participate,311 and their provisions are generally 
written so that they apply broadly to all states-parties.  In this context, 
it would be difficult for the United States to press for a stipulation that 
the treaty’s obligations shall or shall not be subject to legislative im-
plementation.  Any effort to introduce such language would complicate 
possibly delicate multilateral negotiations over a range of substantive 
issues.  If the default rule were self-execution, treatymakers wishing to 
enter into a non-self-executing treaty would have to obtain the intro-
duction of language to the effect that the treaty will not be directly en-
forceable in states whose constitutions recognize that treaties can have 
such effects.  In addition to complicating negotiations with an issue 
that states are not accustomed to addressing in treaties, any attempt to 
introduce such language would encounter resistance from states fol-
lowing the American rule that do wish the treaty to have such effect.  
Thus, for U.S. negotiators seeking to control the domestic conse-
quences of a multilateral treaty, inclusion of the requisite language in 
the treaty itself would appear not to be a practicable option. 
If the default rule were non-self-execution, the problems would be 
even more severe.  If the treatymakers wanted the treaty to be self-
executing, they would have to introduce language to the effect that the 
treaty shall have the force of law (or be directly enforceable in court, 
or be directly applicable as law, or the like) in nations where treaties 
can have such effect.  Such a provision would likely be resisted by 
states that permit direct effect in certain circumstances but do not 
want this particular treaty to have such effect.  More importantly, such 
a provision would produce different results in different states, and un-
certain results in any given state.  The differences would not just be 
between states that follow the British rule and those that follow some 
version of the American rule, but also among states that follow differ-
ent versions of the American rule.  In the United States, for example, a 
treaty with such a clause would not be self-executing with respect to 
provisions that purport to criminalize conduct or appropriate money or 
accomplish any of the other things that can only be done by statute.  
Other states that permit direct effect in certain circumstances likely 
have different limits.  Moreover, the constitutional limits in any given 
state may be uncertain or subject to change over time.  For example, if 
the arguments of prominent U.S. scholars were to be accepted, a treaty 
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 311 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 393 (2d ed. 2007); OSCAR 
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 74 (1991).  See generally 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS ch. 6 (2005) (discuss-
ing how the presence of international organizations as permanent venues for treaty negotiations 
makes states more inclined to negotiate multilateral treaties). 
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that included the clause in question would not be self-executing to the 
extent it conflicted with earlier-in-time statutes312 or addressed matters 
within the legislative power of Congress under Article I.313  Thus, al-
though such a provision would not be unprecedented at the regional 
level,314 the disparities and uncertainties it would produce make it  
exceedingly unlikely to be replicated at that level, and almost impossi-
ble to conceive at the global level.  Indeed, the difficulty of securing 
such a stipulation in a multilateral treaty is almost certainly greater 
than the difficulty of persuading the House to pass implementing legis-
lation.  As a result, adoption of a default rule of non-self-execution re-
buttable by a contrary stipulation in the treaty itself is very likely to 
lead the treatymakers to give up on the idea of self-executing multilat-
eral treaties. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the U.S. treatymakers began to attach 
what appears to be a new form of Percheman stipulation to certain 
multilateral treaties.  Upon submitting four human rights treaties to 
the Senate in 1977, the Carter Administration proposed that a “decla-
ration” be attached to the United States’s instruments of ratification to 
the effect that the substantive provisions of the treaties were not self-
executing.315  Successive Presidents have proposed the same declara-
tion for all but one of the human rights treaties they have submitted to 
the Senate for its advice and consent.316  More recently, responding to 
the possibility that Medellín might be read to adopt a presumption of 
non-self-execution (but pointedly not endorsing Medellín’s analysis317), 
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 312 See AMAR, supra note 48, at 302–07; Kesavan, supra note 48, at 1503. 
 313 Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 64, at 2254. 
 314 See supra note 249 (citing Inter-American Trademark Convention). 
 315 See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining 
to Human Rights, S. EXEC. DOC. NOS. C, D, E, F, 95-2, at VI, XVIII (1978).  Declarations of 
non-self-execution have been attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in 1992, see 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 179, 
190, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.3 (2007), the Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1994, see id. at 302, 
305-06, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion in 1994, see id. at 138, 145. 
 316 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 415–16, 419–22 (2000).  The one exception is the Optional Protocol on the 
Rights of the Child, which was ratified without a declaration of non-self-execution.  S. EXEC. 
REP. NO. 107-4, at 16–18 (2002).  Declarations of non-self-execution have also been attached to 
treaties unrelated to human rights.  See, e.g., 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 315, at 236, 240 (noting that the United States attached 
a declaration of non-self-execution to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption). 
 317 See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-12, at 9–10 (2008).  The report states: 
The committee . . . proposes making such a declaration in the Resolution of advice and 
consent in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 
(2008), which has highlighted the utility of a clear statement regarding the self-executing 
nature of treaty provisions. 
 The committee believes it is of great importance that the United States complies 
with the treaty obligations it undertakes.  In accordance with the Constitution, all trea-
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the Senate has given its consent to at least sixty-three treaties subject 
to declarations of self-execution.318  The intended effect of such decla-
rations is not altogether clear, but one possibility is that they were 
meant to control the domestic effect of the treaties to which they are 
attached.319 
Since their first appearance, however, declarations of non-self-
execution have been controversial.  As this Part discusses, a number of 
scholars have argued that the declarations are invalid under interna-
tional law or ineffective as a matter of domestic law.320  The most 
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ties — whether self-executing or not — are the supreme law of the land, and the Presi-
dent shall take care that they be faithfully executed. 
 318 See 154 CONG. REC. S9328–S9335 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
110-23, at 6 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-22, at 13–14 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-14, at 6 
(2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-13, at 11 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-12, at 10 (2008).  Most of 
these declarations provide simply that “[t]his treaty is self-executing.”  S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-17, 
at 7 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-16, at 8 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-15, at 10 (2008); S. 
EXEC. REP. No. 110-14, at 6 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-13, at 11–21 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. 
NO. 110-12, at 10–20 (2008).  Some, however, provide that particular articles are self-executing, 
and even address more specifically whether the treaty creates judicially enforceable rights.  See, 
e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-22, at 14 (2008) (“With the exception of Articles 7 and 8, this Protocol 
is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer private rights enforceable in United States 
courts.”).  (Presumably, treaties with the latter form of declaration would be enforceable at the 
behest of the United States, federal and state government officials, and perhaps even foreign 
states.)  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has also proposed that declarations of non-self-
execution be attached to five treaties.  See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-21, at 9 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. 
NO. 110-20, at 9 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-19, at 9 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-18, at 10 
(2008). 
  Although the declarations appear in the Senate’s Resolutions of Advice and Consent, see 
154 CONG. REC. S9328–S9335 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008), it appears that the Senate does not con-
template that the declarations will be communicated to the other parties or deposited with the 
instruments of ratification, as the pre-Medellín declarations attached to human rights treaties 
were.  See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-20, at 9–10 (2008) (noting that another declaration “would be 
included in the U.S. instrument of ratification” but not indicating that declaration of non-self-
execution would be). 
 319 The other possibility is that they were merely meant as interpretations of those treaties.  If 
so, it is unclear what weight the declarations should be given.  As noted, most treaties have the 
same content on the question of direct versus indirect judicial enforceability — they permit but 
neither require nor prohibit both direct and indirect enforcement.  If a declaration of non-self-
execution were intended to reflect the treatymakers’ understanding that the treaty does not re-
quire direct enforcement, the interpretation is correct but beside the point.  As discussed above, it 
is clear that a treaty can be self-executing for the United States even if it does not require direct 
judicial enforcement.  See supra p. 635.  If a declaration of self-execution were intended to reflect 
the treatymakers’ understanding that the treaty does require direct enforcement, it is likely a mis-
taken interpretation.  If intended to reflect the treatymakers’ understanding of the treaty’s domes-
tic enforceability as a matter of domestic law, a declaration of self-execution would be mistaken if 
the Constitution were read to require a clear statement of self-execution in the treaty itself.  It 
would be accurate under the correct interpretation of the Supremacy Clause.  In either case, the 
declaration would not make the treaty self-executing or non-self-executing because it was not in-
tended to.  This Part assumes that the declarations were intended to make the treaties to which 
they have been attached self-executing or non-self-executing. 
 320 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1179–80 
(1993); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (1995).  Professor 
Louis Henkin’s position on the question is not altogether clear.  He has described the declarations 
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relevant judicial precedent, the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Power 
Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission,321 lends substan-
tial support to such arguments.  Because declarations of self-execution 
are a recent phenomenon, they have not been the subject of scholarly 
attention, but their validity and effectiveness would appear to be vul-
nerable to the same objections. 
If declarations regarding self-execution are invalid or ineffective, 
U.S. treatymakers seeking to control the domestic consequences of the 
multilateral treaties they conclude would face the significant problems 
noted above.  If either or both declarations were valid, on the other 
hand, the ability of the treatymakers to control the domestic effect  
of the treaty through such a declaration would make it possible  
to achieve a far greater degree of certainty than would otherwise be  
possible.322 
This Part considers whether declarations of non-self-execution 
would be valid if the default rule were self-execution, and whether 
declarations of self-execution would be valid if the default rule were 
non-self-execution.  Although the validity of declarations of non-self-
execution is more difficult to establish than the defenders of such dec-
larations have recognized, I conclude that the arguments against their 
validity are ultimately untenable in the light of Foster and Percheman.  
The case for the validity of declarations of self-execution, however, 
faces more significant obstacles.  The availability of the declaration 
mechanism for specifying the domestic consequences of treaties in the 
one case but not the other would be an additional reason for preferring 
a default rule of self-execution and the Percheman clear statement 
rule.  Indeed, a default rule of non-self-execution not rebuttable by a 
declaration of self-execution would be tantamount to the adoption of 
the British rule for multilateral treaties, which would in turn render 
the process specified in Article II for making treaties superfluous with 
respect to such treaties.  If declarations of self-execution were unavail-
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as “anticonstitutional,” an unconventional term suggesting that he regards the declarations as be-
ing in tension with constitutional values but not necessarily invalid for that reason.  See Louis 
Henkin, Editorial Comment: U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Sena-
tor Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349–50 (1995). 
 321 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom. Am. Pub. Power Ass’n v. Power 
Auth. of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (mem.). 
 322 Note that the choice is not necessarily a binary one between self-execution and non-self-
execution.  If declarations were valid, they could conceivably specify that the treaty will have cer-
tain domestic consequences but not others.  Thus, a declaration could accomplish something along 
the lines of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which gives domestic legal force to the agree-
ments creating the WTO but provides that “[n]o State law . . . may be declared invalid . . . on the 
ground that [it] is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action 
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law . . . invalid,” 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3512(b)(2)(A) (2006).  See also supra note 318 (noting that some recent declarations address spe-
cific aspects of the domestic enforceability of the treaties to which they relate). 
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able, a default rule of non-self-execution would be normatively unat-
tractive and inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and structure. 
A.  Declarations of Non-Self-Execution 
Before examining the validity of declarations of non-self-execution, 
it is necessary to understand exactly what these declarations (inter-
preted as Percheman stipulations) purport to do.  It is clear that the 
treaties to which these declarations have been attached include provi-
sions contemplating that individuals be afforded certain remedies in 
court.323  In the absence of a stipulation of non-self-execution, indi-
viduals would be entitled to such remedies in our courts by virtue of 
the Supremacy Clause (assuming, as I do in this section, that the Su-
premacy Clause establishes a default rule of self-execution).324  No leg-
islation would be needed.  A stipulation of non-self-execution neither 
denies nor diminishes the United States’s obligation to afford those 
remedies to individuals in its courts.  It merely stipulates that the 
United States will satisfy its obligation by passing statutes entitling in-
dividuals to obtain those remedies in its courts.  Thus, the difference 
between a treaty that includes such a stipulation and a treaty that does 
not is that, in the latter case, individuals are able to come into court 
and obtain the remedies the treaty requires by invoking the treaty in 
court (what we have been calling “direct judicial enforcement”), 
whereas in the former case, individuals are able to come into court to 
obtain those remedies only after Congress has enacted a statute enti-
tling them to do so (“indirect judicial enforcement”). 
1.  The Case Against Validity. — The principal argument against 
the validity of declarations of non-self-execution is based on the notion 
that the declarations are not really a part of the treaties to which they 
have been attached — that they are merely unilateral statements of the 
United States regarding a matter of only domestic concern.  This ar-
gument assumes that the treaty itself has no relevant content on the 
question of direct versus indirect enforcement.  Because the declara-
tions do not purport to qualify the United States’s international obli-
gations, they are not part of the treaties to which they are attached.  
As a result, they do not themselves have the force of law under the 
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 323 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 165, art. 9 (requiring judicial remedies in certain  
circumstances). 
 324 For the reasons discussed above, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, individuals would be 
entitled to enforce treaty-based rights in court even if the treaty did not specifically refer to judi-
cial enforcement or judicial remedies.  As noted, treaties have not traditionally addressed the mat-
ter of domestic enforcement.  However, nations negotiating treaties can address such matters if 
they wish.  Article 9 of the ICCPR is an example.  If the treaty does specifically entitle individuals 
to a remedy in domestic courts, there should be no question that the individual would be entitled 
to such a remedy in U.S. courts in the absence of a non-self-execution stipulation.  See Vázquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 26, at 1151–52, 1157–58. 
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Supremacy Clause.  They are, to be sure, statements of the President 
and two-thirds of the Senate, but the President and two-thirds of the 
Senate do not have the constitutional power to make law except pur-
suant to treaty, and these declarations do not constitute treaties (or 
parts of treaties).  They are accordingly legal nullities.325 
This argument derives support from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Power Authority of New York, in which the court struck down the fa-
mous Niagara Reservation on this ground.  The Niagara Reservation 
was attached to a treaty between the United States and Canada in 
which the two countries agreed upon the allowable levels of use of the 
waters of the Niagara River and Niagara Falls.326  The reservation, 
which was attached to the U.S. ratification of the treaty at the insis-
tence of the Senate and was accepted by Canada, provided that the 
use by the United States of its share of the waters would be deter-
mined pursuant to a new statute to be passed by Congress.327  In the 
absence of this reservation, the Federal Power Act, which was in place 
when the treaty entered into force, would have applied and would 
have authorized the Federal Power Commission to license public and 
private entities to utilize the U.S. share of the water.328  The reserva-
tion thus limited the domestic legal effect of the treaty by specifying 
that preexisting laws would not apply to the rights created by the 
treaty.329  It was intended to operate as a Percheman stipulation: it 
provided that certain provisions of the treaty were addressed to the 
legislature. 
Congress, however, had great difficulty agreeing on a statute, and 
in the meantime, because of the reservation, the United States was un-
able to make use of its share of the water.  In an effort to obtain a li-
cense to utilize the U.S. share, the Power Authority of New York ar-
gued that the Niagara Reservation was a legal nullity because it was 
not a part of the treaty under international law and hence had no 
claim to being the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause.330  In 
support of its argument, the Power Authority submitted the legal opin-
ion of two eminent professors of international law, Philip C. Jessup 
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 325 Versions of this argument can be found in Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 541–42; John Quigley, 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1287, 1302–04 (1993); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. 
Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 599 
(1991); Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations that Treaty 
Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233, 243–44 (1979). 
 326 Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 540. 
 327 Id. at 540–41. 
 328 Id. at 539. 
 329 Id. at 540–41. 
 330 Id. at 539–40. 
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and Oliver J. Lissitzyn.331  The professors came forward with exten-
sive support for the proposition that a “treaty” consists of the mutual 
rights and obligations of states in an international agreement.  As was 
made clear by the United States in transmitting the reservation to 
Canada and by Canada in conveying its acceptance of the reserva-
tion,332 the Niagara Reservation was inserted into the treaty by the 
United States purely for domestic purposes — to ensure the inapplica-
bility of the Federal Power Act and provide that additional legislative 
action would be required to determine how the United States would 
make use of its share.  Because the reservation did not concern the 
United States’s rights or obligations towards Canada, or Canada’s 
rights or obligations towards the United States, the professors con-
cluded, it did not constitute part of the treaty.  It therefore lacked the 
force of “law of the land” under the Supremacy Clause.333 
The legal opinion of Professors Jessup and Lissitzyn elicited a re-
sponse from Professor Louis Henkin.334  Henkin cited numerous Su-
preme Court decisions and other authorities that, in his view, stood for 
the proposition that “the treaty power contains an important if limited 
power to legislate domestically to affect domestic rights and interests” 
and that this power includes “a power, where it is deemed necessary, to 
control or postpone the domestic consequences of a treaty at least until 
Congress can consider them.”335  On this basis, Henkin concluded that 
the Niagara Reservation was valid and effective.336 
The court of appeals agreed with Jessup and Lissitzyn and struck 
down the Niagara Reservation.337  Because it was “purely domestic” in 
purpose and effect, the reservation was not a part of the treaty,338 and 
it had no other claim to being part of the supreme law of the land. 
The court of appeals’s conclusion that a “purely domestic” reserva-
tion lacks the force of domestic law would appear to doom declara-
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 331 See PHILIP C. JESSUP & OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, OPINION WITH RESPECT TO THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE’S ATTEMPT TO REPEAL THE FEDERAL POWER ACT IN ITS 
RELATION TO THE NIAGARA THROUGH THE USE OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 
(Power Auth. of the State of N.Y., 1955); see also John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the 
Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 173–74 (2001). 
 332 JESSUP & LISSITZYN, supra note 331, at 2. 
 333 Id. at 95–96. 
 334 Henkin was at the time a lecturer at Columbia Law School.  He later succeeded Jessup as 
the Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia. 
 335 Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 
COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1173 (1956).  Henkin was referring here to the power of the U.S. treaty-
makers (the President and Senate) to make domestic law separate and apart from the law made in 
the treaty itself.  See id. at 1169–75. 
 336 See id. at 1173–74. 
 337 Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543–44 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated 
as moot sub nom. Am. Pub. Power Ass’n v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (mem.). 
 338 Id. at 541. 
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tions of non-self-execution.  If the treaties to which these declarations 
are attached do not require direct judicial enforcement, the declara-
tions do not purport to alter any rights to which the other parties are 
otherwise entitled under the treaties.  The declarations would thus ap-
pear to be “purely domestic” in their operation. 
2.  The Inadequacy of Existing Defenses. — To date, the lower 
courts have enforced declarations of non-self-execution without paus-
ing to consider their validity.  The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain339 appeared to assume their validity in dictum.340  The few 
scholars who have addressed the constitutionality of these declara-
tions and found them valid have appeared to regard the question as 
straightforward.  Some have suggested that the power to decide whe-
ther to make a treaty at all includes the lesser power of making the 
treaty but denying it the force of domestic law.341  Others have relied 
on an analogy to the power of the lawmakers over the domestic effect 
of the statutes they enact.  Just as lawmakers may enact a statute 
while specifying that it shall not preempt state law or confer a private 
right of action, so may the treatymakers conclude a treaty and specify 
that it shall not have such domestic legal effects.342  Finally, some 
scholars maintain that the sole purpose of the Supremacy Clause, with 
respect to treaties, was to empower the federal government to compel 
the States to comply and that, accordingly, the clause places no limit 
on the federal treatymakers’ ability to permit noncompliance (by the 
states or anyone) by limiting the treaty’s domestic legal effect.343 
These defenses are inadequate.  The power to deny a treaty the 
force of domestic law is not a lesser power included in the power not 
to make the treaty in the first place.  Even if they lacked domestic le-
gal force, treaties would establish obligations on the international 
plane, and their violation could be expected to produce international 
friction.  It was to avoid such friction that the Constitution gave trea-
ties the force of domestic law and instructed judges to give them effect.  
The Constitution’s authors may well have preferred no treaty at all to 
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 339 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 340 Id. at 728. 
 341 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 316, at 405–09; cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Exe-
cuting the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1929 (2005) (noting that when “the treaty 
power overlaps with Congress’s enumerated powers,” it is sensible “to say that the greater power 
to make self-executing treaties includes the lesser power to leave the implementation of a treaty to 
Congress, if Congress already has the requisite legislative power”).  But see John Quigley, The 
Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1233 (1996) (noting 
that the view that declarations of non-self-execution are constitutional might seem justified based 
on the rationale that a greater power includes a lesser power, but ultimately rejecting the argu-
ment that the Senate has the power to impose such conditions). 
 342 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 
485, 545–46 (2002); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 316, at 447–48. 
 343 Bradley, supra note 342, at 547; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 316, at 448–49. 
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a treaty that was more likely to be violated because it was not enforce-
able by the courts.344 
The analogy to the lawmakers’ control over statutes also fails.  
First, it is not clear that the U.S. lawmakers may always instruct the 
courts to disregard statutes.  For example, if a statute provides that 
“conduct X shall be permitted,” it is not clear that Congress can, with-
out repealing the statute, instruct the courts to disregard the statute 
when it is invoked by someone being tried criminally for violating a 
law prohibiting conduct X.345  Second, even if Congress did have such 
power with respect to statutes, it would not follow that the U.S. 
treatymakers have that power with respect to treaties.  Statutes are 
made solely by the U.S. lawmakers (a majority of both houses plus the 
President or two-thirds of both houses without the President).  A stat-
ute providing in section 1 that conduct X shall be permitted but pro-
viding in section 2 that no court may take cognizance of section 1 
might be understood as making a purely precatory statement about the 
permissibility of conduct X.  Treaties, by contrast, are not made solely 
by the U.S. treatymakers (the President plus two-thirds of the Senators 
present).  They are made by the U.S. treatymakers plus at least one 
other nation.  In light of Foster, it is clear that the United States and 
one or more other nations may make a treaty that will lack the usual 
effects of domestic law.  But a non-self-execution declaration is prob-
lematic, according to the court in Power Authority, precisely because it 
does not reflect an agreement among the parties.  Critics of declara-
tions of non-self-execution object that to recognize the validity of such 
declarations would be to recognize the power of the President and 
Senate to make law without the agreement of another country — a 
form of law-making not authorized by the Constitution.  That the U.S. 
lawmakers may control the legal effects of the statutes they enact is no 
answer to this argument. 
Nor does it help to note that the Supremacy Clause’s adoption was 
animated by a history of violation of treaties by the States.  It is true 
that the problem the Founders had just experienced was limited to 
treaty violations by the States, not the federal government.  It is also 
true that the Founders could have addressed this problem by empow-
ering the federal government to authorize the courts to enforce treaties.  
But that is not what they did.  They empowered the federal govern-
ment to make treaties, and they declared “all” treaties, once made, to 
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 344 Cf. James Madison, Notes on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 384–93 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (noting 
that Gouverneur Morris was “not solicitous to multiply & facilitate Treaties” as “[t]he more diffi-
culty in making treaties, the more value will be set on them”). 
 345 Cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and 
the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 92 (2007). 
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have the force of domestic law and instructed judges to give them ef-
fect.  That a broadly phrased law was animated by a narrow problem 
is not a justification for construing the law to cover just the narrow 
problem.  A law prohibiting vehicles in the park may well have been 
animated by an excess of unicycles in the park during the period be-
fore its enactment, but that does not mean the law applies only to uni-
cycles.  The Equal Protection Clause may have been animated by a 
history of discrimination against African Americans,346 but that does 
not mean that the clause protects only African Americans.  Under the 
Articles of Confederation, violation of treaties by the federal govern-
ment was not a problem because the federal government was extraor-
dinarily weak.  Upon creating a stronger federal government, the 
Founders may well have wanted to limit its ability to violate treaties.  
No one claims that the federal government is powerless to preclude the 
courts from enforcing treaties — clearly Congress can do so by passing 
a law that requires a violation of the treaty.  I shall conclude that the 
treatymakers can also do so by attaching a declaration of non-self-
execution to the treaty.  But this conclusion cannot rest on the observa-
tion that the immediate problem that led to the adoption of the Su-
premacy Clause (with respect to treaties) was limited to treaty viola-
tions by the States. 
3.  Evaluating the Arguments Against Validity. — Treatymakers 
can attempt to make a treaty non-self-executing by attaching either a 
reservation or a declaration to this effect.  The difference between a 
reservation and a declaration is that a reservation modifies the legal 
effect of certain provisions of a treaty, whereas a declaration does not.  
My analysis of the validity of declarations of non-self-execution will 
begin with an examination of the validity of hypothetical reservations 
of non-self-execution.  My conclusion that the latter would be valid 
leads me to conclude that the former must also be valid. 
(a)  Validity of Reservations of Non-Self-Execution. — The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as “a unilat-
eral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”347  By nega-
tive implication, a declaration that does not amount to a reservation is 
a unilateral statement that does not purport to exclude or modify the 
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 346 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 640 (15th ed. 
2004). 
 347 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 2(1)(d).  Although the United 
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the treaty is widely understood to have achieved 
the status of customary international law in the years since it was opened for signature in 1969.  
See Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 362, 365–67 (1989). 
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legal effect of any treaty provision.348  Thus, the difference between a 
reservation of non-self-execution and a declaration of non-self-
execution is that the former would be attached to a treaty that other-
wise required direct enforcement, whereas the latter would be attached 
to a treaty that did not. 
Before the Second World War, the settled rule was that a state at-
taching a reservation to its ratification of a multilateral treaty would 
become a party to the treaty only if every other party accepted the res-
ervation.349  Thus, if the United States attached a reservation to its 
ratification of a treaty and even one other party objected, the United 
States would not be bound by the treaty internationally.350  The reser-
vation would have the effect of denying the treaty the force of domes-
tic law by vitiating its force under international law.  Under this inter-
national regime, a reservation of non-self-execution would have the 
intended domestic effect (as far as courts are concerned) by having an 
unintended international effect. 
The so-called unanimity principle has given way to a more flexible 
approach to reservations.  Today, a nation that formulates a reserva-
tion to a multilateral treaty may become a party to the treaty even if 
one or more of the other parties objects to the reservation.  If the res-
ervation is otherwise valid, the reserving party and the parties that ac-
cept the reservation become parties to the treaty subject to the reserva-
tion.351  A party that objects to the reservation has two options: it may 
allow the treaty to enter into force between it and the reserving state, 
subject to the reservation,352 or it may stipulate that the treaty will not 
come into force between it and the reserving state at all.353  Subject to 
qualifications discussed below, the upshot is that, if another party ob-
jects to a reservation of non-self-execution, the treaty is either not in 
force between the reserving party and the objecting party, or the treaty 
is in force but is non-self-executing.  Thus, the treaty either does not 
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 348 Because under the Vienna Convention a statement may be a reservation even if called a 
declaration, a statement styled a “declaration” would be a reservation if it purported to modify 
some aspect of the treaty to which it was attached.  A genuine declaration is a unilateral state-
ment that does not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of any treaty provision.  Thus, a 
declaration of non-self-execution, if intended as a Percheman stipulation, would constitute a res-
ervation if, in its absence, the treaty to which it was attached required direct, as opposed to indi-
rect, judicial enforcement.  Even if the treaty to which it was attached required direct judicial 
enforcement, the declaration might not be a true reservation if, rather than “purporting to modify” 
that requirement, it merely offered an interpretation of the treaty.  See supra note 319. 
 349 See J.M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 113–15 (1975). 
 350 If all other parties accepted the reservation, on the other hand, the United States would be-
come a party to the treaty subject to the reservation.  See id. at 116. 
 351 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 21(1). 
 352 Id. art. 21(3). 
 353 Id. art. 20(4)(b). 
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bind the reserving party internationally, or the international obligation 
it imposes is not directly enforceable because of the reservation. 
A reservation is not permitted, however, if it “is incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.”354  Thus, if the United States 
were to attach a reservation of non-self-execution to a treaty that did 
require direct judicial enforcement, the reservation could in theory be 
invalid because it would conflict with the “object and purpose” of the 
treaty.355  If the reservation were invalid under international law, it 
might be a nullity under U.S. law.356 
But reservations of non-self-execution are almost certainly not con-
trary to the object and purpose of any treaty to which they might be 
attached.  The likelihood that nations negotiating a multilateral treaty 
would agree to require direct judicial enforcement and would regard 
any reservation on that question as inconsistent with the treaty’s ob-
ject and purpose is so small as to be negligible.357  First, as mentioned 
above, under the fundamental law of the United Kingdom, treaties are 
never self-executing.358  If a general multilateral treaty purported to 
require that parties regard it as directly enforceable in their courts, a 
nation such as the United Kingdom would be in violation of the treaty 
simply by virtue of its constitutional law.  The fact that states having 
such constitutional rules — including, in addition to the United King-
dom, such other members of the Commonwealth as Australia,359 Can-
ada,360 and India361 — have become parties to general multilateral 
treaties without attaching reservations of non-self-execution and with-
out provoking controversy supports the conclusion that these treaties 
do not require direct judicial enforcement.  It provides even stronger 
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 354 Id. art. 19(c). 
 355 Cf. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 325, at 631–32 (noting that a Senate declaration pur-
porting to modify the self-executing nature of the Torture Convention might be characterized as a 
reservation defeating the treaty’s object and purpose). 
 356 A reservation is also invalid if the treaty specifically prohibits reservations.  Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 19(a).  If a treaty requiring direct judicial enforce-
ment specifically prohibited reservations, then a reservation of non-self-execution would be inva-
lid.  I am not aware of any treaties having both of these features.  If a treaty prohibiting 
reservations did not require direct judicial enforcement, a declaration of non-self-execution would 
not be an invalid reservation. 
 357 It is clear that the treaties to which the United States has attached declarations of non-self-
execution do not require direct judicial enforcement.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Cove-
nant, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004) (“Article 2 . . . does not require 
that the [ICCPR] be directly applicable in the courts . . . .”). 
 358 See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 325, at 575. 
 359 See Simsek v. MacPhee (1982) 148 C.L.R. 636, 642 (Austl.). 
 360 See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. Att’y Gen. of Ont., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 678 (P.C.) (appeal 
taken from Can.); A. JACOMY-MILLETTE, TREATY LAW IN CANADA 131–32 (1975). 
 361 See Nanka v. Gov’t of Rajasthan, 1951 A.I.R. 38 (Raj.) 153, 154; Birma v. State, 1951 
A.I.R. 38 (Raj.) 127; Robert B. Looper, The Treaty Power in India, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 300, 
305 (1955–56). 
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support for the conclusion that, in the rare event that a general multi-
lateral treaty did purport to require direct judicial enforcement, the 
parties would not feel so strongly about the issue as to make this re-
quirement a sine qua non of accession to the treaty.  To regard indirect 
enforcement as contrary to the object and purpose of such a treaty 
would be to disqualify a significant number of states from becoming 
parties unless they amended their constitutions.  No one has ever sug-
gested that any general multilateral treaty requires amendment of con-
stitutional non-self-execution rules.362 
Second, as noted, a reservation of non-self-execution would not 
deny or modify the United States’s obligation to afford individuals the 
judicial remedies the treaty contemplates.  Rather, the reservation 
would stipulate that the United States will comply with this obligation 
by enacting legislation entitling individuals to obtain those judicial 
remedies and that the courts will have the power to enforce only the 
legislation, not the treaty.363  It is hard to believe that a purely proce-
dural reservation of this sort could ever be contrary to the object and 
purpose of a treaty, except perhaps a treaty that was otherwise purely 
procedural.364 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that a reservation of non-self-
execution will rarely be inconsistent with the object and purpose of a 
general multilateral treaty.  If so, then the United States would be a 
party to the treaties to which it attaches such reservations vis-à-vis the 
other parties that do not object.  If some parties objected to the reser-
vation and specified that they did not regard the treaty as being in 
force between them and the United States, the treaty would not be in 
force between those parties and the United States.  In either case, the 
conclusion for U.S. courts would be the same: the treaty could not be 
enforced. 
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 362 The only U.S. treaty of which I am aware that requires that its provisions be directly en-
forced as law includes an exception for nations following the British rule.  See Inter-American 
Trademark Convention, supra note 249.  The existence of this exception establishes that direct 
enforcement was not regarded as essential to the treaty’s object and purpose.  Cf. supra note 259 
(discussing the Van Gend & Loos case). 
 363 The purpose and effect of a reservation of non-self-execution would thus be to bring about 
for the United States precisely the state of affairs that exists for some other countries solely by 
virtue of their constitutional laws. 
 364 If a declaration of non-self-execution were regarded as contrary to the object and purpose of 
a treaty, the next question would be whether the invalidity of the reservation vitiates the reserva-
tion or the reserving party’s ratification of the treaty.  For discussion, see Ryan Goodman, Human 
Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 536–38 (2002).  
Given the remoteness of the possibility that a reservation of non-self-execution would be regarded 
as invalid, I do not discuss the severability issue here beyond noting that the United States could 
all but ensure the latter result by making clear, in ratifying the treaty, that its ratification was in-
severable from the reservation. 
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(b)  Validity of Declarations of Non-Self-Execution. — Declarations 
of non-self-execution, if intended as Percheman stipulations, would 
constitute what the International Law Commission (ILC) calls “infor-
mative” declarations,365 which include statements “whereby the formu-
lating State informs its partners . . . of the internal authorities that will 
be responsible for implementing the treaty.”366  The ILC has cited the 
Niagara Reservation as an example of this sort of declaration.367   
Declarations of non-self-execution would not alter any international 
obligations because the treaties to which they are attached do not re-
quire direct judicial enforcement.  Their function would be only to 
override a domestic law default rule on a matter as to which the treaty  
itself imposes no contrary obligation (direct versus indirect judicial  
enforcement). 
Professors Jessup and Lissitzyn may have been right in concluding 
that an informative declaration of this sort is not technically a part of 
the treaty under international law.368  The ILC’s Special Rapporteur 
on the subject has concluded that such declarations, being “exclusively 
domestic in scope,”369 “ha[ve] no connection to the law of treaties.”370  
But it does not follow that such a declaration has no status as domestic 
law.  The analysis of reservations of non-self-execution in the previous 
section supports Professor Henkin’s conclusion that the treatymakers 
have a limited power under the Constitution to limit the domestic legal 
consequences of the treaties they make.371 
Even when incorporated into the body of the treaty, a Percheman 
stipulation is likely to be “purely domestic” in its effect.  As noted, 
states negotiating treaties generally do not concern themselves with 
domestic enforcement mechanisms.  Thus, when U.S. negotiators seek-
ing to enter into a non-self-executing treaty propose the insertion of a 
provision clearly stating that the United States’s obligations shall not 
be directly enforceable in domestic courts, they are seeking to do the 
same thing as when they insert a genuine declaration of non-self-
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 365 Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties add. 4, 
¶ 376, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/491/Add.4 (July 2, 1998) (prepared by Alain Pellet). 
 366 Id. 
 367 Id. ¶ 382. 
 368 See JESSUP & LISSITZYN, supra note 331, at 96. 
 369 Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 365, ¶ 383. 
 370 Id. ¶ 392. 
 371 See Henkin, supra note 335, at 1173.  The present analysis differs from, but is consistent 
with, Professor Henkin’s.  More recently, Professor Henkin has stated that his analysis of the Ni-
agara Reservation should not be read to suggest that he considers declarations of non-self-
execution to be valid.  See Louis Henkin, Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Confrontations in 
the D.C. Courts, 90 GEO. L.J. 725, 734 (2002). 
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execution.  They are providing for a particular assignment of domestic 
enforcement powers in the face of the other parties’ indifference.372 
More fundamentally, denying legal force to a declaration because 
its effect is purely domestic, as Power Authority would seem to re-
quire, would produce absurd doctrinal results.  Recall from the preced-
ing discussion that a statement of non-self-execution constitutes a res-
ervation if the treaty to which it is attached imposes an international 
obligation of direct enforcement.  A statement of non-self-execution 
would be a genuine informative declaration if the treaty to which it 
was attached did not purport to require direct judicial enforcement.  
The conclusion of section III.A.3(a) above was that a reservation of 
non-self-execution would be valid (or at least effective).  Thus, a 
statement of non-self-execution is valid (or at least effective) when the 
other parties cared enough about direct enforcement to provide for it 
in the treaty.  It is a part of the treaty and thus binding, on the Power 
Authority view, precisely because it goes against the agreement of the 
parties.  Conversely, according to the analysis in Power Authority, the 
statement of non-self-execution would not be a part of the treaty, and 
hence would be a nullity, when it is entirely consistent with the 
agreement the parties reached.  In other words, the statement would 
be effective when it conflicts with the wishes of the treaty parties but 
would be ineffective when — indeed, because — it does not so conflict. 
Two simple examples demonstrate the absurdity of this regime.  
Consider a treaty that includes some provisions requiring direct judi-
cial enforcement and other provisions neither requiring nor prohibiting 
it.  If statements of non-self-execution were valid and effective to the 
extent the treaty otherwise required direct judicial enforcement, then 
the statements would be effective for the provisions of the treaty that 
otherwise required direct judicial enforcement but would be ineffective 
for those that did not.  Thus, the provisions of the treaty that (in the 
absence of the statement of non-self-execution) would have imposed an 
international obligation of direct judicial enforcement would, under 
our domestic law, require legislative implementation.  Conversely, the 
provisions that the parties did not require to be directly enforced 
would not be affected by the statement of non-self-execution and 
would be directly enforceable in court by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause.  The result would be absurd. 
Consider as well a treaty that is unclear about whether it imposes 
an international obligation of direct judicial enforcement.  A statement 
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 372 Of course, it is impossible to know the extent to which the other parties actually care about 
the issue, so it can never be said with certainty that the treaty provision serves only a domestic 
end.  Nevertheless, because nations negotiating treaties are not generally concerned with this is-
sue, it is very likely that such a provision, though located in the body of the treaty, serves the 
purely domestic function of overriding the Supremacy Clause’s default rule. 
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of non-self-execution attached to such a treaty would be valid and ef-
fective only if it turned out that the treaty required direct judicial en-
forcement, but would be ineffective if it turned out that the treaty did 
not.  Again, the result of the Power Authority analysis is exactly back-
wards.  The Power Authority view would recognize the validity of a 
statement of non-self-execution precisely when it runs contrary to the 
other parties’ preferences.  There is no plausible justification for such 
a counterintuitive result.  If the statement of non-self-execution is ef-
fective when the parties want direct judicial enforcement, it must also 
be effective when they are indifferent.373 
If so, one must conclude that U.S. treatymakers have the power to 
“unilaterally” limit the domestic judicial enforceability of the treaties 
they conclude.374  If in fact such a limitation is not technically a part 
of the treaty, for the reasons given by Professors Jessup and Lissitzyn 
and the court in Power Authority, then the present analysis suggests 
that the treaty power includes a limited power to make domestic law 
that is related to, but not strictly part of, the treaty.  It bears emphasiz-
ing, however, that this analysis yields only a very limited non-treaty 
lawmaking power for the treatymakers.  The effectiveness of declara-
tions of non-self-execution follows from that of reservations of non-
self-execution, and the latter are effective, whether or not accepted by 
the other parties, only because objection and acceptance have the same 
result: no direct enforcement.  The analysis would similarly support 
the effectiveness of a declaration limiting but not completely barring 
the direct judicial enforceability of the treaty (for example, a declara-
tion specifying that a treaty shall preempt state law but not federal 
law).  But the analysis would not support the effectiveness of attached 
statements seeking to accomplish other ends, even if related to the 
treaty, such as a stipulation that termination of the treaty shall require 
the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Functionally, there appears to be no reason not to treat declarations 
of non-self-execution as valid Percheman stipulations.  As noted, even 
if contained in the body of the treaty, such stipulations are overwhelm-
ingly likely to serve the purely domestic purpose of overriding the Su-
premacy Clause’s default rule.  Declarations of non-self-execution also 
seem to serve the notice-giving function of Percheman stipulations just 
as effectively.375 
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 373 There would be no absurdity in denying effect to a declaration of non-self-execution at-
tached to a treaty that prohibited reservations, see supra note 356, but other arguments support 
the validity of such declarations, see supra p. 681; see also Henkin, supra note 335, and certainly 
the present reductio ad absurdum does not require that such declarations be denied effect. 
 374 “Unilaterally” here means without the agreement of the other parties. 
 375 Cf. supra p. 643 (noting that such stipulations give the other parties notice that legislation 
will be required, thus potentially reducing the friction that would be produced by noncompliance). 
  
684 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 599
The formalist objection remains powerful, but it may be met with a 
formalist response.  Even if declarations of non-self-execution attached 
to a treaty that does not require direct judicial enforcement are not 
technically part of the treaty as a matter of international law, they may 
be considered part of the treaty as a matter of domestic law, because 
they are formally submitted along with the United States’s instruments 
of ratification and its genuine reservations.  This is not to say that the 
President and Senate may accomplish any goal by attaching a declara-
tion to that effect to the United States’s ratifying instruments.  Indeed, 
I argue below that declarations enhancing the domestic effects of trea-
ties are more difficult to justify.  The validity of declarations of non-
self-execution follows from the validity of reservations of non-self-
execution, and this rationale extends only to declarations limiting the 
domestic effect of treaties. 
Because I have overcome the formalist objection by drawing dis-
tinctions not based on form, my analysis may not persuade an uncom-
promising formalist.  But it seems to me to be proper to allow consid-
erations of coherence in the law to influence conclusions with respect 
to form.  Insofar as they are embodied in a formal document approved 
by the President and two-thirds of the Senate and communicated to 
other parties just like reservations (which are indisputably parts of 
treaties), declarations of non-self-execution may plausibly be regarded 
as parts of the treaties to which they relate for purposes of Article VI. 
Whether they can plausibly be so regarded if set forth in the Sen-
ate’s resolution of advice and consent but not communicated to the 
other parties presents a harder question.376  If such declarations are, 
indeed, of “purely domestic” concern, it might be argued that commu-
nicating them to the other parties is unnecessary.  It is clearly not nec-
essary under international law.  But if the need for a stipulation is 
based on its notice-giving function, then communicating it to the other 
parties may be significant as a matter of domestic law.  Indeed, if part 
of the point of the Supremacy Clause was to induce other nations to 
deal with us by “show[ing] the world” that we authorize our courts to 
enforce treaties as we do statutes,377 then the clause would seem to re-
quire that we also tell the world (or at least our treaty partners) if, in a 
particular case, the courts will not have that power.  At the purely 
formal level, regarding such declarations as parts of the treaties for Ar-
ticle VI purposes when not communicated to the other parties would 
seem to stretch the constitutional text to the breaking point, if not be-
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 376 See supra note 318 (noting that the Senate apparently does not contemplate communication 
of recent declarations of self-execution or non-self-execution to other parties). 
 377 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 68, at 490. 
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yond.378  Recognizing declarations as binding in such circumstances 
may thus require the recognition of a new form of federal lawmak-
ing.379  In any event, statements made by the President or other mem-
bers of the executive branch in submitting the treaty to the Senate for 
its consent, or by members of the Senate in rendering its advice and 
consent, cannot be considered parts of treaties by any stretch. 
B.  The Validity of Declarations of Self-Execution 
The foregoing analysis assumed that the Supremacy Clause estab-
lishes a default rule of self-execution that can be overcome only 
through a stipulation of non-self-execution.  If the assumption were re-
versed, the argument for the validity of declarations (this time of self-
execution) would face more powerful objections.  If the Constitution 
were read to establish a default rule of non-self-execution, rebuttable 
only by a clear statement to the contrary, then it is less clear that a 
treaty that neither requires nor prohibits direct judicial enforcement 
can be made directly enforceable by attaching a declaration to that  
effect. 
Presumably, like declarations of non-self-execution, declarations of 
self-execution do not purport to create a treaty obligation of direct en-
forcement, but instead purport to establish as a matter of domestic law 
that the treaty has certain legal effects, such as preempting inconsis-
tent state laws.  Such declarations would be superfluous under the in-
terpretation of the Supremacy Clause defended in Parts I and II.  If 
Medellín were read to establish the opposite default rule, however, the 
declarations would (as the Court in Medellín put it) purport to “make” 
federal law.380  Yet the President and Senate do not have the power to 
make federal law by themselves.  The Constitution gives them the 
power to make law by concluding a treaty with another country, but 
these declarations are not treaties because they do not purport to cre-
ate rights or obligations vis-à-vis the other states-parties.  If the treaty 
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 378 The resolution of advice and consent, as such, reflects only the views of the Senate.  In some 
cases, the President’s agreement will be inferable from his having proposed the declaration in the 
first place; otherwise, we would have to infer it from contemporaneous statements or simply from 
his subsequent ratification of the treaty.  That we would have to piece together various statements 
of the President and Senate, or even draw inferences from his silence, illustrates the difficulty of 
regarding the content of such declarations as part of the treaties to which they relate. 
 379 Such departures can be justified under certain circumstances.  For a defense of such a de-
parture in another context, see Vázquez, infra note 390, at 1635–37.  Given the existence of other 
means of achieving the same result (i.e., declarations deposited with the treaty or, possibly, in-
cluded in the resolution of advice and consent), departing from the original design does not seem 
warranted here. 
 380 The Court in Medellín described the President’s attempt to require the states to comply 
with the ICJ’s judgment in Avena as an act of “law-making,” and struck it down because the 
President alone lacks the power to make law.  Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1369 (2008). 
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itself does not require direct judicial enforcement, the President and 
the Senate can no more require such enforcement than can the Presi-
dent alone. 
Of course, declarations of non-self-execution posed the same diffi-
culties (when examined on the assumption that the default rule was 
self-execution).  Section A concluded that such declarations were valid 
and reconciled this conclusion with the formal requirements for federal 
lawmaking by regarding such declarations as a part of the treaties to 
which they were attached, even though they did not purport to alter 
the United States’s obligations vis-à-vis other states-parties.  Clearly, 
however, a declaration cannot be used by the President and Senate to 
give domestic legal effect to anything they desire.  The declaration 
must, at a minimum, relate to the domestic legal consequences of the 
treaty.  The question is whether this power encompasses the enhance-
ment of the treaty’s domestic legal effects, or just the limitation of its 
domestic effects.  The obstacles to accepting the former appear to be 
more significant than those to accepting the latter. 
The treatymakers’ power to limit a treaty’s domestic legal effect 
follows from the fact that a hypothetical reservation of non-self-
execution would be valid under international law (and hence under 
domestic law) regardless of how the other states-parties reacted to it.  
Because the only difference between a reservation of non-self-
execution and a declaration of non-self-execution is that in the former 
case the parties wanted the treaty to be self-executing, it would be ab-
surd to accept the validity of a reservation but not a declaration.  The 
parallel argument with respect to declarations of self-execution does 
not yield the same conclusion.  A statement of self-execution would be 
a reservation only if attached to a treaty that prohibited direct judicial 
enforcement of the treaty.381  If states did enter into such a treaty, a 
reservation to the effect that the United States shall regard the treaty 
as directly enforceable would be effective only for states that did not 
object.382  If a state objected and specified that it would not allow the 
treaty to come into force between it and the United States, then the 
United States would not be a party to the treaty with respect to that 
state, and hence there would be no international obligation (and hence 
no domestic law power) of direct enforcement as between the United 
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 381 Such a hypothetical treaty is even more difficult to imagine than a treaty requiring direct 
enforcement, since nations would appear to have no reason to insist that their treaty partners pro-
hibit direct enforcement of a treaty.  (The usual rule — that the treaty does not require direct ju-
dicial enforcement — would satisfy any conceivable interest nations might have in exempting 
their own courts from having to enforce the treaty.)  Still, such a treaty is theoretically possible. 
 382 See supra p. 678. 
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States and that state.383  Thus, the result would be the opposite of 
what the declaration sought to accomplish. 
To be sure, states are unlikely to object to a reservation of self-
execution.  But this points to a separate problem with such reserva-
tions.  States are unlikely to object because such a reservation expands 
the United States’s obligations, rather than limiting them.  The pre-
vailing view in international law is that a state’s unilateral statement 
agreeing to expand its obligations under a treaty does not constitute a 
reservation.384  If so, then it would not be a part of the treaty under 
international law, and hence it would not have the force of domestic 
law in the United States by virtue of being part of the treaty. 
This is not to say that such a statement would be without legal ef-
fect under international law.  It is well established that a state’s unilat-
eral actions may give rise to a legal obligation under international 
law.385  But such an obligation is not considered a treaty obligation 
under international law, and thus would have no claim to being the 
supreme law of the land by virtue of being a treaty.  It might be ar-
gued that such an obligation should have the same domestic legal ef-
fect as do rules of customary international law.  But the domestic legal 
force of customary international law is contested,386 and in any event 
there would appear to be a stronger basis for giving domestic effect to 
norms that have arisen through the consistent practice of nations over 
a lengthy period of time than to norms assumed through a single 
statement by the President and Senate. 
Even if such reservations were regarded under international law as 
technically part of the treaties to which they are attached, it is unclear 
that the President and Senate have the power to “make” such treaty 
provisions as a matter of U.S. constitutional law.  It is one thing to 
agree to direct enforcement of a treaty as the price for some agreement 
assumed by the other state-party; it is another to make such a promise 
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 383 See supra p. 678. 
 384 See Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties 
add. 6, ¶ 1.1.5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/491/Add.6 (July 19, 1998) (prepared by Alain Pellet) (statements 
purporting to expand the reserving state’s obligations are not deemed reservations and are not 
governed by the international law on reservations). 
 385 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20) (“It is well recognized that declara-
tions made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations.”); see also Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emer-
gence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87, 122–24 (1991) (discussing unilat-
eral declarations of law). 
 386 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838–41 (1997), and 
Ernest Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 
(2002), with Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human 
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997), and Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
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ex gratia after the treaty has otherwise been negotiated.387  As noted, 
the treaty power is the power to assume international obligations on 
behalf of the United States in exchange for beneficial concessions from 
other states.388 
Even if the treatymakers did have the power to assume an interna-
tional law obligation of direct enforcement through such a statement, it 
does not follow that they can create a domestic law requirement of di-
rect enforcement without creating an international obligation to that 
effect.  We thus return to the question with which we began: is it more 
problematic to recognize a lawmaking power in the treatymakers to 
enhance the domestic effect of treaties than to limit their domestic ef-
fect?  If there is a default rule that treaties are self-executing, then al-
lowing the President and Senate to limit treaties’ domestic effect does 
empower them to make law, in a sense (i.e., a law repealing the treaty’s 
domestic force), but this sort of lawmaking reduces the degree to 
which the treaty produces legal change.  Such lawmaking does im-
pinge upon the constitutional value underlying the Supremacy Clause 
(compliance with treaty obligations), but in a manner not materially 
different from a statement in the treaty itself or a reservation.  On the 
other hand, if there were a default rule that treaties are non-self-
executing, then to allow the President and Senate to make treaties self-
executing would allow them to make law in a more basic sense.  The 
declaration of self-execution would have the effect of displacing exist-
ing state and federal law, thus directly impinging upon the federalism 
and separation of powers values underlying the Constitution’s specifi-
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 387 It is important to note that the effect of a “reservation” of self-execution is not the same as 
the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation of non-self-execution.  (The latter is something the 
President and Senate may well have the power to do on their own.  See RESTATEMENT OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 131, § 314 reporters’ note 4.)  A true reservation not only lim-
its the obligations of the reserving state, but also entitles other states-parties to the benefits of the 
reservation in their relations with the reserving state.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 45, art. 21(b).  Thus, withdrawal of a reservation of non-self-execution (which 
by hypothesis would be attached to a treaty requiring direct enforcement) would entitle us to in-
sist that the other states-parties enforce the treaty directly.  A “reservation” of self-execution 
(whether attached to a treaty that prohibits direct judicial enforcement or to a treaty that merely 
permits but does not require indirect judicial enforcement) would not give us any reciprocal 
rights. 
 388 See supra pp. 659–60.  Perhaps a reservation of self-execution could be defended as an at-
tempt to attain the same benefits for the nation that the Founders sought from the Supremacy 
Clause.  (As discussed above, the Founders gave treaties the force of domestic law in order to 
avoid international friction and to reap the benefits of a reputation for treaty compliance.  See 
supra p. 617.)  If so intended, however, their strategy would be decidedly risky.  While direct judi-
cial enforcement would indeed make it more likely that the United States would comply with the 
underlying substantive obligations, a reservation of self-execution would also create an additional 
treaty obligation of the United States and would thus increase the possibility of a treaty violation.  
A purely domestic rule of direct enforcement, such as originally embodied in the Supremacy 
Clause, would achieve those benefits without risking additional treaty violations. 
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cation of only three forms of federal lawmaking.389  The constitutional 
problems with recognizing a power of the President and Senate to dis-
place state and federal law without meeting the constitutionally speci-
fied procedures for doing so seem significantly more severe than the 
problems with recognizing a power to exempt their acts from having 
such an effect. 
The above rationale for rejecting the validity of declarations of self-
execution assumes that the Constitution establishes non-self-execution 
as the default rule.  Because this assumption is contrary to the original 
design, it may seem odd to insist on strict adherence to the original de-
sign regarding the mechanisms for making federal law.  A default rule 
of non-self-execution combined with a power in the treatymakers to 
declare a treaty self-executing would leave us closer to the original de-
sign than a default rule of non-self-execution without such a power.  
Thus, if the Court were to adopt a default rule of non-self-execution 
despite its inconsistency with text and original meaning, fidelity to the 
original design should lead it to accept as well the treatymakers’ 
power to declare a treaty to be self-executing even though it is a form 
of federal lawmaking not contemplated in the Constitution.390 
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 389 See Clark, supra note 183, at 1324.  A hypothetical may help illustrate the problem: Suppose 
we had a treaty that was declared to be non-self-executing upon ratification, but a later President 
and Senate decided that the treaty should be self-executing and replaced the declaration of non-
self-execution with a declaration of self-execution.  (Such a change would appear to be permissible 
under international law if the treaty itself neither required nor prohibited direct enforcement, 
even if the original declaration was deposited with the instruments of ratification.  Cf. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 22(1) (“Unless the treaty otherwise pro-
vides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time . . . .”).  If the original declaration was not de-
posited with the instruments of ratification, the change would clearly present no issue under in-
ternational law.  Cf. supra note 318 (noting that the Senate does not contemplate the inclusion of 
the new declarations of self-execution with the instruments of ratification).)  The later decision of 
the President and Senate to make a non-self-executing treaty self-executing would have the effect 
of preempting state and federal law that was not preempted when the treaty took force.  Indeed, 
the new declaration would have the precise effect that the Court in Medellín found to be lawmak-
ing and invalid when done by the President alone.  See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1369 
(2008).  Presumably the majority would have the same objection if the lawmaking were done by 
the President with the Senate’s consent but outside the context of treatymaking.  The fact that the 
declaration of self-execution in this example comes after the treaty has come into force and would 
operate to give the treaty domestic effects that it did not have when it entered into force illustrates 
more vividly how the declaration operates as lawmaking.  But a declaration of self-execution op-
erates in the very same way even when it is made at the same time as the treaty.  (If the default 
rule were self-execution, the power to withdraw a declaration of non-self-execution might possibly 
be inferred from the power to declare the treaty non-self-executing, as the withdrawal would give 
the treaty its usual effect under the Supremacy Clause.  If the default rule were non-self-
execution, however, the power to declare a treaty non-self-executing (which would appear to be 
unnecessary) would not support a power to declare it self-executing later.) 
 390 I have criticized on similar grounds the Court’s insistence on bicameralism and presentment 
in rejecting the legislative veto despite its acceptance of broad delegations to the executive 
branch.  In the light of its departure from bicameralism and presentment in the latter context, its 
strict adherence to these requirements in the former context places us, overall, further from the 
original design than if both departures were accepted.  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separa-
tion of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1635–37 (2008); see 
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But the Court in Medellín did not purport to be departing from the 
original design, or even from established precedent.  I argued above 
that the opinion should, for this reason, be interpreted narrowly.  If, in 
the next case, the Court were to adopt a default rule of non-self-
execution (or interpret Medellín as having already done so), it would 
most likely do so without recognizing that it was departing from the 
original design.  Under such circumstances, the Court would be highly 
unlikely to uphold the treatymakers’ power to make federal law 
through declarations of self-execution.391  Its rejection of the legislative 
veto despite very similar grounds for upholding it392 suggests that the 
Court is unlikely to accept a fourth category of federal lawmaking. 
If declarations of self-execution were to be regarded as invalid, the 
resulting inability of the treatymakers to control the domestic conse-
quences of the treaties they conclude would render a default rule of 
non-self-execution normatively unattractive.  In today’s complex 
world, the treatymakers should be able not only to decide between 
self-execution and non-self-execution, but also to consider intermediate 
options.393  Declarations specifying the domestic legal consequences of 
a treaty provide the treatymakers with a mechanism for doing so.  If 
declarations of non-self-execution were valid but declarations of self-
execution invalid, then the treatymakers would have this flexibility 
only if the Constitution were understood to establish a default rule of 
self-execution. 
The invalidity of declarations of self-execution would also 
strengthen the textual/structural case against a default rule of non-self-
execution.  In light of the difficulty of obtaining a stipulation of self-
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also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 
540–43 (1992); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 123, 179–95 (1994).  Similarly, insistence here on strict adherence to the original de-
sign with respect to the exclusivity of the three methods of lawmaking specified in the Constitu-
tion would place us further from the original design, given the Court’s (hypothetical) departure 
from the original design with respect to self-execution.  If the Court were to depart from the 
original design with respect to non-self-execution, faithfulness to the original constitutional struc-
ture would require a corresponding departure with respect to the methods of making federal law. 
 391 It is of course possible, perhaps likely, that the Court will continue to overlook the fact that 
treaties do not have any relevant content on this issue and persist in regarding the question as one 
of treaty interpretation.  If so, it would likely regard declarations of self-execution as pertinent to 
the interpretive enterprise.  Since the treaties themselves are likely to be ambiguous on the point, 
for the reasons discussed in Part II, the declarations are likely to be the only relevant evidence of 
any intent on the question, and so are very likely to be de facto conclusive.  (Indeed, if the Court 
continues to overlook the fact that treaties have no relevant content on this question, even the less 
formal statements of the President or Senate are likely to be conclusive in practice for the same 
reason.)  If so, the Court will have arrived at the second best solution (from the perspective of the 
original design), albeit on the basis of a misconception. 
 392 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); cf. id. at 984–89 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that adherence to original design is untenable in light of acceptance of broad delegations of power 
to the executive branch). 
 393 See supra note 322. 
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execution in the treaty itself, adoption of such a default rule would be 
tantamount to adopting the British rule with respect to multilateral 
treaties.  Because it would almost certainly be more difficult to get the 
other parties to agree on such a stipulation than to get the House to 
pass implementing legislation, the executive branch would be likely to 
give up on self-execution.  The benefits of self-execution would not be 
worth the trouble of satisfying the requirements for achieving self-
execution.  That such a default rule would resurrect, for today’s most 
important type of treaty, the rule the Founders specifically rejected, is 
yet another reason to conclude that this is not the rule our Constitution 
establishes. 
The plausibility of an interpretation of our Constitution as effec-
tively adopting the British rule for multilateral treaties is reduced fur-
ther by another aspect of our constitutional structure: the availability 
of an alternative process for making international agreements.394  Arti-
cle II provides for the making of treaties by the President with the 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.  The Founders deliberately ex-
cluded the House from the treatymaking process.395  The Supremacy 
Clause reflects a parallel decision not to make the consent of the 
House a precondition for judicial enforcement.  The consent of a su-
permajority of the Senate was deemed an adequate substitute.396  
Adoption of the British rule would make the consent of a supermajor-
ity of the Senate an additional requirement rather than a substitute 
(since implementation would require the concurrence of the House).  
Requiring the consent of both a supermajority of the Senate and a ma-
jority of the House would not be irrational (although it does not ap-
pear to have been the Founders’ intent); it would reflect a desire to 
make it much more difficult to enter into international agreements 
than to make ordinary laws.  But today it is well accepted that the Ar-
ticle II procedure for making international agreements is not exclusive.  
Most international agreements can also be made by the President with 
the consent of a majority of both Houses.397  Given the availability of 
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 394 This is a structural argument rather than one based on original design because the emer-
gence of the congressional-executive agreement process as an alternative mechanism for approv-
ing most international agreements is a comparatively recent phenomenon.  See Bruce Ackerman 
& David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 889–97 (1995) (arguing that 
congressional-executive agreements became part of our Constitution through an informal consti-
tutional amendment that took force in the 1940s). 
 395 See Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1277–78 (2008). 
 396 See James Madison, Letter of Helvidius No. 1 (Aug.–Sept. 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 138, 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (“In this particular case, a concurrence of 
two-thirds at least is made necessary, as a substitute or compensation for the other branch of the 
legislature, which, on certain occasions, could not be conveniently a party to the transaction.”). 
 397 See generally Hathaway, supra note 395 (defending the use of congressional-executive agree-
ments for entering into international agreements and arguing that this means should replace the 
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this alternative procedure, adoption of the British rule would render 
the Article II procedure superfluous.  Why use a procedure requiring a 
supermajority of the Senate and a majority of the House, when a ma-
jority of both Houses will do? 
Even without adoption of the British rule, the possibility of making 
international agreements as congressional-executive agreements has 
been thought to reduce the significance of the Article II treatymaking 
procedure.398  But, if the Article II process remained available as a re-
alistic mechanism for concluding treaties enforceable without legisla-
tive implementation, it would at least continue to be relevant as an al-
ternative procedure for treatymaking.  Adoption of the British rule, 
however, does seem to make the Article II process superfluous.  That 
this default rule would make the treatymaking process specified in the 
Constitution superfluous with respect to the most important category 
of treaty is additional evidence of its implausibility as an interpretation 
of the Constitution.399 
If declarations of self-execution and of non-self-execution were both 
valid, then from the perspective of constitutional design the choice of 
default rule would be a complex undertaking.  Before Medellín, schol-
ars argued that the treatymakers’ tendency to attach declarations of 
non-self-execution to human rights treaties reflected their preference 
for non-self-execution,400 and that this preference, in turn, justified a 
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Senate ratification process entirely).  The option of a congressional-executive agreement is un-
available for agreements that address matters beyond Congress’s legislative power under Article I.  
See id. at 1338–49. 
 398 See id. at 1307. 
 399 Notwithstanding the above analysis, the Article II process for making international agree-
ments is unlikely to die out anytime soon.  Over the past two hundred–plus years, numerous tra-
ditions and practices have accrued around the Article II treatymaking process that will continue 
to affect the behavior of the three branches.  Presidential attempts to steer the process of making 
international agreements to the easier congressional-executive route might lead a Senate that is 
proprietary about its role in treatymaking (or, more likely, Senators with particular responsibilities 
for treaties) to scuttle treaties it may otherwise favor, or to retaliate in other ways (such as in the 
appointments process).  Such attempts may inspire turf battles not just between the Senate and 
the House, but also among Senate Committees, since Article II treaties are handled by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee whereas congressional-executive agreements are handled by the 
committees having responsibility for the subject matter of the agreement.  See Hathaway, supra 
note 395, at 1315.  Thus, it may be some time before theoretical superfluity becomes actual desue-
tude.  My argument here operates mainly at the more abstract structural level: A process effec-
tively requiring the agreement of the President, a majority of the House, and two-thirds of the 
Senate makes little sense if an alternative process exists requiring the agreement of the President, 
a majority of the House, and only a majority of the Senate. 
 400 See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-
Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 515 (1991) (noting 
that declarations of non-self-execution are “manifestations of Senatorial reluctance to affect inter-
nal U.S. law by means of treaties, and, more generally, [of] neo-isolationist preferences for shield-
ing U.S. institutions from international trends”).  In addition to the declarations of non-self-
execution attached to human rights treaties, these commentators cite the statutes that limit the 
enforceability of such international agreements as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agree-
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default rule of non-self-execution.401  It is far from clear, however, that 
the treatymakers have an overall preference for non-self-execution.  
Since Medellín was decided, the Senate has given its consent to more 
treaties with declarations of self-execution than with declarations of 
non-self-execution.402  The above analysis suggests that the President’s 
choice to pursue the Article II route to approval of an international 
agreement reflects a desire that the agreement (or at least some  
of its provisions) be self-executing.403  The pre-Medellín declarations  
of non-self-execution may just reflect the treatymakers’ pre-Medellín  
understanding that the Constitution established a default rule of  
self-execution. 
If we could be confident about the treatymakers’ likely preferences 
overall, or with respect to particular types of treaties, we would then 
have to determine whether the appropriate default rule is the one that 
aligns with those preferences.  While it may seem self-evident that the 
rule that aligns with those preferences is the better one,404 in certain 
circumstances it may be advisable to choose the opposite rule.  With 
respect to Foster-type self-execution, the optimal result would be for 
the treatymakers to deliberate about the domestic consequences of the 
treaties they conclude and resolve the issues themselves — not just be-
cause such a resolution is more democratic but also because it can 
yield a more fine-grained result.405  The default rule most likely to in-
duce the treatymakers to deliberate and resolve this question may well 
be the one that would produce the result the treatymakers would not 
choose in most cases.406  “[Clear statement rules] can be thought of as 
deliberation-forcing or democracy-forcing.”407  If the conditions for the 
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ments and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  North American Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. ch. 21 (2006); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 
U.S.C. ch. 22 (2006). 
 401 Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 64, at 2252–53. 
 402 See supra p. 669. 
 403 If the concurrence of the House will be necessary anyway, as it would be with respect to 
non-self-executing treaties that require implementation, the President would pursue the process 
requiring only a majority of the Senate, everything else being equal.  For the reasons discussed 
supra note 399, however, an analysis of the President’s actual incentives in deciding between the 
Article II process and the Article I process would be exceedingly complex and would likely change 
over time. 
 404 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1433 (1989). 
 405 See supra note 322. 
 406 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing the concept of “penalty defaults”: the 
setting of default rules at what a party would not want in order to encourage parties to contract 
around the rule and affirmatively choose the provision they do want); Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2242–43 (2002). 
 407 Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 686 
(1999). 
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choice of a deliberation-forcing rule were met here (a question beyond 
the scope of this Article), and the treatymakers did have an overall 
preference for non-self-execution, then a default rule of self-execution 
would be the preferable one. 
Of course, from the perspective of constitutional design, we would 
probably not be discussing the appropriate default rule for determining 
the domestic consequences of an Article II treaty.  For a constitution-
writer, a broader set of options would be on the table, including 
whether to retain the Article II process for making treaties at all,408 
and whether to adopt something resembling the British rule.  We are 
focusing on the question of the appropriate default rule because we are 
construing the Constitution we have, not one that we might like to 
have.  I have argued that the Supremacy Clause establishes our default 
rule by declaring that treaties have the force of domestic law.  For the 
reasons set forth above, the best reading of this clause is as establish-
ing a default rule that treaties are self-executing in the sense contem-
plated by Foster, rebuttable by a clear statement in the treaty itself or 
in a declaration limiting their domestic effect. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Constitution establishes a straight-
forward rule regarding the judicial enforcement of treaties.  By declar-
ing treaties to have the force of law, the Supremacy Clause makes 
them enforceable in the courts in the same circumstances as statutory 
and constitutional provisions of like content.  The Founders under-
stood that treaties were contracts between nations that, on the interna-
tional plane, depended on interest and honor for their efficacy.  In or-
der to avoid international friction that might lead to war and to 
capture the benefits of a reputation for treaty compliance, they made 
treaties enforceable in our courts as a matter of domestic constitutional 
law.  The single exception to the requirement of equivalent treatment 
concerns treaties that are non-self-executing in the sense contemplated 
by Foster v. Neilson.  The Court’s subsequent decision in United 
States v. Percheman is best read to have recognized a presumption 
that treaties are self-executing in this sense, rebuttable by a clear 
statement in the treaty that the obligations imposed by the treaty are 
subject to legislative implementation.  The recent decision in Medellín 
v. Texas is best understood as an example of an entirely different kind 
of non-self-execution. 
With respect to bilateral treaties, the Percheman clear statement 
rule leaves matters largely within the control of the U.S. treatymakers.  
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 408 The United States is unusual in having a process for making treaties that differs from the 
process for making statutes.  See Hathaway, supra note 395, at 1272. 
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With respect to multilateral treaties, however, the Percheman rule 
would likely pose significant practical problems for treatymakers seek-
ing to control the domestic legal consequences of the treaties they ne-
gotiate (an important power in today’s complex world).  A hypothetical 
presumption of non-self-execution would be even more problematic 
from this perspective.  Recognition of the treatymakers’ power to con-
trol the domestic effects of a treaty through a clear statement in a “dec-
laration” attached to the treaty would significantly alleviate the prob-
lems.  I conclude that declarations of non-self-execution would be 
valid if the default rule were self-execution, but declarations of self-
execution would be less likely to be upheld if the default rule were 
non-self-execution.  If the declaration mechanism were only available 
in the former context, a default rule of self-execution — the rule that 
coheres best with the Constitution’s text and structure and with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on the subject — would also be norma-
tively preferable. 
